An Exploratory Investigation of Stakeholders\u27 Perceptions of Political Leaders\u27 Behavior and Outcomes by Piatt, Edward S.
Olivet Nazarene University
Digital Commons @ Olivet
Ed.D. Dissertations School of Graduate and Continuing Studies
5-2011
An Exploratory Investigation of Stakeholders'
Perceptions of Political Leaders' Behavior and
Outcomes
Edward S. Piatt
Olivet Nazarene University, epiatt@olivet.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd_diss
Part of the American Politics Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Public Policy Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Graduate and Continuing Studies at Digital Commons @ Olivet. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Ed.D. Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Olivet. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@olivet.edu.
Recommended Citation
Piatt, Edward S., "An Exploratory Investigation of Stakeholders' Perceptions of Political Leaders' Behavior and Outcomes" (2011).
Ed.D. Dissertations. 65.
https://digitalcommons.olivet.edu/edd_diss/65
AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF 
POLITICAL LEADERS’ BEHAVIOR AND OUTCOMES 
 
by 
Edward S. Piatt 
 
Dissertation  
 
Submitted to the Faculty of 
Olivet Nazarene University 
School of Graduate and Continuing Studies 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Education 
in 
Ethical Leadership 
 
May 2011 

 i 
© 2011 
 Edward S. Piatt  
All Rights Reserved
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank my mentor, advisor, and friend, Dr. Donald D. Daake, for 
inspiring me to tackle a project that seemed overwhelming at first. Through his constant 
feedback and useful insights, I was able to develop a profound comprehension and 
knowledge that substantially added to the body of knowledge in the field of stakeholder 
theory and agency theory, and thereby, apply it to the political realm. Without his 
wisdom and dedication to this process, it would not have been possible for me to 
complete my doctoral journey. I am forever indebted to his patience with me.  
I would also like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Paul Koch, the second member of 
my dissertation team, whose insightful knowledge of economics added another critical 
dimension to my research.
 iii 
DEDICATION 
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Gary and Rose Marie 
Piatt, both of whom encouraged me to pursue my education, serve others, and act 
ethically. Without my parent’s encouragement, I would have not been able to complete 
this doctoral journey. Through my parents love and love for God, I rest on my favorite 
biblical verse from Isaiah 41:10. Fear not, for I am with you; be not dismayed, for I am 
your God; I will strengthen you, I will help you, I will uphold you with my righteous 
right hand. 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
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May 2011  
Major Area: Ethical Leadership Number of Words: 120 
 
This was an exploratory and descriptive study on stakeholders’ perceptions of political 
leaders’ behavior and outcomes. A purposeful sample comprised of 471 respondents 
whom were highly engaged in the political process was conducted on five distinct 
stakeholder groups, consisting of government employees, elected officials, union-
building trades, business professionals, and college students. Two emergent results were 
indentified: political party affiliation was a major indicator of stakeholder differences, 
and the inversion of agency theory. Contributing factors of the inversion of agency theory 
whereby a political agent begins to acts as a principle have led the researcher to develop 
the Corrupt-Unethical Behavior (CUB) model. Future research would focus more on the 
salient differences between political party affiliations rather than differences between 
stakeholder groups. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Thomas Jefferson (third President of the United States from 1801-1809) stated, 
“Whenever a man cast a longing eye on office, a rottenness begins in his conduct” (as 
cited in Fitzhenry, 1993, p. 353). Nikita Khrushchev (First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union from 1953-1964) said, “Politicians are the same all over. They 
promise to build a bridge even where there is no river” (as cited in Fitzhenry, p. 351). 
Finally, Ronald Reagan (40
th
 US President of the United States from 1981-1989) was 
often quoted as saying, “Politics is supposed to be the second oldest profession, I have 
come to realize that it bears a very close resemblance to the first” (as cited in Fitzhenry, 
p. 355).  
 In looking at the social framework and individuals pursuing rational self-interest, 
Adam Smith, who is referred as the patriarch of economics and noted author of  “The 
Wealth of Nations,” expressed his central premise of free market belief in the year 1776: 
The public interest is often best served by allowing individuals to pursue their own self- 
interest. However, Smith assumed that self-interest would be constrained by what he 
described as the “moral sentiments”. In the 21st century (2010), this carries a quite 
different connotation in the field of public policy, and further evidence suggests that 
ethical failings of political leaders incur considerable social and economic costs to 
society. 
 What common themes do the insights into politics of these two famous former 
U.S. Presidents, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Adam Smith’s share: the 
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belief that politicians are often seen as corrupt, unethical, and often promoting self-
serving interest behaviors over those of their constituents? Through the course of time, 
politics often carries a negative connotation where the self–interest behavior of the 
political leader is often greater than the common pursuit of good governance. 
 Ideally, in a democracy, public officials (trustees) are elected to represent their 
constituents (various stakeholder groups) and not to pursue a course of personal private 
gain. Economists describe this process as a principal-agent problem, [italics added] when 
trustees abandon their obligations and misuse the power delegated to them in ways that 
advance their own personal agenda or interests rather than those of the public whom they 
were elected to represent. Principal-agency theory was first advanced to describe 
behavior in business organizations, but can be applied across all organizations and 
especially political organizations. There is often confusion just who is the principal and 
who is the agent? In a democratic system, according to political theory, the agent is the 
politician and the stakeholder is the principal. Stakeholders elect the politician to 
represent their interests and pursue good governance policies. However, too often, 
turning agency theory on its’ head, the politician, assumes the role of the principal, which 
can cause political corruption when political leaders pursue their own self-interests and 
not that of the stakeholders who elected them. 
 Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested former Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich for allegedly trying to sell an Illinois United States Senate 
seat. The former governor was subsequently impeached by the Illinois House and 
removed from office by the Illinois Senate in December 2009. The former governor 
removed from the highest office in Illinois has provided much fodder for news stations 
across the country and has brought shame and disgust from citizens across the country 
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and even the world. What does this say about Illinois politicians and citizen’s perceptions 
of corruption? 
 Consequently, a Sunday Chicago Tribune headlined the front page with “A 
history of insatiable greed” (Sector, 2009, p. A1). Furthermore, “We have put an 
impressive collection of cheats and boodlers into public office over the decades, and the 
public outcry has never led to more than a token crackdown of government” (p. A1). As 
such, “No-bid contracts get inflated to cover the cost of campaign cash needed to grease 
them. Public jobs too often go to the connected and lazy instead of the brightest and most 
eager” (p. A1). We all pay the cost of corruption and illegal dealings from unethical and 
corrupt politicians who seek their own self-interests and personal gain over those of the 
electorate. 
 Illinois politicians and citizens are calling for changing the culture of corruption 
that has pervaded the state of Illinois for so long. Changing the culture of corruption will 
mean recognizing that our elected political leaders have cheated us as much by favors as 
by fraud. According to a University of Illinois at Chicago political scientist, over 1,000 
public officials and businessman have been convicted of public corruption in Illinois 
since 1970 (Sector, 2009, p. A2). Cindi Canary, director of the Illinois Campaign for 
Political Reform, publically stated, “The social compact of this state was built on 
corruption” (p. A2). 
 What then are the consequences of this perverse and corrupt behavior that seems 
inextricably linked to Illinois politics? It has long been presumed by Illinois state 
lawmakers that they are not bound by some of the laws imposed on other Illinois public 
bodies, which force them to do their work in the open and not in secret.  
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This apparent lack of ethics in good governance further promoted the culture of 
corruption in Illinois. If the citizens do not know what state lawmakers are doing in 
private then how can they are held accountable if not caught.  
 As a result, a recent Chicago Tribune poll conducted in February 2009 indicated 
that nearly two-thirds of Illinois voters said they consider Illinois among the more corrupt 
states in the nation. In addition, the respondents of the poll indicated at a low margin of 
43% that reform is likely to end corruption. However, voters in the same poll were 
sharply divided when asked what would curb political corruption,  they replied that with 
greater access to government records and term limits for politicians at the top this would 
limit corruption (Pierson & Kidwell, 2009, p. A4)   
 Finally, four individuals interviewed by the Chicago Tribune as appeared in the 
February 15, 2008, story had this to say, Emily Riehl, 24 years old, stated, “Money is 
such a huge factor in deciding all elections, which is what all these scandals show us” 
(Sector, 2009, p. A4). Lorraine Hanschke, 87 years old said, “They think they own the 
job when they are there that long, and they get too much power” (p. A4). Robert 
Boerman, 38 years old stated, “People and corporations that donate a lot of money 
obviously are expecting something in return, and it becomes very hard for a politician not 
to do it” (p. A4). Reggie Alston, 42 years old said, “We need to be able to look into the 
books and the bidding and all that. If all of it was open the people who watch this stuff 
could find out about it, and the people who do it would be more afraid of getting caught” 
(p. A4 ).  
Consequently, this sets the stage for the researcher’s study of corruption and the 
perceptions of the electorate. The culture of corruption and its consequences such as 
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hidden taxes, bad governance, and unethical, corrupt, and illegal activities make the 
citizens more cynical and less likely to trust government officials.  
 An example of this dilemma is the current Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. 
For weeks, pressure has been mounting in Congress to approve additional domestic oil 
drilling, but House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has held the line. She has used her power to 
block a vote on offshore drilling for which in a new CNN/Opinion Research poll released 
in early August, 2008, found that 69 % of Americans favor more offshore drilling, while 
30 % oppose it. However, Pelosi’s constituents in San Francisco might be likely to 
oppose this action. “In a private meeting last week, according to some in attendance, 
Pelosi told members of her leadership team that a decision to relent on the coastal ban 
would amount to capitulation to Republicans and the White House” (Coile, 2008, p. A5). 
Pelosi attributed today's energy problems to “a failure of the Bush administration to 
develop a comprehensive approach, its ties to the industry and a mishandling of 
the economy" (p. A5). "A solid majority of Americans want us to have more drilling for 
more American-made energy, and they aren't going to take no for an answer," (p. A5), 
stated House Minority Leader John Boehner, R-Ohio. While a special session is unlikely, 
Boehner made clear that his party plans to use the issue as a bludgeon against democrats 
throughout the five-week August recess. Boehner said Thursday. "Speaker Pelosi, 
Senators (Harry) Reid and (Barack) Obama are defying the will of the American people, 
and they're doing so at their own risk" (p. A5). Boehner accused the speaker of using 
procedural maneuvers to thwart votes on expanding drilling; a position he said would 
prevail if the moment arrived. “Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi are standing in the way of 
what American people want,” (p. A5). 
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 While one might argue the merits of oil drilling, this display of Speaker Pelosi’s 
action illustrates principal-agency theory at work. By ignoring the pleas of her 
constituents (the principal) Speaker Pelosi is pursuing actions as if she was the principal 
while she is in fact an agent of the stakeholders. She is ignoring the pleas of those who 
elected her to pursue good governance. While there is no evidence of wrongdoing on the 
part of the Speaker, it does illustrate a potential flaw or pitfall of modern representative 
democracy. Specifically, the problem of who works for whom, or in agency theory 
parlance just who is the principal and whom is the agent (Piatt, 2009). 
 
 Consistent with the above, Illinois Speaker Michael J. Madigan and President of 
the Illinois Senate, John J. Cullerton, wrote a letter to Illinois citizens after the 
impeachment and removal from office of Governor Blagojevich, for trying to sell a U.S. 
Senate seat, stating, 
The legitimacy of democratic government is dependent entirely upon the public’s 
expectation that elected officials will remain mindful of the sacred trust that has been 
placed in them. We expect elected officials to act in the best interests of their fellow 
citizens, free from considerations of personal gain. We intend to move swiftly to put 
this dark period in our state’s history behind us and take steps to insure that it never 
happens again. (Madigan & Cullerton, 2009, p. A7)  
At an extreme level, some public officials behave in ways that erode the public’s 
faith in political institutions by exhibiting behavior that maximizes their personal gain. 
Selling their votes to special interests groups in exchange for campaign contributions, 
favoritism, nepotism, back-room deals, racketeering, mail fraud, and accepting bribes are 
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all forms of unethical and often illegal activities public official can engage in (Piatt, 
2009). 
 The costs of corruption and/or unethical behavior can be significant and affect not 
only good governance and public policy, but raises the costs of doing the public’s 
business (Piatt, 2009). Corruption affects and reduces the efficiency of both public and 
private enterprise. Taxpayers incur higher costs and are assessed higher fees for 
government services and programs to subsidize corrupt and unethical behaviors of 
political leaders (Piatt).  
 According to Piatt (2009), ethics and corruption are prominent subjects in today’s 
society driven by the constant stream of newspaper, radio, internet, and television 
reporting of political scandals. The public is often confused over the concepts of 
unethical behavior, corrupt behavior, and illegal behavior (Piatt).  
 There are clear definitions in the literature of what constitutes illegal political 
activities and behavior, but various stakeholder groups frequently perceive the concepts 
of unethical and corrupt behavior differently. This researcher distinguished these 
perceived differences between illegal activities, unethical, and corrupt activities by 
measuring these dimensions in the survey with the various stakeholder groups and 
political leaders (Piatt, 2009). The researcher has postulated that differences in 
demographics among stakeholder groups will vary based on age, race, political 
affiliation, union affiliation, religion, education levels, and media exposure. In addition, 
the stakeholders’ interaction and methods of communication with an elected official can 
also affect or influence the level of perceptions regarding corrupt or unethical behavior 
(Piatt). As well, does non-communication or the inability to interact with political leaders 
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influence perceptions and if so, how can those perceptions be aligned with 
communication strategies to overcome incorrect biases or correct unethical behavior? 
 Consequently, the researcher is advancing a proposed Model of Corrupt –
Unethical Behavior (CUB) - Figure 1 to describe and differentiate the differences 
between unethical, corrupt, and corrupt-illegal behavior (Piatt, 2009). This model 
advances the notion of concentric circles of unethical behavior. Political leaders can 
move throughout the various circles. The nucleus of the inner circles (corrupt-illegal 
behavior); is the most severe form of mistrust and criminal behavior.  
 From this viewpoint, the researcher is postulating that political leaders who 
violate the principal-agency theory and begin to exhibit unethical behavior can easily 
move to the next level of corrupt behavior (Piatt, 2009). If not checked, they can 
eventually move to corrupt-illegal behavior as exhibited in the former governor George 
Ryan corruption case and described in the following section of corruption in Illinois.  
 The researcher has developed the CUB Model to identify the stages of unethical 
and corrupt behavior. As the model indicates, once a political leader or elected official 
moves from ethical to unethical behavior a pattern usually emerges (Piatt, 2009). The 
ideal place to remain on the CUB model is to remain in the ethical realm, outside of the 
first circle, and not enter into corrupt behavior. This model indicates the problems 
associated with unethical behavior, which can lead to corrupt behavior and then corrupt-
illegal behavior (Piatt). 
(A) = Unethical behavior all of which is contained in all of the three circles. 
(B) = Unethical Behavior, plus corrupt behavior, which is everything but illegal 
 behavior. 
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(C) = Unethical behavior + corrupt behavior + corrupt illegal behavior, is the most  
severe form of corruption, which leads to indictments and prison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
  Figure 1. Corrupt-unethical behavior (CUB) model. 
 
A) Unethical behavior. Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral   
 
 or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct  
 
(Sharpe, 1993). 
B) Corruption. Is an elected official’s concealed private, for gain, appropriation of a 
public right (which may include monetary reward, power, special favors to family and 
friends, and possible re-election to their current office or higher office) - (Rose-
Ackerman 1975; Shleifer & Vishney, 1993; Treisman 2000). 
C) Corrupt-illegal behavior. Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational 
gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), as well as conduct by an organization that is proscribed 
and punishable by criminal, civil, or regulatory law (Braithwaite, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 
2009). 
 Measuring corruption is often difficult and there have been some attempts to try 
to capture this phenomenon. Measuring corruption is conducted on a worldwide level 
through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Transparency International (2007) has 
(A) Unethical Behavior 
 (B) Corrupt Behavior = (A +B) 
    (C)  Corrupt – Illegal  
          Behavior= 
(A+B+C)            
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published an annual CPI- Index ordering the countries of the world according to the 
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. 
The poll covered 180 countries in their 2007 survey. The U.S. ranked 20
th
 out of 179 
countries in the 2002-2007 Worldwide Corruption Perceptions ranking of countries.  
 While global corruption indexes have been formulated to compare countries, 
surprisingly, little or no research has been done at the state or local level. In addition, 
virtually no researcher has looked at perceptual differences between and among 
stakeholders regarding corruption/unethical behavior and those of political leaders. 
Furthermore, no one has studied the effects relating to good governance.  
 Corruption in Illinois 
 The focus of this dissertation is looking at corruption and unethical behavior of 
political leaders at the state level and how stakeholders perceive corrupt and unethical 
behavior. Former governor George H. Ryan clearly illustrates the critical importance of 
the highest-ranking state official engaging in illegal, corrupt, and unethical behavior and 
seeking his self-serving interests over those who elected him.   
 On December 17, 2003, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald issued this statement to 
Illinois citizens,  
 
Former Illinois Gov. George H. Ryan, Sr., was indicted by a federal grand jury on 
racketeering conspiracy, mail and tax fraud and false statements charges alleging 
public corruption during his terms as Illinois Secretary of State from 1991 to 1999 
and as Governor from 1999 to 2003. Ryan and certain of his associates allegedly 
engaged in a pattern of corruption that included performing official government 
acts, awarding lucrative government contracts and leases, and using the resources 
of the State of Illinois for the personal and financial benefit of Ryan, members of 
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his family, his campaign organization, and certain associates. (Fitzgerald, 2003, 
p.1) 
The Chicago Tribune reported that after a prolonged and lengthy trial, former 
Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., Illinois’ 39th governor, was convicted on April 17, 2006 
on sweeping federal corruption charges of wielding power to help himself and his friends. 
(Connor & Bush, 2006, para.1) Ryan was found guilty on all 18 counts of steering state 
business to cronies for bribes, gutting corruption-fighting efforts to protect political 
fundraising and misusing state resources for political gain. U.S. Attorney Patrick 
Fitzgerald called Ryan’s quashing of investigations into the sale of driver’s licenses for 
bribes as secretary of state a low–water mark for public service (para. 5).  
In brief remarks after the verdict was announced, Ryan said he was disappointed 
with the jury’s decision but confident he would be vindicated on appeal. On May 27, 
2008, the United State Supreme Court announced it has refused to hear former Gov. 
George Ryan’s appeal of his racketeering and fraud conviction. Ryan’s only hope for 
release from prison now is a possible clemency order by the president. “Mr. Ryan has 
exhausted every legal avenue and argument afforded him but the verdict stands that he 
was guilty of corrupting the highest office in the state,” (Fitzgerald, 2008, as cited in 
Court, 2009). 
 U.S. Attorney Fitzgerald stated, “The former governor is serving a six ½-year 
sentence imposed by Judge Pallmeyer at the correction center in Terre Haute, Indiana. 
Ryan’s attorney, another former GOP Illinois Governor, Jim Thompson, said he still 
believes Ryan’s conviction on fraud and racketeering was the result of an unfair trial. But 
Thompson knows there’s only one way to cut Ryan’ prison term now. Thompson stated, 
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“We recognize that the judicial process has come to an end for former Governor Ryan 
and there will be no more court review,” (Parker, 2008, para. 5, as cited in 
www.abclocal.go.com). “In my opinion, the next step is to ask the President of the United 
State for executive clemency” (Parker, para. 5). In a final statement, Thompson said, “His 
career is gone. His reputation is gone.” (Parker, para. 8). Former Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Zachary F. Fardon who is now in private practice stated after the Ryan conviction, “when 
defendants are charged and they are convicted by overwhelming evidence and it is in the 
context where the public trust was manipulated and violated then I think the conviction 
should stand” (Court, 2009, para. 27). 
The Ryan case illustrates that unethical behavior and political corruption is a 
prominent issue in Illinois. Based on the news stories over the last 20-30 years, it exists at 
the highest levels and exists in the bureaucracy of state government. It is also a problem 
at the county, city, and township levels. Unethical behavior and even corruption occurs 
when the agent (politician) assumes the role of principal and supersedes his own private 
interest over those of the public’s. The reporting by the media of the Ryan case and 
others throughout Illinois indicates the necessity of stakeholders having accurate and 
complete information to evaluate how their elected political leaders behave in an illegal, 
corrupt, or unethical way when they believe the public does not monitor their actions. 
Nevertheless, stakeholders themselves have a variety of interests, values, and agendas. 
Therefore, the researcher hypothesized that the perceptions of various stakeholders might 
be quite different.  
 For example, what one stakeholder might consider unethical, another might 
perceive as okay since the political leader is just doing his (her) job in serving their 
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interests. Virtually, to date, no researcher has conducted studies looking at this 
phenomenon. This researcher will examine this phenomenon, describe, and delineate 
these differences. 
Costs of Corruption 
 Political corruption is like the common cold. It is persistent and society often 
treats the symptoms and not the disease. It exists at all levels of government and all types 
of public office holders. Television, internet, newspapers, and radio report daily on 
corruption and public scandals. This occurrence of corruption and scandals of unethical 
behavior raises important issues for society. Bollens and Schmandt (1979) asked the 
question, what is the reaction of citizens to the continual exposure of wrongdoing by their 
elected officials: disbelief, indignation, indifference, cynicism. Has society failed to move 
more determinedly against the abuse of public trust and does the media tend to 
exaggerate the problem and in doing so, create the impression that most officials are 
dishonest?  
 Most citizens believe that political corruption is a personal failing of the 
individual public servant, which is often reinforced by the press with its focus on 
individuals prosecuted on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, an individual’s understanding 
is not always sufficient in explaining public corruption (Maxwell & Winters, 2004). If the 
corruption of public officials is unevenly distributed or skewed to certain states, then 
some states will exhibit higher percentages of this public bad [italics added] than others 
will. Therefore, specific conditions must act to elevate or reduce rates of public 
wrongdoing (Maxwell & Winters). 
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In 1966, Wilson argued that state governments are more susceptible to public 
corruption when compared to local governments or the wealthier federal government. 
The federal government appears to have a higher level of professionalism. He postulated 
that national politicians are subject to higher levels of intense scrutiny by the abundance 
of national press and television reporting organizations, which historically are more 
professional and skilled compared to state and local press. In addition, he argued there are 
interests that are more prevalent and watchdog groups monitor corruption.  
 Wilson (1966) contended states are more uniquely prone to corruption and offered 
the notion that state officials may be subject to less voter scrutiny because each voter has 
limited access to information regarding the daily actions or behaviors of state officials. 
However, recent events, as illustrated by the Ryan case, show this might be changing. In 
Illinois for example, higher levels of accountability might be occurring due to increased 
media attention regarding recent corrupt behavior at the state, county, and local levels. 
Regardless, if corruption is higher at the federal or state level, there is no doubt; given the 
recent events, that corruption is a major issue in Illinois. However, state government also 
delivers a different mix of goods and services than the federal government.  
 Corruption is often viewed through stakeholders’ lenses of officials’ concealed- 
knowledge. Again, as illustrated in the Ryan case, stakeholders had incomplete and 
inaccurate information of what the agent was doing on their behalf, and the agent’s 
actions benefited him personally over those of the stakeholders. This allows the agent the 
potential for gain appropriation of a public right.  
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Gunnar Myrdal approximated the links between public officials and corruption: 
there is high value associated with officials’ control over the power to positive, or 
negative affect and coerce individuals (Maxwell & Winters, 2004). Myrdal’s contention 
is consistent with agency theory and information asymmetry. 
 Unethical and corrupt behavior has many economic costs associated with it in 
both economic and non-economic terms. For example, non-economic costs such as 
cynicisms, low voter turnout, and lack of interest in the political process, affect the entire 
culture. Economic costs such as higher taxes, hazardous public works projects (bid 
rigging), and lower quality service from public employees (ghost pay rolling, favoritism, 
and nepotism) reduce the overall efficiency of government. 
 One of the most important consequences of corruption is the net effect it has 
regarding the public economic welfare. Corruption has been described as an illegal tax on 
citizens. Corruption increases the cost of public activity of which the government has not 
formally approved. Corruption also has implications relating to transaction costs and the 
insidious and illegal behaviors multiply to address the cover-up. The public often accepts 
at face value the outcomes of politicians’ actions, but citizens have intense doubts about 
the quality of the process and who paid whom, how often, how much, and when, in order 
to get something done or not done (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). In addition, as 
predicted by agency theory, the public is not in a good position to judge because of 
informational asymmetry.  
 Smith (1914) once again showed keen insight into these issues in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, which he indicated that to have a civil society one must have moral 
constraints that place socially appropriate limits on individual action. This moral 
constraint is the law of the land, which constrains individuals to make our social and 
 16 
economic economy work. This certainly applies to citizens and politicians alike. 
 Interestingly enough, the State of Illinois ranks fifth
   
in corruption according to a 
report released by the Corporate Crime Reporter (2004) at the National Press Club, 
Washington D.C. As indicated earlier, because both the profound economic and non-
economic effects of unethical and corrupt behavior a more sophisticated understanding of 
the public’s perception and understanding of this behavior is needed.  
Corruption is prevalent and pervasive in Illinois’s political structure. Because of 
this, perceptions of corruption become an important factor to evaluate and define how 
political behavior (ethical or unethical) is observed and tolerated within the fabric of 
organizational politics and public policy issues. 
 Organizations can be seen through the lenses of politics. Political patterns are 
comprised of competing interests, conflicts, and power. We can see how organizations 
become politicized because of divergent interests of individuals and groups. Conflict is a 
natural property in every organization. Many skilled political leaders recognize the 
continuous interplay between competing interests and utilizing conflicts as a positive 
force (Morgan, 1998). 
Morgan (1998) stated, “Organizational politics arises when people think 
differently and want to act differently when confronted with alternative paths of action. 
Diversity creates a tension that must be resolved through political means” (p. 152). In 
addition, every individual’s personal interests may be viewed in a political context as we 
recognize the existence of other stakeholders with differing agendas. Morgan further 
elaborated that organizations are coalitions, and coalitions arise when groups of 
individuals (stakeholders) have an interest or stake in the organization but whose goals 
and preferences differ. Development of coalitions brings about advancing the interests, 
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power, and influence in an organization and not those of the politician’s coalitions’ wants 
and desires. Conflict is the direct result when interests collide. There will always be 
divergent interests and stakeholders seeking scarce resources for their stakeholder group. 
Effective political leaders can manage divergent groups by utilizing effective power 
techniques of who gets what, when, and how. Scarcity and dependence are the key 
resources of power. How political leaders utilize these resources to the benefit of the 
public is contingent often times on how they are viewed ethically or unethically. 
 Morgan (1998) further addressed the issue by looking at how decisions are made. 
He suggested that a final way of controlling decision-making is to influence the issues 
and objectives to be addressed. The political leader can accomplish this through control 
of knowledge and information (information asymmetry) and making the knowledge 
available to different people thereby influencing their perceptions of the situation. This is 
consistent with agency theory previously discussed. This is commonly referred to as 
being a “gatekeeper” and allowing the flow of information out or in as it suits their own 
self-interests. Finally, Morgan contended that politics is a natural feature of 
organizations. “Tensions between private and organizational interests provide an 
incentive for individuals to act politically” (p. 177). Morgan argued that people employ 
gamesmanship and other forms of wheeling and dealing. Ultimately, this allows 
researchers to recognize and understand how and why organizational actors 
(stakeholders) can act as political actors to gain understanding. Political significance of 
events enacted in the organizational culture and subculture are the direct result of this 
behavior. 
 Morgan (1998) provided a significant insight of how although everyone has 
access to sources of power, ultimate power is given to those stakeholders who are best 
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able to determine the course of action in which the political games are played. In other 
words, when stakeholders realize where the source of power emanates from and 
comprehend that they are political players in the game of politics, their interests will be 
more likely taken seriously. 
Statement of the Problem 
 Stakeholders and politicians may have significant perceptual differences of 
opinions in defining political corruption and unethical behavior. Differences in 
perceptions affect public policy. This issue raises an important question – what are the 
implications these differences have for the quality of government? An exhaustive review 
of the literature points out a gap. This issue again is both surprising and significant. More 
specifically, the problem statement flowed from the following process and background:  
1.  A review of the relevant literature streams that include stakeholder theory, 
agency theory, power, moral hazard, congruence theory, trust/leadership 
theory, ethics, resource dependency theory, corruption, and other relevant 
theories as it relates to corruption and unethical behavior. A broad-based 
literature review of top academic journals (Journal of Business Ethics, 
Academy of Management Review, California Management Review, Journal 
of Public Administration Review and others) was conducted from the fields of 
ethics, business, public administration, political science, and communications. 
2. Discussions and input from political leaders on their perceptions of corruption 
and ethics, how they define it, and possible consequences for effective 
communications and good governance. 
3. Advice and input from academic experts and advisors on how to development 
this proposed research model. 
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4. Having 25 years of government experience at all levels of state government, 
the researcher has seen firsthand the effects of corruption and unethical 
behavior and its dramatic consequences on public policy and good 
governance. This experience provides a deeper ethnographic perspective.  
 The purpose of this research is to examine differences in perceptions of political 
corruption and unethical behavior between and among various stakeholder groups and 
elected political leaders and the consequential impact on each other and public policy. 
Additionally, the research will look at how communications can be improved between 
stakeholders and political leaders. Finally, by utilizing appropriate literature and findings 
from this study a working model relating stakeholder and political leaders’ perceptions 
will be advanced. 
Background -Foundation Concepts Relating to Problem Statement 
 Carl Friedrich (as cited in Heidenheimer and Johnson (2008) illustrated his 
definition of political corruption by stating, 
The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder is charged 
with doing certain things, i.e., who is responsible functionary or office-holder, is 
by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions, 
which favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public 
interests. (p. 9)  
 As indicated in Figure 1 - (CUB Model), the researcher has defined the 
relationship between corruption and unethical behavior and illegal corrupt behavior for 
the purposes of this research. The concept of public interest has many interpretations and 
it is suggested that in determining whether a political policy-influencing action is or is not 
corrupt will depend on the observer’s (stakeholder or politicians) judgment as to whether 
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a particular policy is or is not desirable (Friedrich, 1972). Public opinion is important in 
defining what is actually corrupt or unethical. How a group of stakeholders defines, 
corruption can be vastly different according to Friedrich. So just what is corruption? 
According to Acton (1887), “systematically, corruption is a form of coercion, namely 
economic coercion” (p. 1). He goes so far to say “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power 
corrupts absolutely” (p. 1). Political leaders can find themselves in this position as they 
become more experienced and if arrogance and hubris sets in. The effects include direct 
and indirect forms such as gifts, or attempts to influence the judgment of those who 
exercise government functions or decision-making. Such corruption is possible in all 
forms of government.  
 Again then why are political opinions or perceptions of corruption important? If 
there are significant differences between what a nation’s laws say and how most citizens 
or stakeholders define corruption, there is a disparity between the two. Gardiner (1970) 
contended that it is likely politicians or government officials will be guided more by local 
culture than by the law and thus will be more likely to break the law.  
 Organizational political theory is relevant to the discussion here. Thompson and 
Ingraham (1996) defined organizational politics “as being the art of competition among 
individuals while striving for divergent objectives” (p. 292). This concept illuminates 
agency theory in this context. Trust in governance refers to the level of faith or 
confidence citizens have in state authorities. Political efficacy is defined as one’s 
potential influence on political and government system (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 
1995). Citizen’s perceptions of internal politics and ethics in the administrative branches 
of democracies may prove useful in explaining trust in governance, as well as political 
efficacy and political participation (Vigoda-Gadot 2007). 
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 As mentioned earlier, stakeholder theory arises out of the rejection of the idea that 
the corporation (or organization) should single-mindedly strive to maximize the benefits 
of a single stakeholder, the shareholders (Freeman, 1984). Freeman and Evan (1990) 
made the Kantian recommendation that every stakeholder has a right to be treated as an 
end and not a means. They took a significant step forward when they proposed that 
pursuing the interests of the stakeholder is the true purpose of the organization and that 
the organization should balance the interests of different stakeholders by the 
implementation of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. This veil makes decision makers 
ignorant with the respect to the question which stakeholder is theirs (Wijnberg, 2000). 
Since Freeman’s landmark work, stakeholder theory has been widely applied to all types 
of organizations, both public and private. If one can argue this for a corporate 
environment, even a stronger case for this can be made for political democracy. 
 Donaldson and Preston (1995) utilized a normative approach to stakeholder 
theory and argued that managers should acknowledge the validity of diverse stakeholder 
interests and should attempt to respond to them within a mutually supportative 
framework because it is the moral requirement for the management function.  
Principal-agent relationships are premised on the recognition of two principles-honoring 
agreements and avoiding lying (Quinn & Jones, 1995, p. 38). The researcher will apply 
this to the political environment and look at the possible effects arising out of divergent 
and often self-serving interests of the political leader(s). 
 In summary, the researcher has arrived at the problem statement by integrating the 
following: 
 Corruption is prevalent in all areas of society and especially in Illinois.  
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 A literature- based definition of what corruption/unethical behavior are (see 
Figure1 - CUB model) has been provided. 
 Based on both the literature and 25 years government experience the researcher  
contended that various stakeholders view corruption differently.  
 The proposed research will determine what perceptual differences exist between various 
stakeholder groups (businesses, unions, college students, and government workers) and 
those of the elected political leaders regarding perceptions of corruption and unethical 
behavior. Possible implications and effects will be explored. 
 To restate the problem: Stakeholders and politicians may have significant 
perceptual differences of opinions in defining political corruption and unethical behavior. 
Differences in perceptions affect public policy. This raises an important question – what 
are the implications these differences have for the quality of government? An exhaustive 
review of the literature points out a gap. This issue is both surprising and significant. 
Definitions and Implications of Corruption and Unethical Behavior 
This section will delineate and explain the definitions and implications of 
corruption and unethical behavior. This section will focus on corruption and will 
demonstrate the need for this research to be completed. Corruption and unethical 
behavior has evolved and been a prevalent factor in society dating back to the fourth 
century B.C. Recently, corruption has been studied through various disciplines including 
psychology, sociology, economics, law, and political science. Utilizing a multilevel 
approach and drawing on various disciplinary perspectives an integrative 
conceptualization of organization–level of corruption was adapted (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 
2008). 
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Corruption and unethical behavior often varies in frequency and occurs at all 
levels in the political process. Two general types of corruption can be identified out of 
this process – first, those in public office who use or enhance the wealth or pleasure of 
the politician; and secondly, those whom political leaders employed to maintain or 
expand the holder’s personal power. At all levels of government and throughout the 
spectrum of public officeholders those engaging in corruption have been charged and/or 
convicted of misusing their office or position for private purposes or gain (Bollens & 
Schmandt, 1979).  
 The problem of political corruption has reached epidemic proportions. The 
percentage of corruptive acts might not have increased or may have gone unreported over 
the past 50 years, but it has become significant in bringing discredit to the political 
process. Poll after poll indicates that a large percentage of Americans have a low degree 
of confidence in the government and exhibit a degree of distrust of its elected leaders. 
This attitude becomes more prevalent as the media highlights additional scandals 
(Bollens & Schmandt, 1979). If not dealt with, these attitudes can lead to cynicism and 
disengagement. 
 Perceptions of political corruption are part of a larger societal problem that affects 
all parts of society, not just government. The prevalence of corrupt behaviors in 
organizations across the United States appears to be growing and a recent survey found 
that more than half of U.S. employees observed at least one example of unethical conduct 
in the previous year, and 36% observed two or more (Ethical Resource Center, 2005).  
We have become a nation of distrust, intimidation, and fear. When citizens speak 
out against corruption, those in power play the game of  “Killing the Messenger,” 
instead of addressing and correcting the perceived problem. If perception is reality 
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we are in serious trouble” (Grant, 2006, p. 1). 
 Bollens and Schmandt (1979) argued that political corruption might not rank as 
high in the public’s perceptions as problems such as inflation, unemployment, rising 
energy costs, taxation, or crime in the streets. However, this issue demands the citizen’s 
attention. When the public lacks confidence or trust in their government and are skeptical 
of their political leader’s motives, distrust in government is not likely to change. 
 Phillips (2003) further contended that there are cases that seem incontestably 
corrupt and proposed political corruption is recognized by the following occurrences:  
Public Official A is in violation of the public trust placed in him by the public (B) and in 
a manner which harms the public interest, and knowingly engages in conduct which 
exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in a way which runs contrary to the 
acceptable rules and standards for the conduct of public office within the political culture, 
so as to benefit a third party (C) by providing C with access to a good or service C would 
not otherwise obtain (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008, p. 42). 
 What are the real motivations for those who hold public office? Are they 
motivated by policy outcomes, or do they simply seek the perquisites of office? Political 
office holders have both the power to determine the direction and efficacy of government 
policy. It is important to know, whether elected leaders view public office as a means to 
an end or as and end in itself (Callander, 2008). Motivation for attaining political office 
could also determine the possible perceptions of political leaders and whether they are 
perceived as unethical or not.  
 Pinto, Leana, and Pil, (2008) defined an organization of corrupt individuals as a 
scaling up of personally beneficial corrupt behaviors to the organizational level. Further, 
they have developed the two dimensions of corruption in the organization. The first is 
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whether the individual or organization is the beneficiary of the corrupt activity and the 
second dimension is whether the corrupt behavior is undertaken by an individual actor or 
by two or more actors.  
In the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) indictment, Ryan 
was accused of fraud, bribery and obstruction acts, perjury, and tax violations (Fitzgerald, 
2003). The political campaign committee of Gov. George Ryan and two former top 
committee officials (who also served as key aides during Mr. Ryan’s 1991-99 tenure as 
Illinois Secretary of State) were indicted on April 2, 2002 for allegedly engaging in a 
pervasive pattern of fraud and corruption while working on then Secretary of State 
Ryan’s and other political campaigns (Fitzgerald, 2003). Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United 
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, announced the charges as part of 
Operation Safe Road, [italics added] the ongoing four-year-old investigation of public 
and political corruption. The defendants were Citizens for George Ryan, Sr. (the 28-year-
old state campaign fund-raising committee that supports Mr. Ryan’s campaign efforts) 
and Scott Fawell (formerly chief of staff to Secretary of State Ryan and the principal 
decision-maker for Citizens for Ryan). These defendants were charged with racketeering, 
mail fraud, and conspiracy to obstruct justice in a 10-count indictment returned by a 
federal grand jury (Fitzgerald, 2003). 
 Corruption and unethical behavior is commonly studied at either the individual 
level (e.g., as principal-agent dynamics in economics) or as a group acting in concert or 
tandem (e.g., sociology). Pinto et al. (2008) argued that exploring the relationship 
between these two levels is useful, as individuals engaging in personally corrupt 
behaviors, without essentially colluding, also comprise an organizational–level corruption 
occurrence. According to Finey and Lesieur (1982), many scholars have sought to 
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distinguish between different forms of corruption and whether the violator acts strictly for 
private benefit or whether the beneficiary includes the organization itself. An 
organization may implement procedures to inhibit corruption against it, but the same 
organization may not discourage corruption on its behalf (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). 
 Sherman (1980) argued that often it is difficult or nearly impossible to assess an 
individual’s intent, but it is possible to observe the communications from the leading 
coalition or leadership to organizational members and observe whether a member’s 
behavior is consistent with those messages. Pinto et al. (2008) utilized the dimensions of 
the beneficiary and collusion to look at differences in occurrences. Corruption and 
unethical behavior at the organizational level takes two forms. First is where a majority 
portion of organization’s members’ act in a corrupt manner to benefit their own personal 
interests known as organization of corrupt individuals (OCI), and the alternative is the 
corrupt organization (CO), where a group collectively acts in a corrupt manner for the 
benefit of the organization. In both forms of corruption, the organization is the focal unit. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ryan administration blended the two forms of organizations 
(organization of corrupt individuals (George H. Ryan and his top aides) and his political 
campaign committee, which took the form of a corrupt organization. 
 Political scandals and CUB play an important role in their effects of eroding 
attitudes and perceptions about government and political institutions in general. Clark, 
Feigert, Seldon, and Stewart (1999) indicated that scandals lower the regard for 
individual politicians and government leaders. Bowler and Karp (2004) contended that 
the effect does not stop with popularity but has larger consequences for the public’s view 
of politics and political institutions. While a great deal of research has focused on effects 
of cynicism, very few researchers have studied the effects of how CUB influences how 
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citizens’ or stakeholders’ underlying view of government and institutions. Public opinion 
polls continue to indicate a decline of trust in politicians. Additional contributing factors 
for this decline include media coverage, economic performance, and politician’s lack of 
sophistication. Unfortunately, for political leaders, voters may punish unethical or corrupt 
behavior more heavily than they reward good behavior (Bowler & Karp). 
 Caldwell, Hayes, Karri and Bernal (2008) proposed that perceptions about the 
trustworthiness of leader behaviors allow those leaders to be perceived and viewed as 
ethical stewards. They further argued that in contrast to the constant cynicism based on 
never-ending ethical blunders in business and government ethical stewards can rebuild 
organizational trust. According to Caldwell et al., ethical stewardship is rooted in 
stakeholder theory. It utilizes a theory of governance in which leaders are stewards whose 
motives are aligned with the objectives (goals) of several parties (stakeholders). 
Stewardship Theory in Relation to Corruption 
 Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) in describing stewardship suggested 
that steward “will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for cooperating behaviors 
but will seek to maximize utility for the organization based upon rational principals” (p. 
26, as cited in Caldwell, Hayes, Karri, & Bernal, 2007). Block (1996) proposed that 
stewardship “was established on the principal of service over self-interest, and 
management will treat employees (stakeholders) like partners and owners in the 
organization” (p. 23). For example in the political arena, it works like this: great leaders 
are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from followers (Caldwell et 
al.). The relationship between leadership behaviors, perceptions of trustworthiness, and 
the nature of ethical stewardship reinforces the importance of ethical governance in 
dealing with stakeholders. This means they will create organizational systems that are 
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congruent with the organization’s values (Caldwell et al., 2008). By creating perceptions 
of trustworthiness, political leaders can encourage the public to be more involved in the 
political process as it benefits the stakeholders.  
 Caldwell and Karri (2005) stated the fundamental supposition underlying 
stewardship theory, “is the maximization of long–term economic wealth that will lead to 
the overall well-being of the principals and various stakeholders collectively and present 
opportunities for maximizing social welfare and provide economic benefits to society” (p. 
251).  
While previous researchers have studied and applied this to the business and 
organizational structures, and based on a thorough review of the literature, this theory can 
also be applied to government and non-profit entities. Through efficient use of taxpayer 
resources, efficiency and effectiveness in spending stimulate economic development. C
 Caldwell et al. (2007) described stewardship characteristics and their implications 
for leaders. The leader has a duty to create added value and wealth and benefit society 
based upon virtue ethics and a commitment for ethical focus (Caldwell et al.). A leader’s 
primary function as a steward is to create meaningful opportunities that benefit society in 
whole and not themselves. The vision or focus should increase organizational (society) 
wealth to serve the interests of all stakeholders. The moral imperative for an ethical 
steward is that duties must be honored and interests of all parties must be protected 
(Caldwell et al.). Finally, each person or stakeholder is a valued member of society and 
his or her rights are considered precious. Society should balance the individual’s rights 
with the collective welfare and continuation and growth of the community. 
In summary, the preceding sections have led the researcher to conclude the 
following: 
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1) Based on a preliminary and yet comprehensive literature review, it is apparent 
this is a topic of great interest. There is a significant gap in the literature and a 
compelling need to fill this gap. 
2)  Communication between politicians and stakeholders was discussed. A thorough   
review of appropriate communication theories between stakeholders and political 
leaders are discussed in Chapter 2.    
The researcher’s communication model was introduced to show the communication cycle 
between stakeholders and political leaders. As a result of the various variables introduced 
in the model which affect the communications between political leaders and stakeholders, 
often times distorted, and as a result, this proposed model will further demonstrate and 
clarify how and why communications between stakeholders and political leaders are 
important for better governance strategies.  
 Communication Model between stakeholders and political leaders 
 Communication is affected by the following variables Mistrust (A), Distortion of 
Facts (B), Prior Experiences(C), and Media Influences (D). This proposed model is 
descriptive (describing the various interactions and variables that affect communications 
between the various stakeholder groups and elected political leaders).The researcher 
refined this model to make it potentially a prescriptive model to improve communications 
between political leaders and stakeholders. The researcher developed the Communication 
Model to show the relationships between stakeholders and leaders.  
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Figure 2. Communication model between stakeholders and political leaders  
 Note: * Stakeholders are the principal and political leaders are the agents. 
Exploratory Hypotheses that Emerge from the Literature 
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups  
         regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior. 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups  
         regarding political leaders’ trust. 
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H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups  
         regarding political leaders’ unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups  
         regarding political leaders’ ethical relativism. 
H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups  
         regarding political leaders’ communications. 
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based  
         on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political  
         leaders’ ethical behavior. 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
         on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political  
         leaders’ trust. 
H2c:  There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based  
          on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political  
          leaders’ unethical corrupt behavior. 
 H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based  
          on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political  
          leaders’ ethical relativism. 
H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based  
         on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political  
         leaders’ communication. 
H3a: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior. 
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H3b: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding trust. 
H3c: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H3d: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. 
H3e: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other  
        stakeholder groups regarding communication. 
H4: There will be a significant difference between stakeholders and politicians regarding  
       their level of communications. 
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various   
will stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities.  
Description of Terms 
 Adverse selection. Occurs when the agent has some private information, prior to 
entering into relations with the principal (Heath & Norman, 2004). 
  Agency theory. A theory in which managers are agents for the shareholder and 
assume that both parties are utility maximizers. As the interests of managers diverge from 
those principals, an agency problem is said to exist (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In law, it is defined as a fiduciary relationship that is funded on trust. In economic 
models, it can be defined as an assumption of an absence of trust between the principal 
and agent, focusing instead on moral hazard and adverse selection (Casadesus-Masanell, 
2004). 
 Alliance. Is an arrangement between two or more firms or stakeholders that 
establishes an exchange relationship but has no joint ownership involvement (Dickson & 
Weaver, 1997). 
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 Altruistic. An agent who acts in the principal’s well being and enters positively in 
his utility function. (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004). 
 Autocracy. Described as a paternalistic organization where the rule of “one”  
 
individual in a small group is characterized by absolute or dictatorial power 
 
(Morgan, 1998). 
 
 Beneficiary of corruption. The actor who derives direct and primary benefits  
 
from the action (Wheeler & Rothman, 1982). 
 Business/government ethics: What is perceived as appropriate in the 
organizational setting (Berne & Freeman, 1992), and comprise moral principals and 
standards that guide behaviors in the world of business (Ferrell & Fraederich, 1991). 
 Bureaucracies. In government or regulatory organizations, rule is associated  
 
with the use of the written word and is exercised by bureaucrats who sit behind  
 
their “bureaux” or desks, making and administering the rules that guide  
 
organizational activity (Morgan, 1998). 
 
 Civil order. The absence of collective resorts to violence, or other coercive  
 
actions, to achieve private or public objectives (Eckstein, 1997). 
 
 Congruence theory. Is based on the tenants of two hypotheses: The first pertains  
 
to the viability and performance of political systems regardless of types that says  
 
governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are  
 
congruent (sameness of form – either exists or does not exist) with the authority  
 
patterns of other units of society (Eckstein, 1997). The second hypothesis says,  
 
Democratic government performs well only if their patterns exhibit balanced  
 
disparities - that  is, combinations of democratic and non-democratic traits (Eckstein,  
 
1997). 
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Contract. Is commonly used in stakeholder theory as a metaphor for the  
relationships between the firm and its stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Kuratko,  
 
Goldsby, & Hornsby, 2004). 
 
 Corrupt act. The ability for a public official’s control over the power to  
 
positively or negatively coerce individuals - the public official has to do  
 
something in order to obtain the illegal rewards and there can be the power to do  
 
nothing, to overlook violations of regulations (Myrdal, 1968).  
 
 Corrupt behavior. Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational  
 
gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), as well as conduct by an organization that is  
 
proscribed and punishable by criminal, civil, or regulatory law (Braithwaite,  
 
1989). 
 Corruption. Is an elected official’s concealed private, for gain, appropriation of  
a public right (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Treisman, 2000, as cited in Piatt, 2009). This also 
includes behavior which deviates for the normal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such 
behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of 
trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than 
merit); and misappropriation - illegal appropriation of public resources for private- 
regarding uses (Nye, 1967). 
 
 Corrupt unethical behavior (CUB). As described earlier in Figure 1, as concentric 
circles of unethical, corrupt, and corrupt illegal behavior.  
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Unethical behavior. Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral  
or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct  
(Sharpe, 1993, as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
 Corruption. Is an elected official’s concealed private for gain appropriation of a 
public right (Rose-Ackerman 1975; Shleifer & Vishney, 1999; Treisman, 2000, as cited 
in Piatt, 2009). 
 Corrupt-illegal behavior. Is the result of the misuse of authority for organizational 
gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, as cited in Piatt, 2009), as well as conduct by an 
organization that is proscribed and punishable by criminal, civil or regulatory law 
(Braithwaite, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
 Counter organization. Consists of individuals who coordinate their actions to  
 
create a rival power block (Morgan, 1998). 
 
 Decisional efficacy. The extent to which governments  
 
make and carry out policies in response to political demands and challenges  
 
(Eckstein, 1997). 
 
 Democracy. The power rests with the demos, or populace, and shared is through  
 
participatory forms of rule where different stakeholders are formally represented  
 
in the decision-making, process (Morgan, 1998). 
 
 Directiveness. Denotes the extent to which activities in a social unit occur  
 
because directives, not the free choice of members, and include supervision and  
 
in which severe sanctions are used even against mild compliance (Eckstein,  
 
1997).  
 Ethical relativist. Condones any ethical code as long as society accepts it 
 
(Valasquez, 1992). 
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Ethical standard. A level of effort that is considered “appropriate behavior”  
 
(Casadesus-Masanell, 2004). 
 
 Façade of conformity. Is a term used to refer to an individual behavior that is  
 
inconsistent with personally held values (Hewlin, 2003). 
 
Firm. Is characterized by a relationship with many groups and individuals  
 
(stakeholders), each with (a) the power to affect the firm’s performance and/or  
 
(b) a stake in the firm’s performance (Freeman, 1984). 
  
Governance. Every social unit (political parties, workplace, business, trade  
 
unions, community associations, friendly societies, voluntary associations,  
 
professional societies, churches, sport teams, colleges, and families) must be  
 
directed and managed in some way (Eckstein, 1997). 
 
  Group character. Is the ability of groups of people to refrain from unethical  
 
and antisocial actors without the threat of punishment. The latter refers mainly to  
 
the actions of governing bodies (Fleming, 2001). 
 
 Individual character. Is the ability of an individual to refrain from unethical  
 
and antisocial acts without the threats of punishment (Fleming, 2001). 
 
Information asymmetry. Deals with the study of decisions in transactions where  
one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance of 
power in transactions, which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry.  
Also called asymmetric warfare where smaller challengers beat a dominant incumbent, 
because the challengers fight in ways the incumbent was unprepared for (Newman, 
2000).  
 37 
 Institutional theory. Suggests that institutional environments impose pressures on 
organizations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
 Instrumental stakeholder theory. Purports to describe what will happen  
 
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). 
 
  Irrationality. Is described as the exclusion of information in the formation of  
 
intentions and subsequent behaviors, how one intends to and ultimately behaves 
 
(Watson, Freeman & Parmar, 2008). 
 
 Latent stakeholder. Is one who tends to be “uninterested and uninformed”  
 
(Price, 1992, p. 36) and has a low level of involvement in the discourse process  
 
(Van Leuvan & Slater, 1991). 
 
 Leadership. The ability to define the reality of others, in effect, the leader wields 
 
symbolic power that exerts a decisive influence on how people perceive their  
 
realities and therefore on the way they act (Morgan, 1998) 
 
  Learning theory. A theory that suggests firms can enhance their competitive  
 
position through superior knowledge (Simonin, 1997).  
 
 Legitimacy. The degree to which an establishment is considered by its members  
 
as worthy of support (Eckstein, 1997). 
 
 Locus of control. Is the individual’s belief about the relationship between his  
 
or her behavior and the consequences of that behavior (Rotter, 1966). 
 
  Moral hazard. Is a situation where an agent’s action, or the outcome of the 
action, is imperfectly observable to the principal (Heath & Norman, 2004). 
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Moral stakeholder. The one or group that is affected by the firm’s behavior  
 
(Evan & Freeman, 1988).  
 
 Moral value. A type of personal value described as one that cannot be 
 
violated by or actions nor omitted form our considerations of right and wrong which  
 
 includes trust, honesty, reliability, and the like (Watson et al., 2008). 
 
  Narcissism. The degree in which an individual has an inflated sense of self and  
 
is preoccupied with having that self-view continually reinforced. The chief  
 
manifestations of narcissism include feelings of superiority, entitlement, and a  
 
constant need for attention and admiration (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004). 
 
  Network. Is described as a constellation of businesses or groups that organize  
 
through the establishment of social rather than legally binding contracts (Atler &  
 
Hage, 1993; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).  
   
 Norm. Is a rule or guide to behavior to determine what is appropriate or  
 
inappropriate (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004). 
 
      Normative theory. Is concerned with the moral propriety of the behavior of  
 
the firm and/or managers (Jones, 1995). 
 
      Open system theory. Is a theory that examines how the environment affects an  
 
organization (Katz & Kahn, 1966). 
 
  Organizational politics. Is defined as self-serving, informal behavior that  
 
requires at least two parties: one initiator, the individual trying to exert influence,  
 
 and a target, the object of the influence attempt (Goffman, 1959; Porter, 1981) 
 Participation. Focuses on the individual as a rational actor who decides  
 
whether or not to participate in terms of the benefits and costs to him/herself  
 
(White, 1976).   
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 Political behavior. A behavior that is frequently used as an upward influence  
 
strategy to promote self-interests of the initiator (Porter, 1981). 
 
      Political corruption. The behavior in question is judged particularly heinous  
 
or corrupt if both public officials and the public judge it corrupt and both parties  
 
wish it to be restricted (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008). 
 Political efficacy. The feeling that individual political action does have, or can 
have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s 
civic duties (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). 
      Polity. Originally, a term used in ancient Greece to refer to the many Greek city-
states that had an assembly of citizens as part of the political process and often described 
how performance is measured and if the political component does what it is intended to 
do (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008). 
 
   Power. A relationship among social actors in which one social actor A can 
 
 get social actor B to do something that B would not have otherwise done (Pfeffer,  
 
1981, as cited in Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).  
 Prospect theory. Proposes that individuals are relatively risk averse for gains  
and risk seeking with respect to potential losses; simply stated: a loss of $X is 
 
 more aversive than a gain of $X is attractive (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
 
 Psychological distance theory. Several theories of interpersonal  
 
communication suggest that physical proximity in communication fosters stronger  
 
bonds between parties than communication that occurs remotely (Latane, 1981). 
 
 Public. Designates that a benefit affects the public in general, rather than a  
 
specific individual (White, 1976). 
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Public good. Is one in which consumption by one person does not decrease its  
 
availability to others (Samuelson, 1954). 
 
      Public good theory. Certain benefits, designated as public [italics added] by  
 
economists may be desired by an individual, and yet he/she will not participate to achieve  
 
them (White, 1976). 
 
     Resource dependency theory. Whereby organization A supplies a large 
 
 proportion of inputs to organization B, or absorbs a large proportion of outputs  
 
from B, then B will be dependent on A. The criticality of a resource has to do  
 
with whether an organization can exist without it, if the resource is an input, or  
 
exist without a market for it, if the resource is an output. Inherent in the firm need  
 
for resources provides opportunities for others to gain control over it (Pfeffer & Salancik,  
 
1978). 
Stakeholder. Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
 achievement of the firms’ objectives (Freeman, 1984, as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
 
      Strategic stakeholder. The one who can affect the firm or organization  
 
(Freeman, 1984). 
 
     Stakeholder theory. The stakeholder approach is about groups and individuals  
 
who can affect the organization, and is about managerial behavior taken in 
 
 response to these groups and individuals, and enables managers to understand  
 
stakeholders and strategically manage them. In addition, it is about managing 
 
potential conflict stemming from divergent interests (Freeman, 1984). 
 
Stewardship theory. Suggests that managers should not be constrained by  
 
control systems because they will act as a constraint on the ability of executives to  
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manage effectively. Stewards believe that by acting in the best interests of the principals,  
 
their own will be served (Davis, et al., 1997). 
 
   Self-deception. Is based on the formation of beliefs and ultimately a formulated  
 
framework of beliefs. A person who values or desires a particular state of being is not  
 
the same as declaring that person will act in such a way as to bring about that state  
 
(Smith, 2001). 
   Social exchange theory. The central concept of actors exchanging resources  
via a social exchange relationship. Where social exchange (e.g., Ax; By) is the 
voluntary transfer of resources (x, y,…) between multiple actors (A, B,…) (Cook,  
1977).  
    Social Units. Can be described as collective individuals, not just aggregates of  
Individuals, which have their own identities, separate from individual identities of  
 
members (Eckstein, 1997). 
 
  Subculture. Social and ethnic groups may give rise to different norms and  
 
patterns of behavior with a crucial impact on day-to-day functioning, especially  
 
when the ethnic groupings coincide with different organizational activities  
 
(Morgan, 1998). 
 
      Trade associations. Are typically non-profit organizations formed by firms in  
 
the same industries to collect and disseminate trade information, offer legal and technical  
 
advice, furnishes industry-related training, and provides a platform for collective 
lobbying (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Oliver, 1990). 
    Transgression. Is defined as a corrupt or unethical act by an organization that  
 
places its stakeholders at risk (Coombs, 1995). 
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      Unethical behavior. Includes organizational actions that are deemed immoral  
 
or unacceptable according to societal norms or general standards of conduct  
 
(Sharpe, 1993, as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
      Utility. In economics, utility is a measure of the relative satisfaction from or 
desirability of consumption of goods and encompasses a moral commitment to equality, 
or the enjoyment of social contacts (White, 1976). 
      Utilitarianism. A doctrine that states the maximization of utility as a moral 
criterion for the organization of society and according to John Stuart Mill (1806-1876), 
society should aim to maximize the total utility of individuals, aiming for the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number (Mill, 1906). 
Significance of the Study 
 The objective of this research study was to begin to fill this important gap in the 
literature. This is primarily a descriptive study with potential prescriptive implications. 
To this end, based on extensive literature review, previous empirical studies, prior 
developed ethical scales, and sound methods of original scale development, this 
researcher has developed an instrument to measure perceptions CUB and its effects on 
stakeholders’ and political officials relationships and communication patterns. Supporting 
the importance of more research in this area, Gioia (2002) contended that a systemic view 
is important because corruption appears to thrive in particular organization, industry and 
national environments. Furthermore, “if that systemic corruption or even the perception 
of corruption prevails, the entire system can fail” (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 
2008, pp. 670-671). Ethical leadership and the CUB model have probably never had a 
higher profile than they do today. 
The media can greatly affect the perceptions of stakeholders with the constant 
barrage of negative reporting on elected political leaders, as illustrated by the Ryan case 
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cited previously. One of the outcomes of this is that stakeholders can be influenced with 
the constant negative reporting media’s portrayal of political leaders. This research will 
enable the stakeholders and political leaders to address their perceptions on CUB and to 
start developing necessary means of better communication strategies to modify these 
perceptions whether based on real or biased information. 
 By addressing these key research questions and looking at the various stakeholder 
groups and political leaders, the researcher will gain valuable insights to their 
perceptions. By understanding the issues of political perceptions (a descriptive test), the 
outcome can provide key communication strategies to tackle the disparity in perceptions 
between political leaders and stakeholder groups (a prescriptive outcome). The net effect 
of this study could promote better governance in public policy through more effective 
communications between stakeholders and political leaders.  
     Leadership is about vision. However, leadership is equally creating a climate 
where the truth is heard and the brutal facts confronted. There is a huge difference 
between the opportunity to “have your say” and the opportunity to be heard. The 
good –to great leaders understood this distinction, creating a culture wherein 
people had a tremendous opportunity to be heard and, ultimately, for the truth to 
be heard. (Collins, 2001, p. 74) 
  This significant statement becomes a major underlying theme in this research. 
Increased communication between the stakeholders and political leaders is crucial for the 
furtherance and development of good governance. Collins (2001) elaborated on his point 
that leaders cannot make good decisions without implementing the process of honest 
confrontation of the brutal facts. Furthermore, they must create a culture wherein people 
have significant opportunities to be heard and primarily, that the truth be heard. Collins 
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further stated that leadership does not begin just with a vision. It begins with people able 
to confront the brutal facts and to act on the implications. Finally, Collins further 
explained that one of the primary ways to de-motivate people is to ignore the brutal facts 
of reality. One potential finding of this present study may be that cynical view of political 
leaders reported by the media may be overblown. If in fact this is true, the brutal facts 
[italics added] may be pleasantly surprising. In fact, this misunderstanding could inhibit 
the better communications advocated in this research. 
Procedure to Accomplish 
 In the planning process, the researcher demonstrated and utilized a mixed 
methods approach and combine qualitative and quantitative methods to gather the data 
following the illustrative model (see Figure 3). The Research Model in Figure 3 has 
driven the research. 
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These specific steps for the major exploratory hypotheses are: 
1. An integrative literature review of scholarly journal articles from several 
relevant streams of literature to frame the research question. 
2. Discussions with political leaders (state senator, state representative, 
county board chairperson, county board members, mayors, and trustees to 
get their perspectives on the problems of perceptions of political 
corruption and their views on how they deal with these perceptions from 
their constituent groups and various stakeholder groups. In addition, to 
understand needs political leaders express regarding stakeholder 
perceptions.  
3. From the literature review and input from the political leaders, the final 
research questions will be refined and formulated. 
4. Develop testable hypotheses from the information gathered from the 
political leaders. 
5. Phase I research will consist of conducting a comprehensive survey of 
stakeholder groups to determine their perceptions. 
6. Statistical analysis will include correlation, ANOVA, ANCOVA, Cohen’s 
d, correlations, frequencies, means, standard deviations, Independent-
samples t-tests, and qualitative interpretation of the data. 
7. Phase II will consist of conducting in-depth interviews with selected 
individual informant focus groups to develop a deeper understanding of 
the data. 
8. The results of this research will be reported in Chapter 4. Beyond the final 
defense, papers and journal articles and workshops will be developed. 
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 An important aspect of this research is that it uses multiple methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative. The researcher set up meetings with political leaders to 
follow- up on survey results. One of the most compelling aspects of this research is once 
data are analyzed; the researcher will meet again with several political leaders to discuss 
results. This will then allow them to see what the stakeholders perceptions are in relation 
to theirs and thus create more effective communication strategies for better governance. 
   Shaw (n.d) best sums up the politician by stating “He knows nothing; he thinks 
he knows everything – that clearly points to a political career” (www.working-
minds.com/GBSquotes). Said sarcastically, Shaw does make a point! This research will 
result in political leaders gaining knowledge about their stakeholders and knowing 
something about their perceptions. 
The Figure 4 research model represents the development of the survey instrument 
that was used for the surveying the various stakeholder groups. 
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Figure 4. Survey development methodology 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
According to Jean –Jacques Rousseau (1762) “Politics and Morals cannot be 
separated, and he who wants to study one without the other is bound to misunderstand 
both” (Kolm, 1996, p. 117). This quote is the starting point to analyze, review, and 
integrate the literature and then briefly review the concepts presented in Chapter I. The 
researcher further discussed the models developed in Chapter I and the relationships it 
has on generating the hypotheses and implications for this study through this literature 
review. 
Prior to reviewing the Chapter I concepts review, the researcher will demonstrate 
through existing literature the relevance of applying agency theory to the political realm. 
The application of agency theory, which becomes the major focal point of this 
dissertation, will focus on a representative democracy, such as the United States, and 
concentrate on examples in Illinois, but which also is applicable to any other state in the 
union. 
Governments have always mattered to business organizations by the 
establishment of legal frameworks and enforcement of laws, and regulations that provide 
structures of actions for managers and their organizations (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004). 
Surprisingly however, little research has been done from the political side of applying  
agency theory to government. Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem of 
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governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the 
government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of 
interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396). Long before management 
scholars discovered and exposed principal agent-models, James Madison discussed the 
problems at length in the Federalist Papers. He posited because government 
representatives are vested and entrusted with specific institutional powers and those 
political agents may then act to benefit themselves while neglecting or acting contrary the 
interests of their constituents who elected them (Madison, 1787). Carey (1994); Goff and 
Grier, (1993) indicated the literature on the dilemma of shirking by legislators is quite 
extensive. 
Lord (1995) stated, “the emphasis on pursuit of self-interest which is at the crux 
of agency theory provides a useful bridge between the management literature and the 
prevailing views of legislative behavior in political science” (p. 396). Lord asserted 
elected leaders-legislators have a strong interest for remaining in office. To remain in 
office, legislators need to maintain a stream of power, influence, pay, prestige, and 
benefits emerging from incumbency. Therefore, legislators must serve their constituents 
interests and needs properly in order to be re-elected again. Fenno (1978) and Mayhew 
(1974) both indicated the quest for re-election becomes a fundamental motivator for 
legislative behavior. However, for self-interested legislators, the interests of all 
constituents  need not be considered as legislators concerned only with getting re-elected, 
need only concern themselves with the interests of a large enough group to get re-elected 
(Grier & Munger, 1991; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986).  
 
51 
 
Regular elections are the ways in which constituents can enforce the agency contract 
(Carey, 1994). Finally, legislative agents act in accordance with the constituents to gain 
or maintain support of the majority of the principals who in reality vote (Lord, 1995).  
Legislators are elected to serve the interests of their constituents. However, there 
are three important agency issues as Lord (1995) identified. First, the political agency 
contract is flawed, as constituents have the difficult task of monitoring the behavior of 
their elected official. This process becomes encumbered, as the constituents do not have 
the time, resources, or expertise to monitor public policy processes. Second, even if the 
constituents have the necessary information to monitor their representative, additional 
costs would incur for the enforcement of the agency contract. In effect, this precludes 
most constituents from monitoring, and the consequences of this dilemma, is that only a 
small percentage of constituents actively engage in political activities, and only a fraction 
actually votes. Third, an agency problem exists when legislators face a lack of 
information about what their constituent‟s preferences are regarding public policy. 
Legislators face the issues of lack of information, limited personal staff time, ambiguity, 
and resources regarding the constituent‟s preferences regarding public policy. Legislative 
agents then fall into the trap of failing to act in the interests of their constituents, not 
because of intentional shirking, [italics added] but due to lack of knowledge. 
Political agency problems occur when the above-mentioned items come into play. 
Lack of knowledge, monitoring and enforcement costs, between the constituent who is 
the principal, and the legislator whom is the political agent are important factors in 
agency and the feedback process. Lord (1995) articulated that politically active 
constituents become the relevant group who active support of legislators must mature in 
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order to win re-election and maintain their incumbency. This becomes an essential issue 
in understanding agency theory. 
Agency theory and stakeholder theory are thereby, tied together in this political 
sphere, and those stakeholder groups who are involved in the political process. Lord 
(1995) stated, these major constituent groups are those who “exercise a disproportionate 
share of influence over legislators” (p. 397). Legislators look at these indicators to 
ascertain how their legislative behavior will affect those stakeholders groups who vote 
and the likelihood of that stakeholder group‟s activity between elections and during the 
election process. Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, stated in his July 31, 2009 budget address, 
state Government belongs to the people not to the office holder (Quinn, 2009). This 
becomes the starting point for applying agency theory to the political realm. When the 
agent – the political leader assumes or inverts his or her role to that of the principle, an 
interesting dilemma occurs. Recent statements made by 11th District Republican 
candidate, David McAloon, in which he stated, highlight this concept: 
People have to remember, government works for them, even though at times it 
feels like people are here to serve politicians. It is time to reclaim our government 
and tell them “no more”. We have to tell them, this is not your country. You work 
for us… Do not be silent anymore. We have to get involved. (Provost, 2009, p. 
A1)   
Finally, Buchholz and Rosenthal (2004) argued that with stakeholders 
representing so many divergent interests in business, bureaucratic maneuvering would 
increase as well as wasteful political practices that are the hallmark of democracy. Thus, 
corporate decision-making will become more like the decision-making that characterizes 
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the federal and state governments. They further stated, “Government must use its power 
of coercion when necessary to see that the system is not undermined by self-serving 
managers or other stakeholders” (p. 149). This view is contrasted by Machiavelli who 
stated: 
Any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the 
great number who are not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his authority 
must learn how not to be good, and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it as 
necessity requires. (Greene, 2000, p. xxiii) 
This begins the dilemma for the political leader who comes into office with ethical 
standards and having to balance those interests with those who do not have those 
intentions for good governance. This researcher will explore and develop models 
exploring this inversion of agent-principle and show the consequences of such actions as 
illustrated below.  
Chapter I: Concepts Review 
The researcher developed a proposed Model of Corrupt-Unethical Behavior 
(CUB) - see Figure 1, to describe and differentiate between unethical, corrupt and corrupt 
illegal behavior. The researcher has postulated that as political leaders move deeper into 
the CUB circles the level of corruption increases from unethical behavior to corrupt 
behavior and finally to corrupt-illegal behavior which leads to indictments and prison 
sentences. Corruption is prevalent in the U.S. and throughout Illinois. In addition, the 
researcher has developed a second model on political communications. This model (see 
Figure 2) examines how the communications process between stakeholders and political 
leaders are influenced and are affected by the following variables: media influence, 
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mistrust, distortion of facts, prior experiences, and the level of interactions between 
stakeholders and political leaders. Whether stakeholder groups perceive political leaders 
as ethical or corrupt is critical in this research for the formulation of communication 
strategies to promote better governance.  
Building on these concepts from Chapter I, the researcher will review major 
literature streams as promoted by Davis and Parker (1997) who suggested a stream of 
research approach as a method guide to the literature review and research process. They 
further suggested a process that identifies the academic field, the area of interest, the 
stream of research, and the theory base. As an introduction to the literature review, the 
researcher will identify these areas. This is discussed in further detail and the research 
hypotheses will flow directly from the literature. 
Theoretical Foundation 
This section includes an overview of the theoretical foundations that informs the 
research questions. Several research streams are investigated, along with antecedent 
research that informs these constructs. These include the following major themes: 
 Stakeholder theory 
 Principal agency theory and moral hazard 
 Corruption 
The following are supporting and ancillary themes: 
 Good governance 
 Public choice theory 
 Political motivations 
 Narcissism  
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 Resource dependency theory 
 Power theory 
 Congruence theory 
 Trust and perceptions 
 Cynicism 
 Ethical leadership 
 Communication theory and mass media base 
 Demographics 
 Self Reporting Bias 
These essential streams of literature in Chapter 2 provided context to investigate 
the phenomenon of differences of perceptions within and between in various stakeholder 
groups. This resulted in the hypothetical suggestions of how political leaders can develop 
communication strategies to reduce negative perceptions and thereby increase good 
governance. From an action research perspective, this will assist the researcher to and 
frame the research methodology in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 5. Factors affecting political-unethical behavior 
Figure 5 indicates the factors that affect and a political leader‟s unethical 
behavior. The statements shown in the boxes are indicative, of the thoughts or actions by 
a political leader, and therefore, move the political leader towards unethical behavior. 
Concept 1: Stakeholder Theory 
This section provides a literature review of stakeholder theory and associated 
factors that are related to stakeholder theory.  
   Political –Unethical Behavior 
Poor or lack of communication between 
Political Leaders and Stakeholders. 
Political Leaders views Stakeholders as 
complacent, “No one really cares,” about 
governance 
Political Leader‟s lack of vision for  
good governance and ethical behavior.                                                                      
an 
Political Leaders act bureaucratic “It‟s 
always been done this way.” 
Self-serving political behavior. “ It‟s all 
about me over you.” 
Stakeholder‟s complacency for political 
corruption. 
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Stakeholder Formation 
  Stakeholder theory is utilized to explain and guide the structure and operation of 
the defined political organization (Piatt, 2009). It aids in understanding the organization 
by determining which participants matter and what are their interests (Donaldson & 
Preston 1995). “Stakeholder analyst argue that all persons or groups with legitimate 
interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima 
facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another” (Donaldson & Preston, p. 
68).  
A stakeholder approach to strategy emerged in the mid 1980‟s (Piatt, 2009). 
Freeman‟s (1984) seminal work in stakeholder management formulated a framework by 
which managers could deal with unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and 
change (as cited in Piatt). Freeman defined a stakeholder as “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organizations objectives” (p. 46, as 
cited in Piatt). In contrast, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders as those who have placed 
something at risk in a relationship with the organization, whereas Freeman and Evan 
(1990) speak of stakeholders as contractors or participants in exchange relationships (as 
cited in Piatt). In addition, management should explore its relationships with all 
stakeholders to develop business strategies and long- term success (Freeman & McVea, 
2001, as cited in Piatt). However, key stakeholders may use various types of  influence 
strategies to make known their priorities to the organization in their decision making 
process (Frooman, 1999, as cited in Piatt). Bryson (1995) further explained that 
stakeholders are of particular importance in public and non-profit organizations, which 
have a more diverse and divergent group of stakeholders than private- for- profit 
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organizations making it more difficult to identify key strategic issues (as cited in Piatt, 
2009). This is of particular relevance since the present research focuses on the public 
sector. 
Stakeholder Approach 
Stakeholder theory attempts to answer a fundamental question in a systematic 
way (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Which groups of stakeholders deserve the special 
attention of management and which do not? Who then are stakeholders? Stakeholders can 
be persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the 
natural environment (Mitchell et al., as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
In addition, Phillips (2003) contended that stakeholder theory is organizational 
since organizations have constituencies (as cited in Piatt, 2009). Furthermore, 
organizations are dependent upon these constituency groups for their continued success 
(as cited in Piatt). Constituencies are therefore stakeholders in an organization (as cited in 
Piatt, 2009). A fundamental tenant of stakeholder theory is that decision makers must 
continually keep the interests of different stakeholders in balance (Freeman, 1994, as 
cited in Piatt).  
Advancing this notion, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) contended that the 
ultimate aim of stakeholder management is for the organization to consider if the firm is 
system centered. In activities as complex as a political system, the causes for unethical 
and corrupt behavior are numerous, complicated, interdependent, and often enigmatic, 
making the political reformer‟s job exceeding difficult (as cited in Piatt, 2009). However, 
from a systems perspective, the reformer must look at the organization as organic (Piatt).  
In this organic model, change is seen primarily as an adaptive response by the system, 
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acting as a whole or through a subsystems, with specific functions to maintain itself in 
balance with a shifting environment (Beeson & Davis, 2000, as cited in Piatt).  
Do managers gain information from all stakeholders for the purposes of the 
organization‟s survival, economic well-being, coalition building and factors that bring 
opportunities to the organization? Balancing stakeholder interests is a process of 
assessment and addressing the competing claims of those who have a stake in the 
organization. The desire to balance stakeholder interests is a key component in the ability 
to keep score in the organization (Freeman, 1984). Furthermore for managerial survival, 
the distribution of resources in a reasonable fashion among relevant stakeholders is 
critical and as a matter of legitimacy. If the manager does not meet occasionally with 
certain stakeholder groups he or she can lose their support. Thus, it is in the interest of the 
manager or political leader to insure that stakeholder interests are somewhat balanced 
(Reynolds, Schultz & Hekman, 2006).  
A significant question arises. Can an entity be in a stakeholder relationship with 
an organization without having any actual relationship with it? Mitchell, Agle and Wood 
(1997) argued these potential relationships can be as relevant as the actual ones. Clarkson 
(1994) views the idea of involuntary stakeholders of those individual‟s interests who are 
not at risk within the organization. 
 Closely related is systems theory that was developed by Ackoff and Churchman 
(1947), which emphasized the external links that are part of every organization. 
Organizations that are described as open systems are part of a much larger network and 
are not stand-alone independent entities. This theory explores the relationships and 
identification of both stakeholders and the interconnections in the organization or 
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network. Using system theory, problems in an organization can be solved only with the 
support of all of the stakeholders or members in the collective network of the 
organizations (Freeman & McVea, 2001). 
These ideas represented in stakeholder theory have mainly been a concern of 
management literature, but have also drawn interest in the public sector. However, due to 
stakeholder analysis and the applicability of recognizing the needs of various competing 
stakeholder groups in the organization, stakeholder analysis and these concepts can be 
applied to political organizations, and governments as well as not-for-profit organizations 
(as cited in Piatt, 2009). Stakeholder theory holds true to all types of organizations that 
comprise divergent stakeholders seeking scarce resources. In reiterating this concept of 
applying agency theory to politics, Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem 
of governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the 
government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of 
interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396). 
By emphasizing a stakeholder approach to strategic management, Freeman (1984) 
postulated that management must formulate and implement a process by which all groups 
that have a stake in the organization must be satisfied (as cited in Piatt, 2009). The long-
term success of the organization is dependent upon the management and integration of 
the relationships and interests of all stakeholders in the organization (as cited in Piatt). A 
stakeholder approach emphasizes active management of the organizational environment 
and the furtherance of relationships of shared interests (as cited in Piatt, 2009).  
Many traditional views of strategy have overlooked or marginalized some 
stakeholders and have consistently traded-off the interests of those stakeholders with the 
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more favored stakeholders (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In stable environments or non-
turbulent times, this approach may seem appropriate but in times of chaos or in a 
constantly changing environment the interests of the stakeholders must be integrated into 
the goals of the organization, and stakeholder relationships must be managed in a logical 
and strategic fashion (Freeman & McVea, 2001, as cited in Piatt). 
From this viewpoint, Schendel and Hofer (1979) developed the theory of 
enterprise strategy, which described the relationship between the organization and society 
by answering the question, what do we stand for? Looking at a stakeholder approach in 
its original form as an enterprise strategy was important but neglected the question of 
which type of values are the most important (Freeman & McVea, 2001). 
Political leaders can gain a better understanding of characteristics of a stakeholder 
approach as developed by Freeman and McVea (2001). They outlined which major 
concerns for a stakeholder approach to be successful in the political organization or any 
other organization. The major relevant issues that are germane to this researcher‟s project 
as developed by Freeman and McVea are listed below: 
 A stakeholder approach can provide a single strategic framework, flexible 
enough to deal with environmental shifts without requiring managers and 
political leaders to adopt new strategic paradigms. (p. 9) Given the 
developments of stakeholder literature, Freeman and McVea have 
hypothesized that this can likely be applied to political leaders as well.  
 A stakeholder approach is a strategic management process rather than a 
strategic planning process. Strategic planning focuses on predicting the 
future environment and then independently developing plans for the 
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organization to exploit its position. (p. 9) 
  Conversely, strategic management actively seeks a new direction for the 
organization and considers how the firm can affect the environment as 
well as how the environment may affect the firm or governance. (p. 10) 
 A stakeholder approach as it relates to survival of the organization and as 
Freeman described as “the achievement of an organization‟s objectives. 
(p.10) Management in turbulent times must direct the course of the firm, 
not merely optimize current output. Therefore, understanding stakeholder 
relationships is as important as achieving the organization‟s objectives, 
which is in, turn a matter of survival. This concept can be summed up in 
stakeholder management is a never-ending task of balancing and 
integrating multiple relationships and multiple objectives. (p. 10) 
   A stakeholder approach encourages management to develop strategies by 
looking out from the firm and identifying, and investing in, all the 
relationships that will ensure long-term success. Diverse collections of 
stakeholders can only cooperate over the long run, in spite of their 
differences, if they share common set of core values. For this approach to 
work, values must be incorporated within the strategic management 
process. (p. 10) 
 A stakeholder approach is both a prescriptive and descriptive approach, 
rather than purely empirical and descriptive. It integrates economic, 
political and moral analysis in the strategic management process. 
Stakeholder management relies on the fact that stakeholder relationships 
63 
 
can be created and influenced, and not taken as a given. (p. 11) 
 A stakeholder approach emphasizes “names and faces” for stakeholders 
rather than analyzing particular stakeholder roles. Management then can 
create a level of understanding, options and strategies that have the 
support of all stakeholders. (p. 12) 
 A stakeholder approach calls for an integrated approach to strategic 
decision making. Managers and political leaders must set strategy that 
optimizes ways to satisfy multiple stakeholders simultaneously and not by 
stakeholder by stakeholder. This strategy is successful if it integrates the 
perspective of all stakeholders rather than offsetting one against another. 
(p. 12) 
  Not all stakeholders will win with this strategy but managers and political 
leaders must develop strategies that distribute harm in a manner that 
ensures the long-term support for all stakeholders. Stakeholder interests 
over time must be managed in the same direction. (p. 13) 
More broadly, what then are the implications for political leaders as described 
above by Freeman and McVea (2001)? How then does management implement a 
stakeholder approach? Evan and Freeman (1993) developed a justification of a 
stakeholder approach based on Kantian principals. In its simplest form, this stakeholder 
approach is based on the manager‟s or political leader‟s ability to treat people as ends 
unto themselves. Incumbent upon managers and political leaders is to make decisions 
respecting stakeholders well being rather then treating them as a means to an 
organization‟s end. Phillips (1998) advanced a different perspective in a stakeholder 
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approach in the principle of fairness. When stakeholder groups or individuals enter 
voluntary into cooperative agreements they create an obligation to act fairly. From this 
viewpoint, normal business transactions create a moral obligation for organizations to 
treat stakeholders fairly and thereby consider their interests when making strategic 
decisions. 
A Stakeholder - Approach to Corporate Governance and Organizational Theory 
Continuing a pattern of applying stakeholder theory in the political organization, 
this stream of stakeholder theory has been advanced as a contrast to the traditional view 
that it is the fiduciary duty of management to protect the interests of the shareholder. The 
stakeholder model argues that management and political leaders should make decisions 
for the benefit of all stakeholders in the organization (Freeman & McVea, 2001). 
Williamson (1985) utilized a transaction costs framework to promote shareholders over 
stakeholders because of asset specificity. Williamson further argued that a shareholder‟s 
stake was eminently tied to the success of the organization and would have no residual 
value if the firm failed, unlike those of the labor of a worker. Evan and Freeman (1993) 
contended that by utilizing corporate governance policies, stakeholder relationships could 
be explained. Many other stakeholders have stakes that are somewhat firm specific. As 
shareholders can exit more easily due to the financial (stock) markets than stakeholders, 
asset specificity alone does not grant a prime responsibility towards stockholders at the 
expense of other stakeholder groups (Evan & Freeman, 1993).  
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As restated earlier, Lord (1995) stated, “In political science, the problem of 
governance by representative agents is a pervasive theme because the interests of the 
government representatives and those represented often diverge. This divergence of 
interests is the setting for a classical agency problem” (p. 396). This divergence of 
interests between the constituent and the political leader is essential in understanding and 
applying stakeholder theory to the political realm. 
What implications does that have for various stakeholder groups who cannot exit 
out of the organization such as a disenfranchised taxpayer or voter who cannot leave the 
political organization or government (as cited in Piatt, 2009)? A taxpayer can leave one 
community and move to another, but there is a monumental difference if the taxpayer 
moves from the United States to France. A complimentary view to the stakeholder 
approach was advocated by Goodpaster (1991) in which he developed the theory that 
management appears to have a contractual duty to manage the firm in the interest of the 
stockholders and at the same time management appears to have a moral duty to take 
stakeholders into account (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In the political sense, stockholders 
represent those primarily taxpayers and voters. Other various stakeholder groups include 
being “insiders” to the political organization such as lobbyist or other special interest 
groups with businesses, business organizations, chambers, unions, schools, and other 
trade organizations.  
Others attempts have been made by researchers to expand stakeholder theory into 
what Jones (1995) has referred to as a central paradigm that links agency theory, 
transaction costs and contracts theory into a coherent whole (Jones; Clarkson, 1995). Due 
to these factors and “the accommodating framework the stakeholder concept provided an 
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opportunity to develop an overarching theory that could link together such concepts as 
agency theory, transaction costs, human relationships, ethics and even the environment” 
(Freeman & McVea, 2001,  p. 16). 
A Stakeholder Approach to Social Responsibility and Social Performance 
One aspect of stakeholder theory that has been called into question is the problem 
of identifying stakeholders. Phillips and Reichart (1998) stated that, “stakeholder theory 
is often unable to distinguish those groups or individuals of stakeholders from those who 
are not” (p. 185). Phillips and Reichart further contended, “Stakeholder theory 
nevertheless exists within a backdrop of social and moral rules and mores that also dictate 
behavior both inside and outside the organizational and managerial frame of reference” 
(p. 191). 
In turn, the defining critical question in stakeholder theory happens to be: is there 
such a thing as an illegitimate stakeholder, and if so, how should legitimacy be defined? 
Agle, Mitchell and Sonnefield (1999) have taken a different slant on this question and 
have conducted an empirical study to identify which stakeholders‟ management or 
political leaders actually considers legitimate. Their research offered a theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience that suggested that managers perceptions of three 
key stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy and urgency. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 
(1997) further suggested that researchers might be able to identify stakeholders by 
applying sorting criteria to the field of possibilities (who and what really is a 
stakeholder).  Mitchell et al. (1997) further argue that legitimacy (a claim on a firm, legal 
contract, legal right, legal title, moral right, or moral interest) is required to narrow the 
definition of a stakeholder. They further argued that power to influence the organization‟s 
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behavior whether or not they have a legitimate claim must also be taken in account to 
keep the stakeholder definition broad. Finally, they argued that urgency - a stakeholder‟s 
claim that requires immediate action by the organization-must also be considered in the 
definition of who is a stakeholder. “The inclusion of urgency adds a catalytic/dynamic 
component to the process whereby stakeholders attain salience in the minds of managers” 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 864). In the political process, how political leaders define 
stakeholders is relevant to their impact on the political organization. The stakeholder 
approach above clarifies these characteristics and concepts. This explains the success and 
influence of the stakeholder concept within the fields of business ethics, society and 
government. 
 Utilizing the concepts as presented by Ronald, Bradley, and Donna (1997) 
stakeholder power exists where one actor, A, can get another actor, B, to do something 
that B, would not have otherwise done. Legitimacy is the assumption that actions of the 
entity (stakeholders) are desirable and fit into the realm of norms and beliefs and that 
stakeholder urgency is when claims made by the stakeholder are both important and 
delaying attention to the stakeholder is unacceptable. Consequently, society does grant 
authority (legitimacy and power) to political leaders and as Davis (1973) stated, “In the 
long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible 
will tend to lose it” (p. 314, as cited in Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).                                                                       
Stakeholder Theory Goals 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) approached stakeholder theory through their 
central theses, which they summarized as follows: 
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 Stakeholder theory is descriptive and provides a model of what the 
organization is. It describes the organization as a compendium of co-
operative and competing interests possessing intrinsic values (p. 66). 
 Stakeholder theory is also instrumental. It establishes a framework for 
examining the connections, if any, between the implementation of 
stakeholder management and the achievement of goals of the organization 
(pp. 66-67). 
 Stakeholder theory is also normative and incorporates the idea that 
stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in the 
technical and on-going operations of the organization and are identified by 
their interests in the organization whether or not the organization has any 
resultant useful interest in them (p. 67).  
 Stakeholder theory can be described as managerial in that it moves beyond 
describing existing situations or predicting cause and effect relationships; 
but advocates attitudes, structures and practices that, taken together, 
constitute stakeholder management. Furthermore, stakeholder 
management requires as its key trait, simultaneous attention to the 
legitimate interest of all appropriate stakeholders (p. 67).  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) looked at the integration of the above-mentioned 
concepts and further analyzed stakeholder theory by contrasting and combining 
approaches. The descriptive aspect of stakeholder theory considers and promotes past, 
present, and future states of affairs of the organization and its stakeholders.  
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Instrumental uses of stakeholder theory fuse the connection between stakeholder 
approaches and commonly desired objectives of the firm.  
Political leaders can view stakeholders from three categories as described by 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997): descriptive, 
instrumental, or normative. A descriptive theory would indicate that the organization has 
stakeholders; an instrumental theory would promote the idea that successful organizations 
consider their stakeholders; a normative theory would describe why organizations should 
consider their stakeholders.  
Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) concluded that stakeholder organizations will 
materialize when stakeholders hold critical assets, expose those assets to risk and have 
both influence and voice. Stakeholders must not only be understood at the present-time, 
they must be managed over the long run (Freeman & McVea, 2001). 
Multiplicity of Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory began as a response to the belief that shareholders of stock in 
an organization should be the prime beneficiaries of the organization‟s activities. The 
organization should maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Stakeholder theory relies 
on the multiplicity of groups having a stake in the operation of the organization, all of 
whom should receive consideration in the managerial decision making process (Phillips, 
1998).  
From a systems perspective, Neville and Meguc (2006) stated, “While stakeholder 
theory has traditionally considered organization‟s interactions with stakeholders in terms 
of independent, dyadic relationships it has been suggested through recent scholarship that 
organizations exist within a complex network of interwining relationships” (p. 377). The 
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complexities demonstrate that stakeholder formations are often complex within the 
political environment.  
Further development of stakeholder theory indicates that stakeholder groups 
sometimes compete against each other; secondly, that stakeholder groups forge strategic 
alliances, or may cooperate with each to increase the persuasive power of their combined 
efforts; and thirdly, the stakeholders potential to influence other stakeholders and the 
organization is determined by their actual nature of the role (Neville & Menguc, 2006).  
To measure stakeholder influence Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience suggests that managers will prioritize stakeholder 
claims according to their relative legitimacy, power and urgency. However, Neville and 
Mengue (2006) argued that the notion of the traditional, dyadic stakeholder-organization 
relationship has been too narrow in focus and introduced the concept of stakeholder 
multiplicity. Considering the stake in which stakeholders have in the organization, how 
then are stakeholders defined? Stakeholder theories tend to view stakeholders as 
unidimensional, homogenous groups and construe their behavior in the pursuit of 
interests that are defined by their stake in the organization. Consequently, few 
stakeholder theorists have looked at the motives, identities, ideologies and tactical 
choices of organizational stakeholders and their effect on the organization (de Bakker, 
2008). 
From this viewpoint, stakeholders who are considered secondary by management 
or political leaders impact the organization in various ways. Secondary stakeholders “are 
diverse and include those who are not directly engaged in the organization‟s economic 
activities but are able exert influence or are affected by the organization” (Savage, Nix, 
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Whitehead & Blair, 1991, p. 62). Fringe stakeholders are those groups, which lack a 
formal contractual bond with the organization and do not have a direct legal authority 
over the organization, and thus find themselves having a weak bargaining position with 
the organization (Clarkson, 1995; Easley & Lenox, 2006). Due to these fringe 
stakeholders‟ lack of power in the organization, stakeholder theorists have largely 
ignored their existence. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) further stated that:  
Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power nor 
legitimacy, are the „mosquitoes buzzing in the ears‟ of managers: irksome but not 
dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management 
attention, if any at all. (p. 875)  
Political stakeholders therefore must make their voices known to political leaders so they 
are not ignored and viewed as fringe stakeholders in the political system. 
Up to this point, researchers have taken two approaches to stakeholder 
management. A demographic approach in identifying key stakeholder attributes, or a 
structural approach as a focal point between the relationship of the organization and the 
stakeholder (Frooman & Murrell, 2005). Hirschman, (1970) advanced the idea of that 
stakeholder management can be redirected to secure the loyalty of relevant stakeholders 
to the organization by offering key stakeholders the ability to express their voice and 
partake in the decision making processing.  
de Bakker (2008) further advocated that both primary and secondary stakeholder 
groups undeniably exert influence over the organization through resource dependence 
relationships. Stakeholders influence can be directed from outside the direct relationship 
with the organization and thus stakeholders can claim a position of influence opposite of 
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the organization. Management and political leaders have limited time and resources to 
pay attention to stakeholder claims. As described earlier, Lord (1995) stated, the political 
agency contract is flawed, when constituents have the difficult task of monitoring the 
behavior of their elected official. This process becomes encumbered, as the constituents 
do not have the time, resources, or expertise to monitor public policy processes (Lord). 
Likewise, Lord asserted, legislative agents then fall into the trap of failing to act in the 
interests of their constituents, not because of intentional shirking, but due to lack of 
knowledge. This situation brings about a competing interest between primary and 
secondary stakeholders for the attention of management and political leaders. Stakeholder 
salience is a direct result of this occurrence and management must navigate the blurred 
boundaries between these two groups and determine whom to consider, whom to turn for 
legitimacy and whom to take into account when formulating organizational policy.  
Furthermore, managers must be aware of which stakeholders are supportive of the 
organization‟s activities and those that are not, and the possibility of potential alliances 
that may result and form over different issues. Managers and political bureaucrats, who 
are also known as managers, and political leaders, must be aware of the strength of 
influence of interacting stakeholders and awareness of the potential strength and degree 
of interests these alliances bring (Neville & Menguc, 2006). 
 The Study of Stakeholder Perceptual Differences 
Neville and Menguc (2006) concluded their analysis of stakeholder multiplicity 
by stating stakeholder theory provided a useful tool to understand the influence of key 
stakeholders in the organization. Managers and political leaders must understand the 
interactions of multiple stakeholders within the stakeholder network. Understanding this 
73 
 
framework of conflicting, complimentary or cooperative claims of stakeholders will 
allow managers and political leaders to understand the direction, strength and synergies 
within the stakeholder network. 
Furthermore, Neville and Menguc (2006) stated stakeholder alliances are 
developed with the goal of attaining sufficient salience to influence the organization. As 
managers and political leaders become cognizant of multiple stakeholder groups, the 
salience of one stakeholder group may be ineffective in affecting the organization: 
However, forming an alliance partnership with another stakeholder may increase the 
salience of the new stakeholder group and affect the organization. Managers and political 
leaders must therefore not only consider independent, dyadic relationships but confuses 
the view of interacting stakeholders who can form alliances and affect the organization. 
According to the principal of stakeholder fairness, stakeholders should have a 
slice of the organizational outputs and have a voice in the organization‟s value that is 
consistent with the contributions to the organization. However, stakeholder balance does 
not imply equality of voice or a share in the outputs of the organization. Voice and a 
share in the organization from a management or political leaders view should be based on 
the contributions of the stakeholder to the organization. The more a stakeholder group 
contributes to the organization the more of a voice and share of values created should be 
(Phillips, 2003). 
Expanding on the general foundations of stakeholder theory, Sherwin (1989) 
advocated the general function and purpose of the organization is to act as a principal 
mechanism for producing and distributing economic goods; but the specific purpose is 
dependent upon the perspective of the organizational participants (stakeholders). The 
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emergent factors coming out of stakeholder theory is the view of the organization as the 
nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between stakeholders; the recognition of the 
different stakeholder interests; and finally the definition of management‟s role as a 
mediator between stakeholder interests (Harrington, 1996).  
Harrington (1996) further addressed the issues of stakeholder theory by viewing 
the organization through the ecology of organized economic systems of relationships, 
which emerge through independent systems of various stakeholder groups. Each of these 
diverse stakeholder groups has a unique set of differences, which usually are 
organizationally related, but often times conflicting. The interdependence of stakeholders 
arises because of common goals and a stable organizational environment; however, 
conflicts occur over resource allocation and the possibility of the stakeholders not being 
treated equitably. If the organization is to remain stable then resource allocations 
decisions will be generally equitable over time (Harrington).  
Sharman (1994) contended that no matter what their purpose, organizations play 
an important role in our entire social system. The organization‟s decision processes are 
affected and influenced by a range of often-conflicting priorities and interests among its 
different stakeholders. Trying to understand stakeholders and their varying priorities, and 
the reasons for their decisions, is often difficult. As noted by Sharman, individuals make 
choices based on differing circumstances, values and goals, and therefore, managers- 
leaders need to look an issue from a number of sides in order to balance these often 
competing and complicated priorities.  
How stakeholders interact with the organization reflects their differing goals and 
objectives according to Sharman (1994) and in addition, within a stakeholder group, 
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individual differences will vary depending on their perceptions of how the organization 
or governmental entity‟s behavior will further their interests. Therefore, Sharman 
advocated that management or leaders balance stakeholders‟ needs and priorities, and set 
a direction for the organization. Managers and political leaders must communicate these 
stakeholder needs to throughout the entire organization to validate the mission. Sharman  
further described that the organization analyze the stakeholder groups needs and 
determine how well the organization is meeting those needs, and continually conduct 
stakeholder analysis as an integral part of the organization‟s mission in the strategic 
planning process. As political leaders implement stakeholder analysis, they will be better 
equipped to manage the divergent and competing interests of stakeholder groups they 
represent and be able to create good governance.  
Stakeholder theory is an integrated approach to look at who are stakeholders, how 
stakeholder groups are formed - (formal, informal, voluntary, involuntary, primary, 
secondary, and foundational strategic alliances), and the relevancy of stakeholder groups 
in the organization. Building on this principal leads the researcher to move into the next 
closely related literature stream of principal-agency theory.  
Concept 2: Principal-Agency Theory. 
This section reviews the extant literature related to principal-agency theory. The 
central premise becomes how organizations and leaders can incorporate an agency 
perspective in solving problems having a cooperative structure. Agency theory has been 
widely utilized in several fields such as accounting, economics, finance, marketing, 
political science, organizational behavior and sociology. The relevance for agency theory 
as applied to the political realm is consequential for understanding what happens when a 
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political agent inverts his or her role to that of the principal‟s. When the political agent 
then inverts his or her relationship with the principal then the CUB model is applicable.  
Agency Theory Defined 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their seminal work defined agency relationships in 
this context, “As a contract under which one or more persons (the principal (s) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on the principal‟s behalf, which 
involves delegating some decision making authority of the agent” (p. 5, as cited in Piatt, 
2009). 
 If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The 
principal can limit divergences from his interests by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and incur monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant 
activities of the agent. (p. 310, as cited in Piatt, 2009)  
As discussed earlier, James Madison argued about this problem at length in the 
Federalist Papers. He posited because government representatives are vested and 
entrusted with specific institutional powers and those political agents may then act to 
benefit themselves while neglecting or acting contrary to the interests of their constituents 
who elected them (Mclean, 1788). Again, this is representative of an agency problem. 
In addition, there are situations that will require the principal to pay the agent to 
expend resources (bounding costs) to insure that the agent will not take certain actions 
that could harm the principal or to insure if the agent does take such actions, the principal 
will be compensated (as cited in Piatt, 2009). In most agency relationships, the principal 
and agent will incur monitoring and bounding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary) 
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Jensen and Meckling, 1976, as cited in Piatt, 2009). In addition, there will be some 
departure between the agent‟s decision and those that would maximize the principal‟s 
welfare (Jensen & Meckling, as cited in Piatt).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976, as cited in Piatt, 2009) further postulated there is a 
dollar equivalent loss for the principal (residual loss) for actions taken or not taken by the 
agent that is not in the best interests of the principal. This concept of agency costs is 
defined as the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the 
agent and the residual loss (as cited in Piatt). Agency costs can further arise in any 
situation involving cooperative efforts by two or more people even when there is no 
clearly defined principal-agent relationship (as cited in Piatt). 
An agency problem exists when the problem of introducing an agent to behave as 
if they were maximizing the principals [italics added] welfare (as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
This agency problem exists in all organizations, all cooperative efforts, mutual 
companies, universities, government authorities, unions, and in any defined agency 
relationships where there is a principal and agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, as cited in 
Piatt).  
 The agent thus acquires legal and economic obligations towards the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009). The organization is no longer a single 
monolithic actor, but is comprised of a complex set of interactions among several 
individuals (as cited in Piatt). This formulation of principal-agent interactions is 
considered a nexus of contracts between principals and agents (Maitland, 1994, as cited 
in Piatt). In this context, by looking at various stakeholder groups within the political 
system interact, and how political agents sometimes invert their role with the principal, 
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U.S. Representative Tim Johnson, R-Champaign, Illinois, in a recent statement regarding 
the financial crisis and massive spending bailouts facing our nation, stated:    
I simply cannot support expenditures of this magnitude that are patched together 
in haste, that are laden with special-interest sweeteners to attract votes because the 
package cannot stand on its merits. As stewards of the people‟s resources we are 
morally obligated to do better. I believe government does have a role in this 
process and shares responsibility for this crisis. I believe we must restore 
confidence and accountability. We are in this mess because people in privileged 
positions made unwise, risky decisions; I will not be part of the same mistake. 
(Johnson, 2008, p. A6)  
Congressman Johnson‟s statement illustrated the correct principal-agency 
relationship, as defined by the U.S. Constitution and our representative democracy 
political system. The agent (political leader) acts, not in self-interest, but in accordance 
with the moral values of the principal (taxpayers) and constitutional legal requirements.  
Furthering this discussion, Bohren (1998) contended usually there are different 
goals and interests among individuals involved in agency relationships. Agency theory 
assumes that individuals are opportunistic and strive to maximize their own interests. 
Thus, there are no guarantees that agents will act in the best interests of the principal. 
Conflicting interests between principal and agent then introduce the constant temptation 
for agents to maximize their own interests, even at the expense of the principals. An 
example of this occurs when a legislative agent hires his own family members at the 
expense of someone who is more qualified. In the business community, this can occur 
when a purchasing agent obtains special favors or other valuable considerations from a 
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vendor to benefit them over the company, and shares bid documents with the vendor to 
underbid the vendor‟s competitor.  
Agency theory and agency cost present another relevant dimension to the mix. In 
an organization when incomplete information and uncertainty are prevalent, two kinds of 
problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard  
Adverse selection refers to agents potentially misrepresenting their ability to do 
the work as agreed to. Moral hazard refers to the dangers of agents shirking their tasks 
and not putting forth their best efforts. This divergence between the principal and agent 
inevitably generates costs that result in the agent‟s failure to maximize the principal‟s 
wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the government realm, this often occurs when a 
governmental official hires someone due to their political party affiliation who is deemed 
more qualified than a person who is from the opposing political party. Another example 
is when a person is hired, and shirks their job duties because of their party affiliation. 
Both troublesome occurrences happen when hiring is done strictly on patronage and not 
qualifications.  
Shankman (1999) advocated that the central point of agency theory is to develop 
procedures that ensure the alignment of interests between the agent and the principal, thus 
reducing agency costs. Shankman also advanced the notion that principals are required to 
design contracts that protect their interests and maximize their utility in cases of conflicts. 
Shankman argued that these contracts are made with several assumptions regarding 
agents including self-interest, limited rationality, risk aversion, and goal conflicts 
between members and information (asymmetrical). 
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Bohren (1998) further addressed the issues of an agent acting morally would be 
reasonable if it presented a greater economic incentive in terms of utility and pleasures to 
the contrary. Since agency theory subscribes to individualism, it reasons that every 
endeavor agents seek is to increase their own utility. Perez- Lopez (1991) contended if 
the interests of other people are not taken into account, there will be less information 
available and it will be difficult to make the right decisions. 
Advocating the primary focus of the principal-agent literature, Eisenhardt (1989) 
defined what the optimal contract (behavior versus outcome) is between the agent and the 
principal. The simple model assumes goal conflict between principal and agent. It can be 
an easily measured outcome for an agent who is more risk adverse than the principal 
(Eisenhardt). Demski and Feltham (1978) described two aspects of agency theory. The 
first is a simple case of complete information where the principal knows what the agent 
has done (as cited in Eisenhardt). This makes the agent more risk adverse than the 
principal since the contract is based on behavioral outcomes. In the second case, the 
principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Because the agent has self-
interest and may not behave as agreed upon, an agency problem arises. The principal 
cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately as outlined in the contract.  
The second case illustrates a moral hazard, where an agent seeks his or her own 
self-interest over those of the principal‟s. Moral hazard is the expectation that a person 
who is insulated from risk may behave differently from the way they would behave if it 
they were fully exposed ... (Eisenhardt). In the political realm, a legislative agent might 
not be so forthcoming on a controversial bill to the public. The bill might contain 1000 
pages of convoluted and intertwining bills and amendments attached. The agent then is 
isolated from being exposed to the public by stating that they did not quite understand the 
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complex bill to begin with: something the American public witnessed recently in 
President Obama‟s stimulus package. The agent produces little or no effort and shirks his 
or her duty. For example, an agent (employee) works on a personal research project on 
company time where the project is so complex that the principal (management) cannot 
detect what the employee is actually doing.  
Adverse selection according to Eisenhardt (1989) arises when an agent 
misrepresents his or her ability to the principal. An agent or representative of the 
principal, can claim abilities and skills sets that the principal cannot completely verify 
(Eisenhardt). For example, a research scientist asserts to posses a unique set of complex 
scientific skills when hired, but, for instance, and the principal (employer) cannot verify 
these skills sets (Eisenhardt). A political example of this is when a political hire that is 
deemed very qualified, but due to party affiliation is not questioned on their specific skill 
sets or ability to produce quality work. The manager might not be able to questions the 
skills of the political hire due to that person coming from influential leaders in the ruling 
party. 
 A principal who is challenged with the agent‟s misrepresentations or lack of effort 
has two options according to Eisenhardt (1989), one is to discover the agent‟s behavior 
by investing in information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, and 
additional layers of management. These added layers of information can aid the principal 
in acquiring complete information and reveal the agent‟s behavior to the principal. The 
second option is to contract the outcomes of the agent‟s behavior (Eisenhardt). The 
outcome-based contract aligns behavior and preferences of the agent with those of the 
principal, but incurs a cost for transferring risk to the agent (Eisehhardt). When the risk 
for the uncertainty of the outcome is low for the agent, the cost of shifting risk are low, 
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and outcome -based contracts become attractive (Eisenhardt). Conversely, when 
uncertainty of the agent‟s behavior increases, it becomes more expensive to shift the risk 
to the agent, despite the motivational benefits for the outcome-based contracts 
(Eisenhardt).  
As described above, agency theory deals with actions of the agent in relation to 
the principal. When the agent does not perform (due to lack of effort or misrepresentation 
of himself or herself), the principal is faced with moral hazard and adverse selection. 
“Democratic performance is contingent upon agents because they are employed exactly 
when incentives often fail, either out of inefficiency or  out of subversion” (Miller & 
Whitford, 2006, p. 231).  
The next section deals with how agency theory contributes to organizational 
theory.  
Contributions of Agency Theory to Organizational Thinking 
The further development and utilization of incentives and self-interest, agency 
theory makes its way into organizational thinking (Perrow, 1986). Organizational life is a 
factor of self-interest, and agency theory deals with common problem structures across 
research topics (Eisnehardt 1989). Barney and Ouchi (1986) described organizational 
research as being more topic than centered on theory and that agency theory further 
prompts us that common problems structures do exist across various research domains.  
Agency theory also makes significant contributions to organizational thinking by 
viewing information as a commodity (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in Piatt, 2009). 
Information has costs and, as such, can be purchased. This has significance for the 
organization through the implementation of formal information systems, such as 
budgeting or management by objectives (MBO) and boards of directors; and informal 
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systems such as managerial supervision, a concept commonly used exclusively in 
organizational research (Eisenhardt, as cited in Piatt). This suggests that organizations 
can invest in information systems to control an agent‟s opportunism (Eisenhardt, as cited 
in Piatt). Governments can also take advantage of this organizational technique by 
utilizing reform commissions such as the ethical reform commission instituted by Illinois 
Governor Patrick Quinn. Using these techniques, government can set up governmental 
(MBO) relating to ethical behavior in government, and use the foundation of the 
commission to monitor unethical political behavior. 
Furthering this concept, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued for using information 
systems to monitor executives (agents) behaviors via a board of directors (as cited in 
Piatt, 2009). From an agency perspective, boards can provide richer information and 
monitor shareholder or stakeholder interests. Top executives (agents) are more likely to 
engage in behaviors that are consistent with stakeholder‟s interests. From an operational 
viewpoint, frequent board meetings, subcommittees, members with specific industrial and 
managerial experience, and board members representing specific stakeholder groups add 
to the overall monitoring process of the agent‟s behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989, as cited in 
Piatt).  
The use of agency theory in the organizational setting is significant. Organizations 
that utilize and purchase information and use board meetings to constantly review and 
monitor an agent‟s behavior in the organization can reduce the effects of an agent‟s self-
interest. The organization can further implement procedures to monitor the executive 
performance and insure the agent‟s interests are in line with the organization‟s.  
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The government‟s use of agency theory in the organizational setting can assist those in 
leadership to review, monitor, and reduce elected official s misuse of power. Ethical 
reform commissions, better government associations, and the media, all can collaborate 
to root out the self-serving behaviors of political agents that are corrupt or illegal. 
The Validity of Agency Theory in the Organization 
When agency problems occur, a common approach from the positivist (actual 
knowledge is based on actual sense experiences) perspective is to identify a policy or 
behavior in which the stakeholder and management interests diverge, and then to 
demonstrate that information systems or outcome-based incentives solve the agency 
problem (Eisnehardt, 1989). 
Advancing this concept, Eisnehardt (1989) stated that agency theory is more 
applicable in the organization where contracting problems are difficult and where 
substantial goal conflicts between the principal and the agent are possible. Two 
approaches are apparent in applying agency theory. One approach applies the agency 
structure to the organizational behavior that relates to information asymmetry or 
cooperative situations (Eisehardt). Thus, agency theory can contribute to the organization 
by examining how self-interested behavior affect the organization and can lead to a better 
understanding  when such behaviors are likely to occur and when they will be effective. 
A second approach to agency theory, according to Eisenhardt, is to expand pure forms of 
the behavior and outcome contracts leading to a broader range of contracting alternatives.  
As top managers, through multiple compensation schemes, are rewarded, the 
organization can look at this phenomenon and its effects by moving away from the 
current focus of single rewards and the behavior consequences and moving towards 
monitoring the effects of a broader spectrum of contracting.  
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The richness and complexity of agency theory would be enhanced through this process 
(Eisenhardt).  
 Hirsh, Michaels and Freeman (1987) argued that the traditional view of 
economics is dominated by a single paradigm, price theory, and a single view of human 
nature, self-interest. In contrast, the authors contended that organizational research is a 
mixture of  theories that result in a more realistic view of the organization. Eisnehardt 
(1989) agreed with Hirsch et al. to use agency theory supplemented by complimentary 
theories. The organization‟s management can gain a deeper understanding of the 
complexities facing the organization by examining additional perspectives in conjunction 
with agency theory. As Eisenhardt noted, “Agency theory provided a unique and realistic, 
and empirically testable perspective on problems of a cooperative effort” (p. 72).  
In summary, agency theory is a useful tool in analyzing relationships of the 
principal-agent and agency problems in the organization. Fontrodona and Sison (2006) 
state the nexus  of contractual relationships of the organization be defined as a 
community of persons, each of whom is endowed with a unique dignity, and the 
organization, since it is a human institution, has various members and no single owner. 
Finally, according to Putman (2000), new forms of organizations should give priority to 
persons rather than relationships and that maximum care are given so, as not to diminish 
social capital and that the market is not allowed to rule over the entire sphere of human 
relations. This applies to government as well, by giving priority to its citizens, and not 
just special interest groups who are in favorable relationships with those in elected office. 
What are the implications, however, for stakeholders when agents reverse their 
roles and act or assume the role as a principal?  
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The next section introduces the concept of corruption and its impacts on an 
organization and especially on political organizations and the consequences for good 
governance. 
Concept 3: Corruption 
“Read it and weep for good government gone” (as cited in Angelo, 2008, p. E3) 
stated former Illinois governor Dan Walker, who served time for corruption, discussing 
James Merriner‟s book on the political life of former Governor George Ryan. Merriner 
(2008) argued that Ryan presided over a corrupt empire as Illinois Secretary of State. 
  Thus, we have the starting point for discussing political corruption in Illinois 
politics and the consequences it has on good governance. The researcher looked at the 
various streams of literature associated with corruption and its effects on the public 
policy. In addition, political corruption is explored through the lens of the agent and the 
principal, and its impact on good governance.  
Political corruption in broadly stated terms is the misuse of office for unofficial 
ends (Klitgaard, 1998). However, research indicates that corruption correlates closely 
with corrupt deeds or activities that are considered morally wrong (Johnson, 1994). There 
are other problems with this broad definition according to The Hungarian Gallup Institute 
(1999) an international institute on corruption. The institute stated that the broad 
definition is “Largely dependent upon culture, historic age, actual social climate, and 
social groups whose activities can be perceived as corruptive” (p. 1). 
Definitions of Corruption 
Heidenheimer and Johnston (2008) broke down corruption into three categories: 
public office-centered; market-centered and public interest –centered. 
Public Office-centered corruption: “Political corruption is behavior which 
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deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of (close family, personal, 
private, clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967, as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 
2008, p. 8). 
Market-centered corruption: A corrupt politician regards (public) office as a 
(separate) business and will seek to maximize the income from the corrupt acts (van 
Klaveren, 1989 as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).  
Public-interest-centered corruption: The pattern of corruption exists when a  
politician, who is a responsible office holder, is charged with doing certain things for 
monetary or other rewards not legally provided for. They also are induced to take actions 
which favor those who provided the rewards and thereby damages the publics and their 
interests (Friedrich, 1989, as cited in Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2008).  
In a representative-democratic system, trust in the honesty of public officials is 
crucial. Despite the presumed essential honesty in government, however, there has been a 
long tradition of popular rogues who are considered dishonest and corrupt but retain their 
popularity for their strong and effective leadership (West & Stewart, n.d.). In the long-run 
public interest depends on private virtue (Wilson, 1985). On the other hand, as Robinson 
(1975) stated, “A democratic system cannot survive a monetary or social crisis with 
institutions that lack the public‟s respect” (p. 97).  
West and Stewart (n.d.) further contended that voters prefer honesty and 
leadership in leaders. Yet those politicians who are perceived as dishonest and corrupt 
can actually be rated high on their job performance if their leadership skills offset their 
lack of integrity. They described an effective leader who is perceived as honest, is 
considered a popular leader; one who is an effective leader and dishonest is called a 
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popular rogue; one who is an ineffective leader and honest is considered an unpopular 
leader; one who is both dishonest and ineffective is considered an unpopular rogue. 
Oftentimes, politicians seek to divert attention from their misdeeds to their 
opponents. The accused politician employs media spin control to present their plight in a 
more favorable light to themselves and the public (Kurtz, 1998). “As long as the political 
leader is perceived as effectively managing government, providing strong direction and 
not paralyzed by the scandal, the voters will judge and balance the politician on honesty 
and leadership in their overall assessments” (West and Stewart, n.d., p. 12). However, 
they argued that when popular rogues face legal indictment for corruption, voters form a 
different perception, namely, facts, evidence and legal reasoning matter more than media-
political spin and the politician has less ethical room to maneuver using these spin tactics.  
The integration of political spin and the concept of government as an organization 
then advances the idea that “All organizations are public to some degree, because 
political authority affects some of the behavior and processes of all organizations” 
(Bozeman, 1987, p. 84). Political constraint, Bozeman‟s argument is significant because 
it links the public interest with a broader purpose to expand the generalized constituency 
of an organization. Cooper (1991) stated in order for government to remain efficient, its 
citizens should view it as one that maximizes the full range of public-private relationships 
for any given inputs. This view is consistent with looking at political corruption at the 
organizational level.  
In Acton‟s famous statement “that all power tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely” (as cited in Applewhite & Evans, 1992, p. 278), there is a political 
paradox of power and morals in his statement. Lord Acton focused on the moral 
depravity of men, which he believed was caused by power. Friedrich (1972) advanced 
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this by looking at what caused leaders to think no longer about what is right action or 
conduct, but only about expedient action or conduct that produced practices that were 
dysfunctional and morally corrupt. In other words, when political agents acquiring power, 
this can produce dysfunctional and morally corrupt behaviors and does not benefit the 
good of society.  
Friedrich (1972) links corruption with a functional component (as it aids in 
buying loyalty of corrupt officials) as restated in Heidenheimer and Johnston, (2008) as:     
A form of coercion, namely economic coercion. Not only the buying and selling 
of votes and actual monetary rewards, but all the more indirect forms, such as 
gifts or otherwise influencing judgment of those who exercise government 
functions, are instrumentalities in this sphere. (p.16)  
Freidrich (1972) contended there are degrees of corruption and it is endemic in all 
forms of government. According to this view, corruption can serve as a check on 
functional or coercive power and its abuse. Complications arise when power appears to 
be consensual, whether it is not, or when power appears to consensual for some groups 
and not for others. 
 Caiden (1990) suggested that corruption at times may be functional (a) to speed 
up the legislative and administrative processes; (b) to make bureaucracy more 
approachable and humane for those stakeholders who have not yet adjusted to a modern 
way of life (third world countries); (c) to overcome excessive and inflexible bureaucratic 
systems; (d) to integrate alienated stakeholder groups (politically weak  ethnic, religious, 
and radical groups) and thereby providing an alternative to violence for these particular 
stakeholder groups; and (e) to enable entrepreneurs to function in difficult business 
environments. A certain amount of corruption is tolerated when government appears to 
90 
 
be satisfying citizen‟s needs. For instance, Chicago‟s Mayor Daley, administration is 
plagued by scandals and corruption such as the hired truck scandal, and pervasive fraud 
in hiring and contracts, yet, it is tolerated by the citizens of Chicago and seen as a city 
that works. 
Even though corruption may be functional, there is no apparent need to worry 
about this. Nye (1967) suggested a cost-benefit matrix where corruption could be 
considered harmful based on its impact on economic development, national integration, 
and governmental capacity. Heywood (1997) postulated this worsens the effects of the 
administration, the more it encouraged corruption and further worsened the effects of the 
administration (p. 427). In a contrary view,  Nas, Price, and Weber (1986) used Nye‟s 
approach and suggested that if corruption has a positive effective on social welfare it is 
beneficial, if it has negative consequences, detrimental. 
Corruption is likely to occur on every observer‟s list of issues that threaten 
sustainable development and good governance (Pillay, 2004). Heymans and Lipietz 
(1999) thought corruption had a dynamic core that runs contrary to accountability and the 
rule of law because it destabilizes governance, diminishes public trust in the credibility of 
the state, and threatens the ethics of government and society. Frisch (1994) agreed with 
Heymans and Lipietz “… corruption kills the development spirit - nothing is as 
destructive to a society as the rush to quick and easy money which makes fools of those 
who can work honestly and constructively” (pp. 60-61).  
Corruption is on the upswing as evidenced by recent media reports and offers an 
interesting illustration on the links between corruption and good governance. Corruption 
violates the contract between citizens (stakeholders and principals) and public officials 
(agents of the principals) and has serious implications for effective government (Pillay, 
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2004). Most of corruption is not technically illegal but often opportunistic and referred to 
as rent-seeking behavior (Gallagher, 1991). Economists frequently view this in a narrow 
way as “the direct use or waste of economic resources for non-economic gain” (p. 31). 
Werlin (2002) preferred to see it as “legalized or systemic manifestations of greed” (p. 
345). In addition, Werlin argued that rent-seeking behavior results from bad or weak 
governance and that it can be more damaging to the political and economic systems than 
explicit structures of corruption that are illegal. 
Redefining Corruption and Good Governance  
Introducing another definition of corruption, Werlin (1998) wrote that corruption 
is the subversion of statesmanship by partnership or governance of greed and stated, 
Political systems are most effective when authority
 
is widely dispersed without 
diminishing the ultimate responsibility
 
of top leadership for results. Leaders must 
rely upon non-persuasive forms of power (e.g.,
 
coercion, corruption, or 
intimidation); their capacity to delegate
 
responsibility is limited. The more elastic 
the organization
 
or political system, the softer are the more normal manifestations
 
of power, allowing and encouraging delegation of responsibility,
 
decentralization, 
widespread participation, deregulation, communication
 
from below, and 
constructive criticism.
 
Political elasticity theory is here used to overcome such 
persistent
 
dichotomies in administrative literature as: leadership followership;
 
conflict/harmony; centralization/decentralization; regulation/deregulation;
 
private 
sector/public sector control; and elitism/pluralism. It is also used to revaluate 
development administration literature. (p. 49)
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Werlin‟s (2002, pp. 347-348) theory flows from the following five propositions:  
I. Government will be more successful if those in positions of authority can 
integrate  soft forms of political power (linking incentives to persuasion) 
and hard forms of power (disincentives and coercion); As political leaders 
integrate and alternate between soft and hard forms of power, their 
political power allows them to delegate and decentralize.  
II. Political leaders can increase their power in various ways without losing 
control by expanding their influence, reliability, and predictability thereby 
affecting the behavior of wider circles of stakeholders.  
III. Political elasticity is comprised of political hardware (“objective” forms of 
the organization, regulation, procedure and technology) and political 
software -subjective quality of relationships between principal-agents)  
IV. Political software becomes more effective by implementing good 
governance (hiring qualified people, improved communication processes 
and morale, developing conflict-resolutions, promoting legitimacy, 
training and protecting independent spheres of authority). If these steps 
listed are not managed properly, reform efforts are difficult to implement 
in the governmental organization.   
V. Political software includes the balancing of the struggle for competitive 
advantage and the struggle for consensus.  
 Werlin (2002) looked at “primary corruption as excessive partisanship or greed; 
and secondary corruption as governmental inability to control or mitigate a situation” (p.  
347). Secondary corruption becomes a delicate balance between greed and governance. 
As the dysfunctions and manifestations of greed increase, good governance becomes 
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weaker. Secondary corruption of greed is more uncontrollable as compared to the 
primary form, according to Werlin. 
Further demonstrating the difference between primary and secondary corruption, 
Werlin (2002) viewed primary corruption as merely a political problem, whereas 
secondary corruption; as a form of political illness. Werlin stated that primary corruption 
is like a first degree burn (painful but not deep) whereas secondary corruption is like a 
third degree burn (penetrating deeper in the skin). Therefore, secondary corruption 
undermines an already weak government system and requires substantial political reform 
before punitive measures can be effective in restoring order (Werlin). 
What is the significant relationship between good governance and corruption? 
Gardiner (1993) defined corruption as the abuse of public power and authority for private 
and other group gains. At the United Nations 13
th
 Anti-Corruption Conference (1989) it 
was stated:  
Good governance requires the highest standards of integrity, openness and 
transparency and was not only concerned with new forms and dimensions of 
corruption, but also its pervasive effect on government performance, use of public 
resources, general morale of public services and the legitimacy of the state and 
law. (p. 1) 
At the United Nations Crime Congress (1990) it was discussed that dealing with 
corruption is important when dealing with public officials who engaged in corrupt 
activities, which can destroy the potential benefits of government programs, encumber 
development, and abuse individuals and stakeholder groups.  
94 
 
Therefore, good governance results is based on  integrity, efficiency, the economy of the 
government, the effectiveness of the government, and how the governments 
organizational activities are directed (Doig, 1995).  
Corruption negatively affects good governance by the continual outpouring of 
money to influence and manipulate government. Corruption is manifested in every 
society. It is a sign of society not managing effectively its resources for public purposes 
or for the overall good of its members. Corruption results in resources being privatized 
and appropriated for private gain by political leaders at the expense of the public that is 
supposed to be served by the government (Charlick, 1992-93).   
In changing times the character and face of corruption change, and though 
corruption may be constrained through transformations of its character, most importantly 
it cannot be destroyed (Doig, 1995). This remains a key component in combating 
corruption. 
In summary, political corruption and its gradients of corrupt acts and salient 
characteristics can be viewed through a matrix as developed by Peters and Welch (1978). 
A political act is corrupt when it violates some formal standard or rule of behavior set 
down by a political system for its public officials (Peters & Welch). According to 
Heidenheimer (1970), as cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston (2008), corruption is, if both 
the public and public officials judge it be correct and wish it to be restricted. 
Peters and Welch (1978) formulated the following postulates on perceived 
corruption:     
 When we look at a public official involved in an alleged act of corruption, was the 
official acting in the performance of the official‟s political duties? Misusing one‟s 
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political office for private gain is more objectionable than engaging in behavior 
outside of one‟s official duties.  
 If a public official is in a judicial or other non- political post, certain acts are 
considered more corrupt than if the public official holds a political post.  
 If the corrupt actor is the donor of the payoff or recipient of the political favor, 
and if the donor is considered a constituent, the favor will be viewed as less 
corrupt than if the donor was a non-constituent since the legitimacy of constituent 
services outweighs that of non-constituencies. 
 Private favors and non-constituency favors will be seen as more corrupt than 
those with a large public benefit or those done for a constituent. In addition, if the 
favor is done in routine performance of duty rather than extraordinary service, it is 
less likely to be seen as corrupt. 
 If a corrupt act involves a payoff, the larger the payoff, the more perceived degree 
of corruptness. In addition, a short-range benefit from a payoff is considered more 
corrupt than a longer-term yield.  
From an historic view, Peters and Welch (1978) contended political corruption in 
America has not been subject to the rigorous analysis of other political phenomena‟s in 
recent times. Political corruption is inherently difficult to define. Peters and Welch 
demonstrated that the public opinion‟s definition is more useable by refining it to allow 
gradients of corrupt acts. Determining why public officials hold similar or divergent 
beliefs about what makes a particular act corrupt or not allows the citizens to monitor 
their behavior. Welch and Peters (1977) also explored the differences in perceptions of 
corruption based on social class and demographic variables (race, religion and sex). 
Patterns may merge, helping to identify which office holders, institutions, or processes, 
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which are susceptible to political corruption. Sources of political corruption then could be 
systemically identified (Peters & Welch).  
In order to gain a better understanding of the effects of corruption in a political 
system, Merriner (2008) looks at the political behavior of former Illinois governor 
George H. Ryan. Merriner understood that Ryan‟s motives might be puzzling but that 
they are not opaque; the key to understanding Ryan is that he is the son [italics added] of 
a political machine. Merriner states, “A machine that runs on an intricate system of 
rewards and coercions, based on the values of loyalty and tribalism” (p, 1).  
Merriner (2008) explored how Ryan was raised in a politically corrupt system and 
the negative effects it had on stakeholders for governance. An example of this is in one of 
Ryan‟s political sponsors, former state senator Edward McBroom, who distributed state 
jobs at the former Manteno Mental Health Center. Through unwritten and often informal 
agreements, citizens seeking jobs, it was clear they had to or at least believed their jobs 
were dependent upon purchasing a car from McBroom‟s Cadillac dealership (Merriner). 
Although Ryan became accustomed to operating in this corrupt political 
environment, in its seven-year investigation of Ryan‟s actions in office, the U.S. Justice 
Department never directly accused Ryan of extorting cash for specific favors.  
Rather, he used his political office to curry favors and take care of himself and his friends 
in exchange for loyalty and personal gains (Merriner, 2008). 
The initial position of former governor George Ryan differs vastly with his latest 
statement to President Bush in November 2008, (as cited by Zorn, 2008) when he was 
seeking a commutation or presidential pardon, former Governor Ryan stated: 
I accept the verdict against me, and I apologize to the people of Illinois for my 
conduct. There is a deep shame for me in serving this 78-month sentence resulting 
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from my public corruption conviction. My failings have brought deep humiliation 
upon my family, cost me my reputation and name, brought financial ruin to me 
and my wife and, worst of all, caused me to be away from Lura Lynn when, in our 
twilight years, she needs me most. My heart is heavy, knowing that I have hurt the 
public, my family and my friends in failing to keep their trust. I have failed them 
and for that, I have profound remorse. (p. 2)  
This statement differs significantly, from what Ryan told reporters in early 
November, 2007 as he reported for prison, “I will report to the federal corrections 
facility… [but] with a clear conscience.” He further stated, “I have said since the 
beginning of this ten year ordeal that I am innocent” (Zorn, 2008, p. 2).  
The differences of these statements within one year indicate that former governor 
Ryan in seeking a commutation or presidential pardon changed “his tune” on his level of 
guilt. Agency theory once again is at play. Ryan inverted his role from political agent to 
principal. Again, it further demonstrates when an agent of the people acts as an principal 
and treats the government resources as their own. However, when reality struck and the 
former governor sought a commutation of his sentence he expressed remorse, “for my 
heart is heavy, knowing that I have hurt the public, my family and my friends in failing to 
keep their trust. I have failed them and for that I have profound remorse” (Zorn, 2008, p. 
2). By applying agency theory to Ryan‟s behavior, it is evidently clear, that he abused the 
trust of the citizens of Illinois and acted out of self-serving interest. Ryan believed the 
governor‟s office was his own personal resource and inverted the agency relationship 
between acting as an agent of the people of Illinois to one of acting as a principal.                                                                                                                                         
 
 
98 
 
 Kass (2008) added that, 
 Ryan betrayed the people, who have a right to expect honest service from their 
government. His corruption also left a body count. Nine people, including the six 
Willis children, were killed in crashes with truck drivers who paid bribes for 
licenses when Ryan was Illinois secretary of state. Dozens of others in his office 
went to prison before him, convicted of selling licenses for bribes, with much of 
the money going into Ryan‟s campaign fund so he could be elected governor. And 
others were ruined. (p. 2) 
 Kass (2008) further explored the issue of Ryan and stated, “In what universe does 
redemption come without cost, where cynicism so casually dresses itself up as mercy and 
compassion” (p. 2). Herein, lies the issues of corruption, unethical behavior, and remorse, 
when Ryan was faced with serving an entire prison sentence. Ryan expected mercy and 
compassion from the courts while engaging in unethical, corrupt, and illegal behavior. 
The remorse that Ryan showed at the last minute again shows the self-serving interest of 
his behavior. The citizens of Illinois deserved more from their imprisoned governor. 
As evidenced by the previously discussed literature on corruption, the net effects 
of corruption directly relate to and affect the political leaders to represent their 
constituents. As stated previously, corruption results in resources being privatized and 
appropriated for private gain by political leaders at the expense of the public that is 
supposed to be served by the government (Charlick, 1992-93). 
  The next components reviewed from the literature are public choice and political 
motivations. A discussion on how both of these concepts are applicable to stakeholders, 
principle-agency theory and applicable good governance. 
 
99 
 
Concept 4: Governance  
Governance Overview 
Good governance is the foundation and prerequisite of good government. Hunter 
and Shah (1998, as cited in Piatt, 2009) stated:   
Governance quality is enhanced, according to this theory, by more closely 
matching services with citizen preferences, and by moving governments closer to 
the people, they are intended to serve, which ensures greater accountability of the 
public sector. Governance is a multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of 
the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the 
management of the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is 
thus determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life 
enjoyed by its citizens. (p. 2)  
The central theme of governance as related to agency theory, is the when the 
political agent inverts the principal-agent relationships and its consequential effects on 
the governance system (as cited in Piatt, 2009). What happens when an elected official 
who is the agent of the electorate inverts their relationship to the duties or contractual 
responsibilities within the principal-agency relationship (as cited in Piatt)? From a 
perspective of governance, the elected official (the agent) represents and is put into office 
by the electorate (the principal). The elected- official, who is the representative, or 
servant of the people, is in fact running the political mansion, so to speak. However, 
when the political leader subverts their responsibility of the agency relationship, becomes 
deceitful, and inverts the agent - principal relationship becomes skewed (as cited in Piatt). 
The political system then enters into disequilibrium state as compared to the ideal, as 
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stated in the United States Constitution of a representative republic form of government 
of, by, and for the people (as cited in Piatt). 
O‟ Farrell (2009) declared that “good governance leads to good government” (p. 
1). Bad governance is therefore a function of a corrupt politicians‟ self-serving behavior 
and their never-ending need for power, hubris, and ownership for the electorates‟ 
resources present devastating effects on good governance strategies. Consequently, it 
becomes essential to restore the public‟s confidence in their elected officials. “Without 
that trust, it will be nearly impossible for government – any government to implement the 
needed reforms to right the many wrongs” (p. 1). In addition, O‟Farrell described that the 
electorate should not tolerate any politician or government that intentionally misleads or 
withholds information, with the purposes of retaining power. He further expounded on 
the notion that governments often bend the truth to suit their own political advantage; 
therefore, the rise of political culture puts the retention of power ahead of the public 
interest.  
Concept 5: Public Choice 
Public choice is a literature stream in economics. It is best defined “as the 
application of the rational choice model to non-market decision-making” (Hill, 1999, p. 
1). In a more general sense, it is the application of economics to political science. 
Buchanan (1949), one of the founders of public choice, argued, that public choice 
involves the science of exchanges. The substance and subject matter of public choice is 
the tool for political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behavior, party 
politics, the bureaucracy, etc. In addition, the methodology of public choice utilizes 
economics. A basic tenant of public choice, as with economics, is the belief that man is 
egotistical, rational, and a utility maximizer (Mueller, 1979).  
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One of the interesting facets of economics is the demonstration that individuals 
with purely selfish motives can mutually benefit from exchange. In a simplified 
economics model, actor A raises corn and actor B raises cattle; both actors can then 
improve their welfare by exchanging cattle for corn. In conjunction with price systems, 
this process can accommodate assortment of goods and services in the market place 
(Mueller, 1979). 
Hill (1999) stated that public choice views individuals in the political process as 
pursuing utility maximization, subject to the organizational and budgetary constraints 
facing them. There are no distinctions made between individuals or stakeholder groups 
operating in the market place or political field. The government is seen as providing 
goods and services to its constituents or stakeholders, and those goods and services may 
be difficult to obtain in the market. Hence, the equilibrium and prices are stable. 
What happens, if unlike the example stated above of mutual exchange, (positive 
sum game), both actors enter into and pursue a situation of negative sum game behavior, 
in which each actor engages in stealing assets from one another? Both actors engage in 
stealing, in their selfish pursuits leave both actors worse off (Mueller, 1979). Olson 
(2000) also discussed this issue as a form of a stationary bandit, a tyrant who has an 
incentive to encourage a degree of economic success, since he will expect to be in power 
long enough to take a share of it. 
Public choice becomes clearer when political leaders try to maximize their own 
utilities. Patronage, funding from special interest groups and the concealment thereof, and 
pork barrel projects all combine to form an epidemic of chronic corruption in government 
(Merriner, 2008). Merriner indicated that if politicians would observe section 1346 of the 
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U.S. mail fraud statute, Honest service is required of public officials, [italics added] they 
would not place themselves in these situations. 
The public choice literature focuses on three aspects in a representative 
democracy: the behavior of elected officials or representatives for office, during the 
campaign and after elected; the behavior of the voter in choosing representatives; and the 
characteristics of the outcomes in a representative democracy. Public choice theory is 
reliant upon the condition that political leaders, like voters, are rational and seek to 
maximize their utilities (Mueller, 1979).  
   Therefore, in a representative democracy, “parties formulate policies in order to 
win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 28).  
Agency theory is then demonstrated by the fact the agent is trying to be re-elected for 
their self-serving interests, rather than formulating public policies for the benefit of 
society. Whereas, individuals with differing preferences engage in a cooperative effort to 
win an election and therefore set policies which benefit or maximize their stakeholder 
utilities at the individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (March, 1962;  
Pfeffer, 1981). 
Emphasizing public choice in the government sector suggests that certain actions 
taken by government officials often become biased in favor of current benefits, rather 
than future ones, that are hard to identify, even though the net present value of the cost is 
greater than the net present value of the benefits (Hill, 1999).  
This cost benefit scenario has further ramifications for political leaders who seek 
to maximize their current utilities over ones in the future, which could provide greater 
utilities to the stakeholder. Hill (1999) further contended that the public choice model has 
103 
 
an inherent danger that may decrease civic virtues and limit the ability of stakeholders to 
look beyond their self- interests. 
If public choice looks at how political leaders seek to maximize their own 
utilities, what then are political leader‟s true motivations for seeking political office? Are 
politicians seeking office to affect policy or merely to be the recipient of the benefits and 
rewards of that office?  Political leader‟s motivations are addressed next in the context of 
how it affects stakeholders and governance. 
Concept 6: Political Motivations 
Politicians often discuss their motives for pursuing a political career, but rarely 
mention their desire for power, prestige, and remuneration. Instead, they claim their 
devotion to people, and their commitment to national, state or local interests. 
 They proclaim their strong sense of promoting their constituents interests and the 
responsibility that entails. History has shown that we should not always take their 
statements at face value. Skeptics assert that politicians only care about their narrow self-
interests (Beniers & Dur, 2007).  
Beniers and Dur (2007) also explored the importance of politicians‟ motivation 
for the quality of government decisions (governance) is not always apparent. Moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in political decision-making affect policy choices 
and are related to politicians‟ motivations. Beniers and Dur addressed the issue of 
politicians‟ motivations. They indicated, “To the extent to which the politician cares 
about (what he perceives) as the public interest relative to the private rents from being in 
office indicates their motivation” (p. 30). Politicians‟ motivations and their competencies 
are not always observable. Voters and other politicians are informed through the political 
issues, which may draw them into the political system. In addition, multiple politicians 
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may be involved in policy-making and, thus, face trade-offs between the public interests 
and being reelected. This occurs when the politician is more concerned with being 
reelected rather than developing public policies that promote the common good for 
society. 
    Two sobering questions arise. First, do political office seekers view public office 
as a means to an end or as an end in itself? Second, do political leaders who engage in 
unethical acts seek office to maximize their own self-interests for power and prestige?  
Ethics literature points to political leaders engaged in unethical acts often justify their 
behavior in one or more of the following way as described by Cooke, 1986; Cuilla,1985; 
Gellerman, 1986:  
 The organization expects or condones unethical behavior.  
 Behaving unethically is the only way to advance in the organization. 
 The activity is not considered immoral or illegal. 
 The behavior is in the best interests of the agent and or political 
organization. 
 The unethical behavior will not be discovered or go unnoticed. 
The leaders of the organization accept unethical behavior as it benefits the 
organization as a whole. Exemplifying the above is George Ryan, who when Speaker of 
the Illinois House of Representatives, said, “I used to say to people, you know, I even 
control the drapes in the house chamber” (Merriner, 2008, p. 34). Ryan also spoke of the 
power in the flow of legislation: “You want a bill to come out of committee, you send it 
to a committee you‟re pretty sure you can get out of” (Merriner, p. 34). When Ryan 
became lieutenant governor of Illinois, he was so ambitious that he immediately upon 
taking office used public funds to advance his personal political campaign for Illinois 
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Secretary of State, which he planned to use as a launching pad for the Governor‟s Office. 
He apparently was not concerned over the impropriety or illegality of his actions 
(Merriner). 
To consider the nature of political motivations, Frost and Hayes (1977) defined 
political behavior in the following way: 
Political behavior (is) the activities of organizational members…when they use 
resources to enhance or protect their share of an exchange…, in ways which 
would be resisted, or ways in which the impact would be resisted, if recognized 
by the other party or parties to the exchange. (p. 8) 
Taking this definition into consideration, Gandz and Murray (1980) reported that political 
leaders rarely reveal their innermost thoughts to unknown researchers. It is much more 
effective to ask respondents to report not on their own thoughts but on the behaviors of 
others, which is more revealing.  
 For the electorate, determining politicians‟ motives is difficult. Barro (1973) in 
his seminal article developed a model that focused on the division of interests between 
the public and its political representatives. When the public office holder acts to advance 
his own interests and those interests do not coincide with those of the stakeholders, a 
division of interest occurs and moral hazard results. Barro‟s model contends politicians 
acting out of self-interest will not pursue activities in the public sector in accordance with 
the desires of their stakeholders. Furthermore, electoral control (getting re-elected) is 
only partially effective to induce the politician to advance the interests of the 
stakeholders.  
How, then, do stakeholders determine the real motivations of political leaders? As 
mentioned above, the literature indicates that political leaders are reluctant to disclose 
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their true motivations for seeking political office. Only by examining how political 
leaders acting as agents or stewards of the voters can the principal make a judgment. 
From these behavior patterns of the political leader, the voters can determine if the 
politician is seeking office for the best interests of the electorate or for reelection. Does 
the political leader allocate scarce resources for the overall good of society or use his or 
her position to engage in private benefit, unethical and corrupt behavior? Beniers and Dur 
(2007) stated, agency problems occur when voters are less informed about the effects of 
policies than politicians are. Politicians will behave opportunistically if they believe other 
politicians are more likely to behave that way also. Staying in office in a highly polarized 
political environment is more rewarding as it keeps politicians with differing policy 
preferences out of power.  
Consequently, politicians who deeply care about the public interest can undo 
opportunistic actions by those politicians who care very little about the public interest 
(Beniers & Dur, 2004). When politicians can evaluate each other‟s policy, politicians 
who greatly care about the public interest will research the policy and withdraw their 
support. Conversely, if politicians who care little about public interest, have the 
opportunity to learn about the effects of a competing politicians policies, this opportunity  
may enable the politician, who cares little about public interest, to damage the reputation 
of other politicians. Opportunistic politicians do not seek out information. Highly 
motivated politicians do, and this can lead opportunistic politicians can claim their 
competitor‟ policy as a failure. Thereby, they can vote against efficient policies designed 
by other politicians (Beniers & Dur).  
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Concept 7: Narcissistic Behavior 
Researchers in strategic management and organizational theory have found that 
top executives often inject their experiences, preferences, and dispositions into their 
decision-making and in their leadership style (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). If this is 
the case, how do  leaders in general and political leaders in particular, use these 
experiences? What are the effects on their stakeholders, and how does this relate to the 
quality of management and governance? 
Chatterjee and Hambrick, (2007) describe narcissistic leaders as favoring bold 
actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or losses for their organization. But in 
reality, these organizations perform no better than firms with non-narcissistic leaders. 
Deutschman (2005) described narcissistic leaders as visionaries who are actually 
innovators which help them excel in the end. Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) 
defined narcissistic leaders as having highly inflated self-views and who are preoccupied 
with continuously reinforcing those self-inflated views and can be expected to engage in 
behaviors and make decisions that affect not only those individuals who interact daily  
with them but also with various stakeholder groups. 
Leaders who exhibit narcissism typically behave in ways and take actions that 
often defy convention and can seriously affect their organization (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). Political leaders who exhibit non-conventional methods to attract 
attention to them are exhibiting narcissistic behavior. This can impede good governance 
strategies if the political leader is only seeking public applause to validate his or her need 
for attention. Similarly and further explained by Judge, LePine, and Rich (2006), 
narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that enables the individual to have an 
inflated sense of self. They are preoccupied with having that self-view continually 
108 
 
reinforced. Chatterjee  and Hambrick state: “The chief manifestations of narcissism 
include the feelings of superiority, entitlement, and a constant need for attention and 
admiration” (p. 353). 
Narcissistic leaders are continually seeking fuel for their self-image, 
exhibitionism, the devaluing of others, and “the chronic goal of obtaining continuous 
external self-affirmation” (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001, p.177). Leaders who score high on 
narcissism are pleased with the way they are. They see no need to change or make 
improvements, are very confident in their abilities to take on in tasks, and are objectively 
overconfident (Campbell, Goodie & Foster, 2004). Since the political leader has a need 
for continuous external self-affirmation, the narcissistic political leader is not content 
with praise in the distant future, but requires applause at frequent intervals (Buss & 
Chiodo, 1991). Narcissistic leaders will work on tasks that will earn admiration for their 
public boldness and sensation seeking, yet at the same time are prone to boredom 
(Emmons, 1981). “Narcissists, therefore, favor the extreme, the grandiose, and the 
colorful. Discrete or incremental actions are not satisfying” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007, p. 355). 
Continuing a pattern of narcissistic behavior, the political leader may confuse the 
hubris hypothesis, which is the notion that a leader can run the organization better than 
the incumbent manager or current elected political official (Roll, 1986). A narcissistic 
leader can be identified by monitoring the speech patters and by their use of first- person 
singular pronouns reflecting self- absorption, (Raskin & Shaw, 1988).  
Consistent with the above discussions on narcissism, there are other unobtrusive 
indicators of narcissistic political leaders: Emmons (1987) formulated conceptual 
elements of narcissism to predict narcissistic leaders by identifying statements such as:  
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 I like to be the center of attention 
  I like having authority over other people. 
  I like to look at myself in the mirror. 
  I am an extraordinary person. 
  I usually dominate any conversation. 
  I am a born leader. 
  I insist on getting respect that is due to me. 
  I am envious of other people‟s good fortunes. 
On the other hand, Emmon‟s discussed an interpretive alignment with elements of 
narcissism by the leader in the organization which are the summarized by the following 
statements, and differs in respect to the above by the leader‟s contention that he or she is 
central to the organization‟s purpose (p. 365): 
 I am the central figure of this organization. 
 I deserve to be show cased in the organization. 
   I am, by far, the most valuable person in this organization. 
  Leadership is a solo endeavor, not a group activity. 
  I am the central figure in this organization; The organization and I are 
synonymous;  
 I deserve more compensation than anyone in this organization does.  
From this viewpoint, narcissistic leaders are easy to identify.  
 Zaleznik and Kets de Vries (1975), in their classic work on corporate leadership, 
distinguished between two types of leaders: minimum man and maximum man. A 
minimum man was described as a bland conformist who did not rock the boat and was a 
team player. Contrasted to that image is the maximum man, who is a colorful, bold, risk-
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taker who is capable of making fast and far reaching decisions in the organization. The 
maximum man is identified as being narcissistic. 
There are implications of being a narcissistic leader both good and bad. Collins 
(2001) described good-to great leaders with words like “quiet, humble, modest, reserved, 
shy, gracious, mild-mannered, self-effacing, understated, did not believe their own 
clippings, and so on” (p. 27). Are non- narcissistic leaders humble? Even though Collins 
did not equate the two concepts, a link can be drawn between the two.  
Narcissistic political leaders can adversely affect good governance. Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, (2007) stated that the behavior of executives are often bold and risky. Their 
performance is either very good or very bad and can often swing between these two 
extremes. Narcissistic political leaders affect their stakeholders, those who work directly 
for them, the organization, and society. There are profound implications for narcissistic 
leaders in the political organization and the effects are difficult to ascertain. However, 
narcissistic leaders may enter into the corruption/unethical model, as their behavior is 
such that they believe they are the cornerstone of the organization. If this statement is 
true, then the political leader will act as if they own the office and corrupt and unethical 
behavior may ensue.  
The next section addresses the literature on resource dependency, power, 
congruency, trust, perceptions, and cynicism theories. The researcher will review the 
critical aspects of these literature streams as they relate to stakeholders, principal-agency 
theory, perceptions, and good governance. 
Concept 8: Resource Dependency 
  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) work in resource dependency theory, indicated 
organizations are not self- sufficient that they need to acquire resources from the 
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environment. Consequently, organizations become dependent on those resources and 
relationships for their survival. The role of the manager or leader is to arrange these 
dependencies in the most cost- efficient and effective manner (Griffin & Dunn, 2004). 
Leaders must manage dependencies predicated upon gaining (internal) 
organizational commitment, particularly the commitment from the dominant coalition or 
stakeholder group (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Managers or leaders must make decisions 
within a constrained environment because of limitations in cognitive ability, (Simon, 
1976) information, and increased uncertainty (Thompson, 1967). As a result, Griffin and 
Dunn (2004) argued that managers or political leaders who are resourced-constrained 
make satisficing, a seminal concept developed by Simon (1959), rather than optimal 
decisions. The satisficing decisions that managers or political leaders make underline the 
organizational routines for which information are filtered through the organization 
(Schuler & Rehbein, 1997). The leaders in the organization are more likely to establish 
formalized routines if the needs to manage dependencies are great (Griffin & Dunn). 
The fundamental tenet of resource dependency is that managers or leaders attend 
to critical resources. Leader‟s and managers choices are designed to control external 
dependencies and secure necessary resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Dependencies 
in the organization, specifically political leaders commitment and resource allocations, 
should be related to the structure of the activities of the governance of the organization 
(Griffin & Dunn, 2004). 
Related to resource dependency is institutional theory. This theory defines the 
organization in which further it develops structural roles and procedures not to make the 
organization more efficient and to make the organization appear more efficient to 
external parties and stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, organizations are 
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considered legitimate if they behave in a manner in which society‟s expectations for that 
type of organization are met. In the case of a government organization, it should behave 
in a manner that promotes good governance on behalf of all its stakeholders (Scott, 
1987). Consequently, organizations conforming to society‟s expectations are perceived to 
be legitimate and consequently gain access to the resources they need to survive (Meyer 
& Rowan).  
Sterns, Hoffman, and Heide (1987) argued, “The primary reason organizations 
seek out alliances is to gain control over their environment through these alliances. This 
can  insulate an organization from its external environment and guarantee a more stable 
flow of resources in times of scarcity” (p. 75). Hence, it is particularly important political 
leaders understand stakeholder alliances and carefully allocate resources in times of 
scarcity (limited budgets, etc.) so they can promote policies and procedures that benefit 
society. Leaders who successfully manage their environment through these linkages will 
not only insure their continued survival but will be more effective in government (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). 
Concept 9: Power 
“Power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute of the actor” 
(Emerson, 1962, p. 32). This dyadic approach to resource dependence, as postulated by 
Emerson, yields two forms of power in a dyadic relationship: power imbalance and 
mutual dependence. Power imbalance, for example, would equate to the differences in 
the degree of power each actor holds over the other. The differences between the 
stakeholders and the political leader or the differences between two competing 
stakeholder groups are the essential element for the power struggle. The second 
component of dyadic power Emerson described is mutual-dependence, which captures 
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the bilateral dependencies of the dyad regardless of whether the two actors (principal-
agent), in our context the political leader-stakeholders dependencies are either balanced 
or imbalanced. Political leaders need to be constantly aware of both the power imbalance 
and mutual dependence. It needs to be considered in order to produce the complete 
picture of the power structure in the dyad (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  
 In general, power imbalance reduces the occurrence of exchange among social 
actors by reducing conflict resolution (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Therefore, those with 
power advantages, such as leaders, are more inclined to argue for agreements that favor 
themselves or self-serving interests, whereas disadvantaged actors or stakeholders will be 
more likely to argue for agreements that equalize benefits (Lawler & Yoon).  
This view is consistent with the stakeholder theory that divergent, less powerful 
stakeholder groups will tend to argue for equalized benefits. Lawler and Yoon (1996) 
further contended that unequal actors (less powerful stakeholder groups) will be less 
likely to develop mutually satisfactory exchange relationships with other more powerful 
stakeholder groups or political leaders when there are conditions of unequal power 
between the two groups.  
Stakeholders are joint occupants of a network position in the organization, or a 
political system, and therefore a function of all dyadic ties that link one position to all 
other positions in the network of relationships (Lawler & Yoon, 1996). Political leaders 
have vast social, economic, and political power in making decisions that affect a wide 
range of stakeholders on the local, state and national level. Due to the dyadic and network 
positions of stakeholders in the organization, or a political system, the political leader 
must evaluate and monitor the balance or imbalance of power in the network to foster 
effective governance. However, a political leader can equally use this imbalance leading 
114 
 
to corrupt, unethical, and illegal behavior, hence, bad governance. Additionally, Greene 
(2000) stated, “An understanding of people‟s hidden motives is the single greatest piece 
of knowledge you can have in acquiring power” (p. xxii). He concluded by stating, 
“Power is endlessly seductive and deceptive in its own way. It is labyrinth–your mind 
becomes consumed with solving its infinite problems, and soon you realize how 
pleasantly lost you have become” (p. xxiii). He further added, ”The key to power, then, is 
the ability to judge who is best able to further your interests in all situations” (p. 13). This 
is something our political leaders need to take into account regarding the assent to power 
in their quest for political office, and in the process remember whom they work for – the 
electorate and not themselves. Building on power theory, the researcher will examine the 
next component, congruence theory, and will explore the relationship between 
stakeholders and political leaders in terms of organizational fit.  
Concept 10: Congruence 
Congruence of fit can be defined as “the degree to which the needs, demands, 
goals, objectives and or structure of  one component is consistent with needs, demands, 
goals, objectives and or structure of another component” (Nadler & Tashman,1980, p. 
40). Several researchers have expounded the need to create and maintain congruence 
between the individual‟s needs and those of the organization (Downey, Hellriegel, & 
Slocum, 1975). Additionally, congruence theorists have proposed that a greater degree of 
fit between the environmental and organization, the greater effectiveness of the 
organization‟s behavior at multiple levels (Galbraith, 1977; Nadler & Tushman, 1980). 
Congruence theory contains an element of flexibility, defined by Baird and 
Meshoulam (1988) as the organization‟s ability to adapt in a successful and timely 
manner to changing or diverse demands. This can be from either the outer environment or 
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from within the organization itself. However, another group of researchers indicated that 
the nature of congruence theory essentially involves fit and flexibility. They contend both 
concepts are essential for organizational effectiveness (Chakravarthy, 1982).  
Because the congruence between stakeholder needs and organizational climate 
factors is important for predicting performance, several strategies are available to the 
organization to utilize this information according to Downey, Hellriegel, and Slocum, 
(1975), these strategies include:  
 Attempting to select those individuals whose needs are most congruent 
with the climate of the organization, which is important for predicting job 
satisfaction and performance. 
 An organization that is open and affiliative, and rewards people for high 
achievement could seek individuals who desire to affiliate and tend 
towards sociability. 
 The organization‟s climate can be changed to utilize fully the 
predispositions of managers and others. 
 Applying these strategies to stakeholders, political leaders, and the political system, as 
described in the organizational setting from advanced by Downey et al., stakeholders 
could select or elect those political leaders whose needs are most congruent with those of 
the political system and good governance. Voters can select or elect political leaders who 
desire to affiliate with those various stakeholders within the political system of good 
governance.  
A final point, congruence in the political organization is the fit between the needs 
of the stakeholders and the political leaders. Wexley, Alexander, Greenawalt, and Couch 
(1980) showed that perceptual congruence is related to important organizational 
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outcomes, such as the congruence between the subordinate‟s description of the manager 
and the manager‟s self-description is significantly correlated with the subordinate‟s 
satisfaction. Applying this to the political organization, elected leaders will receive higher 
performance marks from the voters if the voters are satisfied with the elected leader‟s 
performance.  
However, in applying Hatfield and Huseman‟s (1982) organizational work to the 
political system, the stakeholder‟s satisfaction with political leaders may not be as 
important as the stakeholder‟s own perceptions of factors affecting political leader-
stakeholder relationship. 
Concept 11: Trust 
As indicated earlier, corruption is prevalent in all eras and in all areas of political 
and administrative systems. Brinkerhoff (2000) stated citizens (stakeholders) are 
demanding a more active say in the what and how [italics added] of governance and no 
longer endure the abuses of public trust and of the malfeasance of the past; stakeholders 
expect accountability and transparency from the political leaders. Public trust is not the 
only significant outcome of public participation (Conway, 1991). “Public participation 
also leads to legitimacy, a better- informed public, improved decision making, and altered 
patterns of political power” (Wang & Wart, 2007, p. 266). 
Moy and Scheufele (2000) argued that without political trust, which includes the 
beliefs that the system works for the stakeholders, stakeholders will perceive any actions 
taken by the political leader as ineffectual. Similarly, the absence of social trust may lead 
stakeholders to perceive political leaders as driven by self-interest and prevents 
stakeholders from perceiving that others, such as political leaders, can work toward 
common goals or that such common goals exist (Moy & Scheufele).  
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Wang and Wart (2007) revealed that consensus building occurs when 
stakeholders and the elected leaders agree on what needs to be done. Signing the 
agreement does not win public trust; the fulfillment of that agreement does. They further 
postulated that the public administration, and political leaders, should demonstrate to the 
stakeholders that the participation process eventually leads to improvement of public 
services, and public trust increases when public officials demonstrate integrity, honesty, 
and moral leadership through the institutionalizing of ethics in government because of 
stakeholder participation.  
“The sine qua non of a well-functioning system is the existence of trust” (Allum, 
Patulny, & Sturgis, 2007, p.1). Trust is a critical component in government. Coleman 
(1990) argued that trust and social capital tend to go together. If social capital is a 
resource that is available to individuals or stakeholders for mutual benefit, then the social 
capital acquired through the relationship can only be distributed, spent, or allocated 
between trusting individuals and stakeholders. Trust is the key component between the 
elected leader and the voters. Social capital is the ingredient that binds the principle-agent 
together in the political system. Without social capital, the relationship disintegrates.  
As outlined by Newton and Norris (2000), institutional and social trust link 
between trust by citizens with trust in state institutions. Newton and Norris introduced 
institutional performance theory in the following way: 
Because all citizens are exposed to government actions, confidence in political 
institutions is likely to be randomly distributed amongst various personality types. 
Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of 
citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and 
low confidence. (p. 7)  
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In the view of  Rothstein and Uslaner (2006), effective government enables social 
trust and association membership (stakeholders) to occur. Good government encourages 
social trust from its ability to organize individuals into groups or stakeholders and to 
create space for voluntary organizations to flourish (Newton & Norris 2000).What occurs 
when trust is broken? When a significant violation of public trust has occurred, lying is a 
common consequence because the wrong- doing encourages concealment by the 
politician (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2008). The ease of lying by the politician will 
likely increase the deception once it has started and allow cover-ups and more lies to 
further increase the severity of successive lies (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos). Lack of trust 
can result in a decision by the stakeholder not to communicate with the political leader, 
and as Darley (1992) demonstrated, the covering- up of evidence from past incidents will 
often perpetrate the harmful practices that originated in the first place.  
Looking at this from an organizational political perspective, Ferris, Russ and 
Fandt, (1989) defined this as behavior strategically designed to maximize self- interest. 
By implication, it is in conflict with the collective organizational goals or the interests of 
various stakeholder groups. Therefore, a decrease in loss of interpersonal trust has been 
associated with decreasing stakeholder involvement in the political process as well as 
decreasing willingness to engage in political participatory activities such as voting, or 
getting involved in the political process (Moy & Scheufele, 2000). The integration of 
trust into stakeholder theory is critical to an understanding of how political leaders can 
increase the involvement of stakeholders in the political process.  
Concept 12: Perceptions 
Trust in government and public administration represents a perceptual dimension. 
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As presented by Ferris and Kacmar (1992) they used a cognitive approach and argued 
that the stronger the perception of politics by organizational stakeholders, the less likely 
they were to believe the organization was equitable, just, or fair. Lewin (1936) stated that 
people or stakeholders respond to perceptions of reality, not to reality itself. Vigoda-
Gadot (2007) stated, “Politics in organizations should be understood in terms of what 
people think of it rather than what it actually represents” (p. 287).  
Researchers have suggested that a political organizational climate may contribute 
to the continuation of imbalanced and unjust activities and decisions. This researcher 
proposes these concepts apply to political organizational governments. Stakeholders who 
perceive that they are unfairly treated because of political considerations or self-serving 
interests of public officials, will reduce their level of satisfaction with or trust in 
governance. This will reduce their loyalty to the government, or reduce their voluntary 
activities in the democratic system (Vigoda-Gadot, 2007).  
Niemi, Craig and Mattei (1991) concurred with the above findings and expressed 
that this process may result in lower levels of stakeholders‟ political participation. 
Stakeholders have varying views on political leaders. Foti, Fraser, and Lord (1982) 
argued that if a leader is not effective, the leader is judged to possess a set of 
characteristics different from an effective leader. This included being evaluated more 
highly and attributed more to leadership and responsibility within the organization. As a 
result, if the political leader‟s effectiveness changes (measured by outcomes), then the 
stakeholders will have a different perception of that leader. Therefore, if the political 
leader is viewed as effective it will increase the likelihood of good governance, as the 
political leader‟s task is to be reelected. 
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As their performance is evaluated and monitored by stakeholder groups political 
leaders are perceived differently (Foti, Frazier, & Lord, 1982). Politicians align 
themselves to the beliefs of what leaders should be held that are by the stakeholder 
groups. Politicians desiring to be perceived and viewed as good political leaders may 
emphasize those valued characteristics that stakeholders deem necessary for the effective 
performance of their duties (Carver, 1979). Therefore, politicians may be judged by 
stakeholders as leaders, but we have many politicians who clearly are not leaders by their 
inability to lead, and by their actions thereof, thereby, looking at their effectiveness in 
governance, the stakeholders can better distinguish among them (Foti, et al.). 
In describing the political leader‟s effectiveness and the stakeholder‟s perceptions, 
Kernell (1978) suggested a political leader, when first elected, is considered an 
ambiguous stimulus object, which figures positively in the stakeholder‟s perceptions. In 
essence, this means there is enough information to judge them. Foti, Frazier and Lord, 
(1982) described that as a president or elected official becomes better known, the 
stakeholders form specific and contextual judgments based on information of the political 
leader‟s performance which can further be evaluated in that light. The stakeholder‟s 
perceptions of a political candidate can or does change following the election, and this 
change can result in an increase of the attractiveness of the newly elected winner (Foti, et 
al.). 
Political conflict over valuable resources, then becomes an issue over perceptions, 
with each side trying to convince a portion of the stakeholder‟s, of the correctness of their 
position (Koch, 1998). He expressed the view that when political elites attempt to 
assemble public opinion, by framing the issue in terms that will direct public opinion, in 
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the direction the political leader desires, there may be conflict. For political elites, the 
primary issue is how the stakeholders will understand the conflict. To understand how 
perceptions and trust affect stakeholder‟s ability to perceive or judge the effectiveness of 
political leaders, another dimension must be added to the mix, cynicism. 
Concept 13: Cynicism 
Noticeable symptoms of public cynicism include beliefs of citizens (stakeholders) 
that government agencies and public officials (agents) are corrupt, inept, or out to take 
advantage of them (Johnson, 1993). This disenchantment, causes alienation and 
disengagement and are, therefore, is of particular interest to political leaders,  
public administration, and the resulting impact on good governance (Berman, 1997).  
Cynicism is frequently discussed in the literatures of trust and social capital. 
Researchers such as Fukuyama (2002) have argued that all human relations and 
exchanges (economic, political and social) require trust. Promises of political leaders 
need to be honored and that individuals (stakeholders) must believe they will not be taken 
advantage of (Coleman, 1990). Since trust provides a sense of belonging that enhances 
and serves the emotional needs of the stakeholder (Berman, 1997), a definition of 
cynicism can be low trust, or a pervasive disbelief in the possibility of good in dealing 
with others (Damon, 1995). 
Cynicism increases social distance and reduces the public spirit (Gore, 1994). 
Several authors (McClelland, 1985; Bianco, 1994; Robertson & Tang, 1995) have 
suggested that citizens question their relationships with government or political leaders, 
and therefore, become disenfranchised when these conditions occur: citizens believe that 
local government is using its power against them or perceivably not helping them; 
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citizens do not feel engaged or apart of local government, or feel misunderstood or 
ignored; citizens find local government services and polices ineffective. Berman (1997) 
argued that when citizens perceived that the government is exploiting them, they become 
more cynical and withdraw from participating in government. However, if the citizens 
perceive, these issues as a lesser form of exploitation, in terms of government or in their 
elected political leaders, these stakeholders may develop milder forms of cynicism.   
Stakeholders develop negative perceptions of government when they see 
government as taxing them, charging fees and fining them, while at the same time 
granting special favors or considerations to special interest groups (Berman, 1997). 
Negative experiences with government often conflict with positive views of governance 
(Goodsell, 1994). In addition, most stakeholders recognize local government services 
only after they fail (Berman). How can political leaders overcome or modify stakeholder 
perceptions of cynicism? Berman argued that the government and political leaders could 
show citizens that government uses its power to help rather to harm or to be indifferent to 
them. However, many citizens are unaware of how government activities can enhance 
their own aims. This unawareness reduces levels of trust in government and political 
leaders. Political leaders must reach out to citizens and provide consistent information on 
how and what government does to serve their interests (Wheeler, 1994; Garnett, 1992, 
Denton & Woodward, 1990).  
Berman (1997) argued that citizens be incorporated into public decision-making 
through government use of surveys, panels, and focus groups. Further, by enhancing the 
use of good performance measures and effective communications with stakeholders,  
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Stipak (1977) stressed that by communicating with citizens, they could evaluate the cost 
and quality of government services.  
As a final point, Berman (1997) argued that economic and social conditions of 
citizens affect cynicism, and it is significantly influenced by their education levels and 
economic growth rates. Cities with larger populations are more cynical about local 
government, he also indentified that cities with low crime rates have less public cynicism. 
This is also true in communities that take pride in their city and in which stakeholder 
groups cooperate. He argued that political leaders must manage government-citizen 
relations to restore trust and reduce cynicism. To restore trust, citizens must increase their 
commitment to government. Citizens must believe that government can serve their needs 
that citizens can affect decision-making, and that government is able to deliver.  
Concept 14: Ethical Leadership 
Gray (1998) summarized ethical behavior as propriety of actions and intentions. 
Ethical problems can occur when there are different values between principals and 
agents, and political leaders and stakeholders. A political leader‟s unethical conduct can 
result from the means justifying the ends.  
Leadership necessitates ethics because political leaders have responsibility to 
stakeholders. The political leaders therefore, are in a position to bring about changes in 
behavior that result in good governance. (Dobel, 1998). He asserted that excellent 
political achievements are characterized by the following outcomes. They must: 
 Gain legitimacy. 
 Endure over time.  
 Strengthen the community. 
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 Unleash minimum unforeseen consequences. 
 Require reasonable use of power resources.  
 Endure without great violence and coercion to enforce the outcome. 
“Prudent judgment identifies salient moral aspects of a political situation which a 
political leader has a moral obligation to attend to in making a decision” (p. 76). Political 
prudence captures the essence of political leaders utilizing disciplined reason, and 
foresight, and attention to the long-term consequences. A political leader‟s deployment of 
power, timing, and momentum, and the proper use of the means as an end process, is 
essential to bring prudent and ethical decision making into governance. The political 
leader‟s attention to the durability and legitimacy of outcomes and the consequences for 
the community rounds out prudent and ethical capabilities of the political leader‟s 
governance strategies (Dobel, 1998). To develop a pattern of prudent and ethical 
leadership, political leaders must attend to their own power as well as to their ability to 
perform the problematical work of assembling power and critical resources to achieve 
benefits for the community (Dobel). 
Gray (1998) pointed to unethical behavior that arises from the discrimination 
between special interest groups and end users of services. Special interest groups, for 
instance, can favorably influence political leaders‟ decisions through political action 
committee (PAC) funds, and yet average citizens do not have the same opportunities. 
Thus, citizens often are discriminated against in the governance process. 
 How does a political leader‟s ethical or moral leadership influence the political 
organization? A critical component of leadership understands the culture. For a political 
leader they must understand the community culture. Schein (1992) argued that leadership 
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and the culture are inherent and inextricably linked. He stated, “If leaders want to change 
an organization, they first must understand the dynamics of the culture” (p. 236). 
What is the framework for understanding the political leader‟s ethical decision- 
making process? Hunt (1986) and the Hunt and Vitell model (1993) postulated in their 
model that an individual‟s moral philosophy or ethical ideology is a primary indicator to 
explain the differences in ethical judgments and behavior. They argued that a political 
leader‟s ethical orientation is often influenced by several background factors, one of 
which is an individual‟s personal values. 
This raises an important question: Are a political leader‟s personal values and 
ethics the same? Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) defined values as “concepts of beliefs about 
desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide selection or 
evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance” (p. 551). 
Great political leaders are ethical stewards who generate high levels of commitment from 
their stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1998, 2005; Caldwell et. al., 2008). One facet of ethical 
stewardship from political leaders is honoring their duties owed to stakeholders and 
society in the pursuit of long-term wealth creation (Caldwell, et al.). As evidenced from 
the above definitions, a political leader‟s personal values and ethics are not always one in 
the same. Good governance potentially suffers when this occurs and this may results in a 
political leader‟s decision to advance his or her own self-interest or agenda to the 
detriment of the citizens. 
Given the need for ethical stewardship, a political leader needs to become an 
ethical steward and, thereby, promote better governance.  
Political leaders can create long-term wealth for society and build organizational trust by 
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governing as ethical stewards (Caldwell & Karri, 2005; Pava, 2003).  
Political leaders can apply these traits to their behavior and become ethical 
stewards. Political leaders create meaning and pursue outcomes that benefit everyone 
(Caldwell et al., 2008). As the political leader assumes the mantel of an ethical focus, the 
obligations to benefit society and create added value and wealth become a primary duty 
for the political leader. Individual needs and rights have to be considered precious, and 
the political leader must balance those individual rights with the collective welfare and 
growth of the community. Political leaders share information with their constituents to 
help reduce risk, improve the quality of decisions, and integrate opportunities for their 
constituents. The political steward weighs opportunities and risks cautiously, and their 
choices reflect a obligation to the welfare, growth, and wholeness for all of the 
community (Caldwell et al., 2008). The political leader‟s greatness comes from 
combining their stakeholder‟s talents to achieve community goals, such as, utilizing the 
strengths of community groups to assist in formulating public policies that help the 
political leader promote good governance for the community. Caldwell et al. argued 
leaders must avoid short-term priorities that hurt long-term outcomes  
There are seven principals of public life is described in the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life , First Reports, and as found in (Gray, 1998) in which they 
advocated political leaders are to adhere to the following: selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. Political leaders‟ who 
implement decisions based on public interest over personal financial gain or material 
benefits for themselves, their families or friends, show selflessness and ethical behavior 
to their stakeholders, and in turn, promote good governance. Not placing themselves 
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under financial or other obligations to outside individuals or special interest groups 
demonstrates integrity. The transparency of decision-making processes indicates 
openness and a willingness by political leaders to declare any private interests relating to 
their public duty, and resolving these conflicts signifies to the stakeholder‟s honesty. 
Ethical leadership is the result of promoting and incorporating these principals into the 
political leader‟s daily routine. 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997, as cited in Caldwell et al., 2008) 
contended that the ethical steward “will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviors for 
cooperative behaviors but will seek to maximize utility for the organization based upon 
rational principals” (p. 26). Block (1996) suggested that stewardship has its roots in 
service over self-interest and treated stakeholders as owners and partners. In the political 
realm, the political leader, as a steward of the citizens, is required to place public service 
over self-interest. Caldwell and Karri (2005) stated: 
The underlying fundamental proposition of stewardship theory is the 
maximization of long-term economic wealth, which will eventually serve the best 
interests of the stakeholders and leaders collectively, while additionally 
maximizing social welfare and the long-term benefits to society as a whole. (p. 
251)   
Leadership occurs, therefore, when political leaders exert intentional influence 
over stakeholders. Ethical leadership occurs when political leaders exert influence over 
stakeholders with the intent of maximizing social welfare and benefits to society. In the 
process, they reduce their own self-interest seeking behavior and thus this leads to better 
governance. Each stakeholder interprets the relationship based upon the subjective self-
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perception (Caldwell et al., 2008). Ethical leaders are judged on their fairness, justice, 
and trust to their stakeholders. These perceptions are based upon individual‟s ethically 
based filters. Like all leaders, the ethical steward, is often viewed  through the individual 
lens of each stakeholder (Primeaux, Karri, & Caldwell, 2003, as cited in Caldwell et al., 
2008). The most important role for the ethical political leader is to reinforce in words and 
deeds the values of society. This further creates a cohesive political structure for 
governance (Sinclair, 1993). 
Ethical leaders must become servants and debtors in honoring their ethical 
responsibilities as political stewards of society (De Pree, 1989). As leaders understand the 
implications of being ethical stewards and apply its principals, the results will include 
building trust in the government, improving stakeholder commitment and, creating long-
term wealth (Caldwell, et al., 2008). Leaders should recognize that laws and regulations 
do not guide people‟s behavior as strongly as ethical beliefs (Huehn, 2008). “The 
possibility of political community depends upon trust. Trust for each other, and trust in 
institutions are the social resources and capital that leaders and political institutions 
should work to create and sustain” (Dobel, 1988, p. 79). 
Concept 15: Media Influence and Communication Strategies 
Considering that stakeholders‟ perceptions are important in evaluating political 
leaders policies for effective governance, the role that the media plays in affecting 
stakeholder perceptions of political leaders and those seeking elected office needs to be 
explored. 
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 In an information and knowledge-based economy, political leaders who fail to 
communicate effectively with internal and external stakeholders inevitably take on 
considerable risk that adversely affects stakeholder perceptions of their performance and 
the political leader‟s ability to deliver good governance (Dhir, 2006).  
Political leaders who have a favorable reputation can establish and expand their 
power base. Conversely, a political leader who has or is perceived to have a tarnished 
reputation, can set off a series of cyclical events that will diminish trust and morale in the 
stakeholder and further produce cynicism in governance (Dhir & Vinen, 2005).  
Today, ethical breaches of trust by political leaders are commonplace. The media 
often criticizes political leaders for failing or not fulfilling their duties to stakeholders 
(Dhir, 2006). The news media plays a critical role in a democratic society. It must not 
serve only as a conduit of political information, informing the stakeholders of key events 
of the day, but it must also enhance public communications and instigating informed 
participation by citizens (Moy and Scheufele, 2000). They measured mass media through 
a critical indicator, which determined the extent to which each medium affects citizens‟ 
levels of trust in government and political leaders. The authors contended that data over 
three decades of public opinion polls indicated that Americans have expressed an 
increasingly pessimistic view of government.  
One explanation for decline in public trust according to Moy and Scheufele 
(2000) is the negativity exhibited toward government and political leaders by the mass 
media. Utilizing content analysis, these researchers contended that negative media 
portrayals of political leaders in various media outlets have increased. Political candidates 
and elected leaders often are subjected to criticism by newspapers, radio news, network 
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television news and political talk radio. Becker and Whitney (1980) found that negative 
reporting by the media regarding political leaders, has an effect on citizens‟ level of 
political trust. An interesting trend is that reliance on television news leads to lower 
levels of trust in government, whereas newspaper reading resulted in higher levels of 
trust. Most political talk radio uses controversial content, politically incorrect and 
offensive terms to label politicians, its highly charged rhetoric that has the potential to 
delegitimize political authority, causing widespread damage to the governance process 
(Katz, 1996; Kurtz, 1996; Levin, 1987).  
Considering the nature and extent of media influences on stakeholder perceptions, 
Davenport, Delong, and Beers (1998) stated, “information combined with experience, 
context, interpretation and reflection: it is a high value forum of information that is ready 
to apply to decisions and actions” (Nolan, 2005, p. 7). For the political leader, this can be 
portrayed to the media by utilizing their experiences with their personal message for their 
constituents. Dalley and Hamilton (2000) indicated that information and knowledge are 
not synonymous with each other. The growth of information does not necessarily equate 
with the growth in knowledge. They contended contextual matters related to stakeholders 
acquiring knowledge and information, are continually viewed through filters comprised 
of cultural norms, communications, and modes of learning. Stakeholders then process 
information, interpret, and give meaning to the message. The implications and difficulties 
facing political leaders in using the media to advance their agenda is not with the 
information being presented per se, but in providing stakeholders a credible context to 
internalize the message being advocated (Nolan).  
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Citizens do not limit their information or knowledge of political candidates or 
politicians solely to television, news, and political talk radio (Moy & Scheufele, 2000). 
Prime-time television and entertainment programming take a dim view of the entire 
political process (Lichter, Lichter, & Rothman, 1994). The media has other mechanisms 
as well to influence stakeholders‟ political trust. Becker and Whitney (1980) have argued 
as well as some scholars, that print media can lead stakeholders to have great political 
trust because it increases expertise and knowledge of the political process and 
governance. Research also indicates that periodic framing methods often employed in 
television news leads stakeholders to attribute responsibility of problems to individuals 
rather than the political system. This leads the stakeholders to believe the political system 
is not responding and thus lowers the stakeholders level of political trust (Moy & 
Scheufele).  
In their conceptualization of media effects on political and social trust, Moy, and 
Scheufele (2000) demonstrated that the news media plays a critical role in the political 
system. Their negative portrayals of governance and/or political leaders can undermine 
trust in democratic institutions. Additionally, different types of media content can 
influence social trust. Stakeholders‟ trust is directly related to and affected by their own 
political efficacy, political participation, and political trust, and media influences on 
social trust eventually will affect stakeholders‟ perceptions of political attitudes and 
behaviors. The media, therefore, has the ability to influence positively or negatively 
short-term political behavior, longer-term attitudes and behaviors, and thus, government 
policies (Moy & Scheufele).  
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Concept 16: Political Communication Strategies 
Political leaders are increasingly viewing political communication policies as an 
essential tool to support the strategic objectives and goals of public policy and good 
governance (van Riel, 1995). Political communication follows the corporate 
communication model as described by Stainer and Stainer (1997) by integrating the 
following three forms of communication: First, political communications by the political 
leader to external and internal stakeholders; second, political marketing communication 
to promote policies and governance strategies; and, third, political organizational 
communications such as internal media and public relations media. Political 
communications should be considered by the political leader as a performance 
measurement philosophy to monitor the organization‟s progress (which may be political), 
and to inform stakeholder groups what really matters (Stainer & Stainer). Staying on the 
cutting edge in the political marketplace comes from political leaders regarding particular 
stakeholder insights. This allows the political leader to develop a communication strategy 
that gets results. (Bodensteiner, 1993). Effective communications require both the critical 
resources of time and money (Blakstad, 1994).  
Stainer and Stainer, (1997) point out that additional evidence suggests that there 
appears to be a relationship between communication, productivity and performance, this 
should be regarded as successful information sharing between leaders and stakeholders.  
If stakeholders lack information about the system, and the rationales behind a leader‟s 
decisions and performance, the stakeholder will then become estranged and resentful of 
the leader  
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Thus, effective political communication, as Francis (1987) suggested, entails 
sharing the political leader‟s vision or mission with stakeholders; integrating efforts; 
making intelligent political decisions; and sustaining a “healthy” community.  
This process allows the stakeholders to view political communications between parties as 
a valuable asset. Cruz (1990) argued that in an open organization, leaders and 
stakeholders should share information to the greatest extent possible. Thus, the open 
organization breeds the free flow of questions and answers. The intervention of all parties 
should occur within the organization without fear of interruption. Stating of matters 
directly and sincerely, helps keep the communication process open. This open 
organization should increase productivity and build trust between the parties. Berzok 
(1993) contended that informing and education alone does not automatically increase 
effective communications between parties, since it is only relevant when an emotional 
connection between the stakeholders and leaders brings about the desired results. 
According to Stainer and Stainer (1997), the key focus for political 
communication is that political leaders, “should address the related ethical issues 
encountered, especially those affecting the outcome of image, identity and the quality of 
life” (p. 74). An important political communication strategy involves being persuasive 
and stimulates honesty and fairness which is constructed on the foundations of integrity 
and trust (Stainer  & Stainer). 
   As a final point, political leaders also need to be careful about third- person 
perceptions in political communications. Davison (1983) coined the term the third-person 
effects as “individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to persuasive 
communications…will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than 
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themselves” (as cited in Banning, 2006, p. 785). A group with a more hostile view toward 
the media could be expected to have a different third-person perception level according to 
Banning. 
There are the implications of third-person effects on political communication 
strategies and its effects on different stakeholder groups. Banning (2006) postulated that 
third-person perception levels would vary significantly by political affiliation. He 
demonstrated that media bias claims come primarily from conservative elites who declare 
a liberal bias is prevalent in the entire media spectrum. “Negative media messages have 
shown to increase third-person perceptions and as a result, Republicans have a higher 
third-person perception level than Democrats” (p. 786). Political leaders therefore need to 
be aware of third-party perceptions and effects they have on stakeholders. If the media 
creates negative images, third-party participation can reduce stakeholders‟ voting and 
participation in the governance process. Political leaders need to contemplate both how 
media messages are directed at stakeholders and what people do with these messages that 
affect political participation by those stakeholders (Banning).  
Concept 17: Demographics 
Research in the fields of psychology, economics, marketing, ethics, advertising, 
politics, sociology, and  advertising, refer to a concept called stratification or social class. 
Various researchers have explored the differences in demographic groups (Allmon, Page 
& Roberts (2000); Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, & Lin (2004); Deshpande (1997); 
Glover, Bumpus, Sharpe, & Munchus (2002); Jackson (1973); Jackson (1975); Kidwell, 
Stevens, & Bethke (1987); Ludlum & Mascaloinov (2004); McNichols & Zimmerer 
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(1985); Norrander (1997); O‟Guinn, Allen, & Semenik (2006); Robideaux (2002), 
Serwinek (1992). 
Amongst stakeholder groups and social classes, and according to McDaniel and 
Gates (2005), attitudes are comprised of an enduring organization of motivational, 
emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to a person‟s environment. 
An attitude is a predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable 
manner toward an object or concept. Attitudes are the essence of the human change agent 
according to McDaniel and Gates. The relationship between social attitude and class is a 
topic of interest to both the sociologist and psychologist. In Centers (1949) as cited in 
Eysenck (1950), Centers stated: 
This theory implies that a person‟s status and role with respect to the economic 
processes of society imposed upon him certain attitudes, values, and interests 
relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere. It holds, 
further, that the status and role of the individual in relation to the means of 
production and exchange of goods and services gives rise in him to a 
consciousness of membership in some social class, which share those attitudes, 
values, and interests. (p. 56)    
O‟Guinn, Allen and Semenik (2006) related social class to a persons‟ relative 
standing in a social system. This is produced by systematic inequalities in things such as 
wealth, income, education, power, and status. For example, some members of society 
exist within a richer group (stratum) and others within a less affluent stratum. Race and 
gender are also unequally distributed across these strata. “Thus, a cross section, or slice, 
of American society would reveal many different levels (or strata) of the population 
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along these different dimensions” (O‟Guinn et al., 2006, p. 188). Sociologists refer to this 
as social class. In recent times, however, sociologist have argued that the emergence of 
the New Class, a class of technologically skilled and highly educated individuals with 
great access to information and technology, has further changed the way we define social 
class. “Knowledge of, and access to, information may begin to challenge property as a 
determinant of social class” (p. 188). 
Another powerful tool used in sociology is called community. “Community 
members believe they belong to a group of people who are similar to them in some 
important way and different from those not in their community” O‟Guinn, Allen & 
Semenik, p. 199). The concept of community then can be applied to different 
occupational groups such as government employees, unions, elected officials, college 
students, and business groups. O‟Guinn et al. contended these respective community 
groups share social meaning and serve as an important reference group for the individual 
belonging to that specific community. These members often share rituals and view 
themselves as a group of people who are similar to them in some important way, and 
different from those not in their community. 
The concept of demographic segmentation is widely used in selecting targeting 
segments that include basics descriptors such as age, gender, race, marital status, income, 
education, and occupation. Demographic information has two specific applications 
according to O‟Guinn, Allen and Semenik. First, demographics are commonly used to 
describe or profile segments that have been identified with some other variable. Thus, if 
the researcher is looking at demographics to show group differences it may be tied to a 
variable such as an ethical perception of corruption. Second, demographic categories are 
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frequently used as the starting point for market segmentation. In this particular case, the 
researcher is using demographic information to determine if the market is segmented by 
demographic variables such as race, education, income, age, political affiliation, and 
occupation. If indeed, society is segmented, this effects public policy and good 
governance. Since targeted groups in this study are responding to these questions or 
perceiving these variables differently, these variables depend on conceptual based beliefs 
and of the stakeholder. 
Concept 18: Self Report Bias 
A body of empirical research literature reports that most people believe they are 
above average in a variety of skills and abilities. “Most people believe they are more able 
and more skilled on a variety of tasks than most other people” (Zabojnik, 2004, p. 259). 
Zabojnik also reports that several researchers (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wells & Sweeney, 
1986; Campbell, 1986; Larwood & Whittaker, 1977) have also found biases in self-
assessments in future performances, intelligence, as well in a range of abilities.  
Baker, Jensen, and Murphey (1988) as cited in Zabojnik (2004) suggest that a bias 
in self- assessment may possibly explain why managers are reluctant to give employees a 
poor performance review. They further contended, “if someone believes he or she is 
above average, telling that person that they are not, can generate a lot of dissatisfaction” 
(p. 260). However, Greenwald (1980) as cited in Zabojnik, in looking at self-
enhancement theory showed people have a desire to “ see themselves favorably and as 
competent human beings, which increases their feelings of personal satisfaction and 
worth” (p. 260). Greewald, further argued “these  individuals distort information 
processing so as to select, interpret, and recall information in a way that supports a 
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positive self-image” (p. 260). Korman (1970) as cited in Zabojnik, illustrated this concept 
by looking at consistency theory. “People will distort information processing to preserve 
their prior beliefs and theories because inconsistency in self-image is psychological 
uncomfortable,” according to consistency theory (p. 260). “Conceptual disagreement 
exists when various raters use different conceptual frames of reference for evaluating 
performance” (Zabonjnik, p. 2). 
Cheung (1999) argued self-other rating disagreement (S-ORD) is the extent, 
which one‟s self-rating performance is different from other people‟s ratings. Cheung 
further demonstrated that most Fortune 500 firms are using multirater or 360-degree 
appraisals of manager performance. The premise of a 360-degree appraisal is to provide 
feedback from multiple raters to guide the personal development of rates (Tornow, 1993). 
Conceptual disagreement occurs when raters use a different conceptual frame of 
reference for evaluating a performance according to Murphy and Cleveland, 1995. 
Therefore, one would expect that those individuals (political leaders) self-reporting 
ratings would be different from the population who would rate them on the same 
constructs. The concept of social desirability is intermingled with the notion that there are 
social norms governing behaviors and attitudes. Political leaders may misrepresent 
themselves to appear to comply with those norms.  
Conclusion 
What are political promises worth from politicians with debts or political favors to 
pay? Kass (2008) in his Chicago Tribune article discussed this very point and stated: 
Corruption the Chicago Way does not only waste money and burden tax- payers. 
This is not only about isolated instances of graft and amusing, earthy rapscallions. 
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This is a cartoon. The reality is that Illinois political corruption is an infection that 
spreads. The people either are numbed or deny it, or they feel pressured to suck 
up to their overlords. That is not American. That is positively medieval. (p. 2)  
The overarching assumption for this research is that corruption is prevalent 
through out Chicago and Illinois. Sabato and Simpson (1996) stated that corruption and 
reform are a phenomena of class, ethnic, partisan and even religious conflicts. They 
further contended, “Corruption is nurtured by the political culture, which depends heavily 
on what average voters will tolerate from their elected officials” (Merriner, 2008, p. 171). 
Rich Juliano, a Ryan operative, stated that “anything that belonged to state government 
that could be used for political purposes, as Scott Fawell, Ryan‟s top lieutenant, wanted 
them used for” (Merriner, p. 172). Noted political scientist, Banerfield (1968) as 
described in Merriner (2008): 
The situation where a political boss, must, if he is to keep his organization from 
falling to pieces, look the other way to avoid seeing the inevitable corruption. If 
the political boss sees the corruption, he would have to put a stop to it, and thus 
weaken both his personal political position and the whole structure of government 
power. He further stated that, personal political position and the whole structure 
of government power are powerful gods whom few wish to offend. (pp. 173-174)  
A final epitaph for unethical and corrupt politicians is best stated by British 
statesman, J. Enoch Powell, in Joseph Chamberlain, “All political lives, unless they are 
cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure” (Powell, 1977, p. 151). 
In summary, the overall theme in the Chapter 2 literature review revolved around 
an agent (political leader-politician) acting as if they are the principal. When this occurs, 
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ethical dilemmas ensue and corruption is often the result. When politicians behave in 
ways counter to their elected role as agents (stewards) of the principal (citizens – 
stakeholders), this results in the politician behaving in a manner maximizing utility over 
those whom they represent. Bad governance is the result of these unethical and corrupt 
behaviors of the politician that can result from the agent/principal role reversal. 
Additional theories, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, public choice, 
political motivations, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, trust, 
perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, and media influence and communication 
strategies have been explored. They all interact and are dependent upon each other in 
helping to understand how good governance strategies can be developed by the political 
leader. The compendiums of theories that are interrelated and intertwined form the basis 
for effective communication strategies between political leaders and their stakeholder 
groups. If ignored, this can result in poor governance.  
 The investigator has reviewed major disciplines such as economics, business, 
strategy, leadership, ethics, sociology, public administration, and psychology. The 
following major theories or streams of literature have been drawn upon: stakeholder 
theory, principal – agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, public choice, 
political motivations, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, congruence, 
trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media influence, and communications 
strategies. The researcher‟s hypotheses are developed as a result from these major 
literature streams, which the researcher introduced in the model development. These are 
illustrated and summarized in Tables 1 -5. 
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Model Development 
This next section proposes exploratory hypotheses generated from the literature 
streams and research investigations based on relevant studies previously cited and 
presented in this table-matrix format. 
Table 1 
Exploratory Hypotheses 1A-E Mapped to Literature Streams 
_______________________________________________________________________
Exploratory hypothesis           Literature stream 
 
H1a: There will be significant perceptual 
differences between stakeholder groups          
regarding political leaders‟ ethical behavior. 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual 
differences between stakeholder groups          
regarding political leaders‟ trust. 
H1c: There will be significant perceptual 
differences between stakeholder groups          
regarding political leaders‟ unethical/corrupt 
behavior. 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual 
differences between stakeholder groups          
regarding political leaders‟ ethical relativism. 
H1e: There will be significant perceptual 
differences between stakeholder groups          
regarding political leaders‟ communications. 
 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
Principal-Agency 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Power Theory 
Congruence Theory 
Ethical leadership 
Narcissistic Theory 
Corruption Theory 
Trust and Perception Theories 
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Table 2 
Exploratory Hypotheses 2A-E Mapped to Literature Streams 
_______________________________________________________________________
Exploratory hypothesis                 Literature stream 
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups based on key 
demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political 
leaders‟ ethical behavior. 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups based on key 
demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political  
 leaders‟ trust. 
H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups based  on key 
demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political  
 leaders‟ unethical corrupt behavior. 
 H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups based  on key 
demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political  
 leaders‟ ethical relativism. 
H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups based  on key 
demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders‟ communication. 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
Principal-Agency 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Power Theory 
Demographics 
Ethical leadership 
Narcissistic Theory 
Public Choice Theory 
Communication Theory 
Corruption Theory 
143 
 
Table 3 
Exploratory Hypotheses 3A-E Mapped to Literature Streams 
________________________________________________________________________
Exploratory hypothesis                 Literature stream 
H3a: There will be significant differences between 
political leaders and all other stakeholder groups 
regarding ethical behavior. 
H3b: There will be significant differences between 
political leaders and all other stakeholder groups 
regarding trust. 
H3c: There will be significant differences between 
political leaders and all other stakeholder groups 
regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H3d: There will be significant differences between 
political leaders and all other stakeholder groups 
regarding ethical relativism. 
H3e: There will be significant differences between 
political leaders and all other stakeholder groups 
regarding communication. 
 
Self-Reporting Bias 
Political Motivation 
Stakeholder Theory 
Principal agency Theory 
Ethical Leadership 
Narcissistic Theory 
Public Choice Theory 
Communication Theory 
Corruption Theory 
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Table 4 
Exploratory Hypothesis 4 Mapped to Literature Streams 
________________________________________________________________________
Exploratory hypothesis                  Literature stream 
H4: The will be a significant difference between 
stakeholders and politicians regarding their level of 
communications. 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
Trust Theory 
Power Theory 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Communication Theory 
 
Table 5 
Exploratory Hypothesis 5Mapped to Literature Streams 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Exploratory hypothesis                    Literature stream 
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust 
and ethics higher than the various stakeholders who 
will perceive those same qualities. This implies that the 
public is more cynical that the political leaders who feel 
they are justified by their experiences as political 
leaders. 
 
Cynicism Theory 
Trust Theory 
Cynicism Theory 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Concept map for literature review 
Figure 6, concept map for literature review, indicates the relationships between 
the various streams of literature. The arrows moving in both directions indicate the 
streams, which are related, or interact on each other. Arrows moving in one direction, 
indicate the relationship from one stream to another. This concept map is exploratory in 
nature, and a simplified/clarified map is advanced, because of this research.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
As the literature review revealed, there is sufficient research to suggest that 
stakeholder‟s perceptions are associated with political leader‟s organizational governance 
strategies. Similarly, stakeholder„s perceptions are affected by the mass media which can 
positively or negatively affect stakeholder‟s perceptions and participation in the 
governance process. In addition, an overarching theme as presented in Chapter II is that 
when a politician acts as a principal instead of an agent of the people, unethical and 
corrupt behavior can occur. This is an inversion of agency theory. This inversion of 
agency theory, as proposed by this researcher, may present a significant contribution to 
the literature stream and for this research project. Since the literature does not currently 
address this inversion of agency theory, it has the potential to open up significant areas of 
study relating to this principle.  
This research is based upon the following theories are interrelated and 
interdependent: stakeholder theory, principal-agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
public choice, narcissistic behavior, resource dependency, power, congruence, trust, 
perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media influence and communication strategies. 
These all play an important role in the researcher‟s CUB model and communications 
model for effective good governance by the political leader.  
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This researcher derived hypotheses from the Chapter 2 literature review. The 
researcher illustrated this by developing the conceptual map for the literature review. 
This indicated the complex interdependencies of the literature streams discussed and 
additionally, showed how it related to the exploratory hypotheses.  
This dissertation is considered action research, one of the many streams of 
collaborative research. It is viewed as:  
… An emergent inquiry process in which applied behavior and organizational 
sciences are applied to solve real business problems. It is simultaneously concerned 
with bringing change in organizations, in developing self-help competencies in 
organizations, and adding to the scientific knowledge. (Shani & Pasmore, 1985, p. 
439) 
In addition, “action research brings about the challenge of balance and 
interdependence between researchers and organizational members, between academic 
research and actual applications, between knowledge creation and problems solving, and 
between inquiry from inside and inquiry from the outside” (Coghlan & Shani, 2005, pp. 
533-534). Reason and Bradbury (2001) further elaborated that action research cannot be 
classified as one single methodology, but rather it includes a wide range and levels of 
inquiry approaches, activities and methods. Coghlan and Shani additionally stated that: 
Action research is viewed as a holistic process that comprises several sequential 
dimensions: strategic of policy choices to focus on simultaneous action and research 
in a collaborative manner, design requirements that can make the policy choices 
operational, and design dimensions that bound and specify the requirements and lead 
to a realized design, all of which set the context with which an action research 
develops. (p. 534) 
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Coghlan and Shani (2005) additionally stated that action research is not an 
impersonal approach and that action researchers engage in action to influence outcomes. 
Bell (1998) argued as such, the researcher needed to be self-reflexive about their 
vulnerability, and to have realistic expectations, tolerance, to be able to listen and above 
all, to have an openness and ability to learn.  
From this viewpoint, Abnor and Bjerke (1997) described that “it is important for a 
researcher to go through a process of self-analysis to define who they are and that this 
influences the way the researcher views reality and affects their intellectual identification 
with a specific defining paradigm” (p. 7). More broadly stated, the researcher‟s beliefs 
become a significant factor on the way the researcher views the subject matter and the 
way the research questions are stated (Marinaccio, 2007).  
In a similar vain, Choudhuri, Glauser and Peregoy (2004) described their 
guidelines for qualitative research, it is required that a researcher “include a self-reflexive 
description of the researcher‟s role, location and perspective; this may have relevance to 
the conduct of this research” (p. 444). From this perspective, it is constructive to describe 
the researcher of this dissertation. First, the researcher was raised in a middle-class, blue-
collar family. My father was a union-pipefitter who worked for state institution. At an 
early age, this researcher saw politicians giving out state jobs based on party affiliations, 
paying political dues or monthly contributions, and even purchasing new or used 
automobiles to keep your job. This resulted and formulated the researcher‟s belief system 
that a hard-working individual, like my father, was dependent upon a political system that 
was corrupt in order to keep his job and provide for his family. Second, the researcher is 
a state employee with 26 years of government experience who has witnessed corruption 
on the local, state and federal level. He has personally witnessed the former governor of 
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Illinois convicted for corruption, and a host of mayors and trustees imprisoned for 
extortion all in the name of self-serving political interests. These politicians sought self-
interests and personal greed over the interests of their electorate (stakeholders). These 
self-seeking politician‟s personal interests resulted in poor governance and imposed a 
hidden corruption tax on citizens (stakeholders). Third, the researcher is involved in an 
Ethical Leadership Doctorate program, and the investigation of this subject matter is 
paramount to assisting political leaders with governance and communications strategies 
to reduce negative perceptions and cynicism of stakeholders and further good 
governance. The researcher believes in ethical political leaders who are stewards of 
government resources that enable them to govern effectively for the benefit of all of the 
electorate.  
Because of this study, the researcher, as well as those participants who were in the 
stakeholder groups deemed the necessary traits for effective political leaders are as 
follows: they act ethically, communicate with their stakeholders, and are true stewards of 
the governments resources entrusted to them by the electorate (stakeholders). Ethical 
political leaders do not maximize their own self-interest, but maximize the utilities of the 
electorate (stakeholders) in a fair and equitable way, which further produces good 
governance strategies. To summarize, the researcher has developed an overall research 
question:   
Overall Research Question  
What are the significant perceptual differences across stakeholder groups relating 
to perceptions of ethical behavior of elected officials, and what are the implications for 
communication strategies aimed at producing good governance?   
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Exploratory Hypotheses 
       Many recent examples of exploratory case research have framed broad 
questions but have not stated formal hypotheses (Ancona, 1990; Garud & Rappa, 1994; 
Isabella, 1990). The use of exploratory hypotheses, as demonstrated by Daake (1995), 
acts as a helpful guide and can be a concise summary of the questions raised by the 
literature in Chapters 1 and 2. Five exploratory hypotheses were developed and tested 
within the content of the overall research question. These five exploratory hypotheses 
postulated the overall effects of stakeholder‟s perceptions of political corruption and 
unethical behavior between elected officials and all other stakeholder groups, and its 
consequential effects on promoting good governance strategies for political leaders. 
Five Exploratory Hypotheses: 
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ ethical behavior. 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ trust. 
H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ ethical relativism. 
H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ communications. 
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H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between and stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding 
political leaders‟ ethical behavior. 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ trust. 
H2c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ unethical corrupt behavior. 
 H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ ethical relativism. 
H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ communication. 
H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior. 
H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding trust. 
H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. 
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H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding communication. 
H4:  There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and elected        
officials regarding their level of communications. 
H5:  Elected officials will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various 
will stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. This implies that the public 
is more cynical than the elected officials who feel they are justified by their 
experiences as political leaders. 
 Conceptual Mapping of Exploratory Hypotheses to Survey Questions: 
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to 
this hypothesis - q75, which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, 
which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20; 53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f.  
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ trust. (Questions mapped to this 
hypothesis -18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54) 
H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions 
mapped to this hypothesis -72, 56a, 56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, 47a). 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ ethical relativism. (Questions mapped 
to this hypothesis - 73, which is a linear combination of questions 38, 39, and 40). 
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H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders‟ communications. (Questions mapped to 
this hypothesis - q74, which is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, 46, and 55). 
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders‟ ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 75, 
which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, which is a linear 
combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20;  53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f,). 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54). 
H2c:  There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ unethical corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -72, which is a 
linear combination of questions 22, 23, and 24; 56a, 56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, and 47a). 
H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - question 73, which is a 
linear combination of questions 38, 39, and 40). 
H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders‟ communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - question74, which is a 
linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, and 46; and 55). 
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H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other          
stakeholder groups combined regarding ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this 
hypothesis - q75, which is a linear combination of questions 37, 41, and 43; 70, which is 
a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20;  53d, 56d, 59, 57a-f, and 60). 
H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other          
stakeholder groups combined regarding trust. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 18, 
21, 28, 35, 41, 54 and 71, which is a linear combination of questions 1, 4, 18, 19, and 20). 
H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other 
stakeholder groups combined regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to 
this hypothesis - questions 15, 34, 44, 47a-b, and 72 which is a linear combination of 
questions 22, 23, and 24). 
H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other          
stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 
questions 38, 39 and 40). 
H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other         
stakeholder groups regarding communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 
questions 74, which is a linear combination of questions 19, 20, 45, and 46; 55, and 62). 
H4: There will be a significant difference between stakeholders and elected 
officials regarding their level of communications. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 
questions 80, which is a linear combination of questions 26, 36, 45, and 46). 
H5: Elected officials leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher 
than the various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities.  
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This implies that the public is more cynical that the political leaders who feel they are 
justified by their experiences as political leaders. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis- 
questions 85, which is a linear combination of questions 18, 21, 23, 27, 30, 33, and 35). 
The literature review revealed that there are varieties of theories that can be 
utilized as possible explanations of what is and what are political leaders unethical and 
corrupt behavior, and its underlying effects on good governance. This researcher has 
identified two major theories contributing to understanding these political phenomena, as 
described in stakeholder theory and agency theory. Stakeholder theory as described by 
Freeman (1984) is concerned with how stakeholder groups are formed and identified in 
the organization. The central premise being stakeholders are often divergent and compete 
for scarce resources in the organization. In this case, the researcher is applying 
stakeholder theory in the political-governance organization.  
Agency theory as developed by Jenson and Meckling (1976) defined “how to 
structure the contractual relation between the principal and agent to provide appropriate 
incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal‟s welfare, 
given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist” (p. 7). This researcher has taken 
agency theory and turned it on its head by investigating the phenomenon when a political 
leader who is the agent of the electorate (stakeholders) acts in a manner inconsistent with 
their designated agent role and instead acts as a principal. When this situation occurs, as 
the agency literature suggests several interesting factors come into play, namely, 
cynicism from the stakeholder and narcissistic behavior from the political leader. Other 
antecedent theories come into play: resource dependency and power relationships, these 
affect the balance of power between the principal (stakeholder) and the agent (political 
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leader) when principal-agent roles are reversed and governance is affected. Furthermore, 
when a political leader acts as a principal and not as an agent of the electorate 
(stakeholders), the political leader assumes the mantel of power and believes government 
is their personal entitlement with the requisites rewards for their own personal self-
satisfaction. Unethical and corrupt behavior often is the result of politicians reversing the 
agent-principal role.  
Stakeholder‟s perceptions are constantly being evaluated and internally reviewed. 
These perceptions are affected by a politician‟s action of personal entitlement and self-
seeking behavior, which maximizes the politician‟s personal interests over those of the 
electorate (stakeholders). Communication strategies are inherently important to political 
leaders, as they need to communicate their willingness to represent the values and ideas 
of the electorate (stakeholders). Political leaders must be aware of the perceptional 
problems of stakeholders viewing them as pursuing their own political self-interests. The 
researcher has developed this initial and preliminary model of the factors affecting 
political-unethical behavior as described in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Factors affecting political – unethical behavior 
Research Design 
This study followed the sequential exploratory methods model (Creswell, 2003). 
Creswell delineated the sequential, exploratory mixed-methods model, approach as useful 
to the researcher who “wants to explore a phenomenon but also wants to expand on the 
qualitative findings” (p. 216). The sequential exploratory mixed methods model involves 
collecting the data in stages. One data collection is followed by a second data collection. 
These data sets are used to illustrate an explanatory follow-up design. A qualitative first 
step is followed by a quantitative second step to generalize the results to the population, 
different and more participants are utilized in Stage 3 (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).  
 
   Political –Unethical Behavior 
Poor or lack of communications between 
Political Leaders and Stakeholders. 
Political Leaders views Stakeholders as 
complacent, “No one really cares.” 
Political Leader‟s lack of vision for 
good governance and ethical behavior.                                                                            
An 
Political Leaders views 
Stakeholders as complacent, 
“really no one cares.” Political Leaders act bureaucratic “It‟s 
always been done this way.” 
Self-serving political behavior. “It‟s all 
about me over you.” 
Stakeholder‟s complacency for political 
corruption. 
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Further, the qualitative data collection used was from a smaller sample then the 
quantitative data collection as described by Creswell and Plano Clark, “as the intent is not 
to merge or compare the data, as in concurrent procedures, so unequal sizes are not as 
much of an issue in a sequential design” (p. 123). 
The position of the researcher is to gather themes conducted from various elected 
political leaders (U.S. congressman, state senators, state representatives, mayors, village 
trustees, state‟s attorney and judges) as it relates to their specific views on perceptions of 
corruption as seen through their eyes. In addition, how the various political leaders see 
themselves as compared to how other relevant stakeholder groups perceive the elected 
official‟s behaviors and attitudes. These themes as identified by the researcher from the 
qualitative interviews will then be designated into the qualitative survey used to measure 
perceptions of various stakeholder groups and politicians. (See Figure 7, p. 155, for an 
illustrative model of this exploratory research model.) 
Furthermore, the researcher utilized methodological triangulation as described by 
Denzin (1978). For example, in which the use of multiple methods to study a single 
problem, such as utilizing interviews, observations, questionnaires and documents were 
used. Denzin further elaborated on the logic of triangulation and stated that: 
No single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival casual factors… 
Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple 
methods of observations must be employed. This is termed triangulation. I now 
offer as a final methodological rule the principal that multiple methods be used in 
every investigation. (p. 28) 
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This researcher developed the sequential exploratory mixed methods model as 
delineated in Chapter 1, Figure 3. Piatt research model. This research model was 
developed to address the exploratory hypotheses. The action research process stems from 
an effort to differentiate how stakeholders groups and political leaders view perceptions 
of ethical and unethical behavior. The object of this research is to determine if differences 
in perceptions relating to ethical and unethical behavior, trust, communications, and 
cynicism exist between stakeholder groups.  
The degree to which various stakeholder groups perceive ethical and unethical 
behavior is crucial in the overall research question. Do different stakeholder groups 
perceive politicians differently than those politicians‟ self-perceptions? The next step was 
to interview a select group of political leaders and ask them to discuss any differences. 
These differences and why did they think there were differences between themselves and 
the other stakeholder groups. The steps used in developing the survey instrument are 
displayed in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model 
 
 
          1st Phase 
       Qualitative 
          Interview 
    Political 
Leaders (PL) 
Leaders 
Identify significant 
statements from 
interviews (PL) 
Group significant 
statements into theme 
2
nd
 Phase 
Quantitative 
Use themes from (PL‟s) to 
write survey instrument 
Surveys reviewed by 
Expert test group 
Surveys adjusted and 
given to test group 
(college students) 
Revised survey given to 
stakeholder groups and 
politicians 
Statistically Analyze results from stakeholder 
groups and politicians with ANOVA, ANCOVA, 
independent- samples t-tests, correlations, and 
descriptive statistics 
Pilot 
Survey 
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Figure 8. Sequential exploratory mixed-methods model (continued) 
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Instrument Design 
This survey instrument utilized an exploratory design as defined by Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2007) with the intent of developing and testing the research instrument 
(taxonomy), and dealt with the information that was most useful in designing and 
developing this research instrument and the procedures used in the process. The 
qualitative data analysis yielded specific quotes from political leaders, which were coded 
by the researcher, and generated general themes that resulted from these categories. The 
quotes from the political leaders then resulted in the formulation of several questionnaire 
items. In addition, these quotes were used to refine, confirm, and clarify previous 
research literature. The categories were designated by variables measured by multiple 
items, and the themes represented larger scales of the instrument (Creswell & Plano 
Clark). 
Second, the researcher implemented sound psychometric properties and good 
scale development procedures in developing this survey instrument. DeVellis (1991) 
described proper scale development procedures that must be incorporated in the scale 
design: 1) A determination what the researcher wants to measure, is grounded in the 
theory, and constructs to be addressed and related qualitative findings. 2) The researcher 
then generates an item-pool using short items, an appropriate reading level, and questions 
that ask a single question. 3) The researcher must make a determination of the scale of 
measurements for the items used, and the physical construction of the research 
instrument. 4) Have the items pool reviewed by experts. 5) Consider the validated items 
from other scale or instruments. 6) Administer the instrument to a sample for validation. 
7) Evaluation of the items (e.g., item-scale correlations, item variance, and reliability. 8) 
Optimization of scale length based on the item performance and reliability checks. 
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Finally, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) suggested that the researcher “review 
and examine previously published mixed methods studies that use an Exploratory Design 
with the intent to develop an instrument, to learn the procedures used in generating the 
survey instrument from qualitative data” ( p. 124). The researcher utilized the procedures 
as outline by DeVellis (1991) by collecting discussion group data and personal interviews 
with political leaders to help form a questionnaire. Other unpublished sources were also 
utilized. The researcher then formed focus groups of knowledgeable market research 
students where participants were asked to evaluate the clarity of the questions. The 
resulting questionnaire was used in a pilot test with participants (college-students) similar 
to those students used in the study. The questionnaire content of the survey instrument 
was validated by a number of experts in the political, academic, and business sectors and 
checked for basic validity and reliability. 
As identified by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) and DeVellis (1991) the 
researcher incorporated these processes into the research instrument. Exploratory journal 
articles, multidimensional scales, and doctoral dissertations (Daake, 1995) were 
reviewed. Further, as described by Green, Caracelli, and Graham (1989), the two-phase 
Exploratory Design resulted in the first method (qualitative) personal interviews, can help 
or develop the second method (quantitative). This researcher utilized an exploratory 
design as described by Creswell and Plano Clark based on the premise that an exploration 
was needed. Current measures or instruments were not available, the variables are 
unknown, and there were no guiding framework or theory for this research design.  
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Because this design began with a qualitative approval, it was best suited for exploring a 
relatively unknown phenomenon. This design is particularly useful when a researcher 
needs to develop and test an instrument because one is not available (Creswell, 1999; 
Creswell, Fetters & Ivankova, 2004). 
   The Exploratory Design used, helps to connect a qualitative, quantitative, mixed-
method approach. This researcher chose this variant of Exploratory Design due to the 
need to develop a quantitative instrument informed by qualitative findings. In this design, 
the researcher first qualitatively explored the research topic with a few participants such 
as political leaders and other knowledgeable informants. The qualitative findings 
(personal interviews with political leaders and others), then guided the researcher in the 
development of items and scales for a quantitative survey instrument. This was done in 
conjunction with other procedure such as literature review, scale review, and brain- 
storming with academic experts. In the second data collection phase, the researcher 
implements and validates the instrument quantitatively. In summary, this researcher‟s 
survey design, the qualitative and quantitative methods are connected through the 
development of the instrument items. “Researchers using this variant model, often 
emphasize the quantitative aspects of the study” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 77).  
In summary, a mixed- method study as proscribed by Creswell (2003) was used. 
This resulted in this exploratory investigation of stakeholder perceptions of political 
leader‟s behaviors and outcomes as it relates to corrupt and unethical behavior. A 
triangulation mixed method design was used, a type of design in which different but 
complimentary data was collected on the same topic. Specifically, in this study, 
perceptions of corruption and ethics were used to validate the proposed Corrupt-
Unethical- Behavior (CUB) model.  
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 The survey was designed to assess general perception and attitude levels of 
stakeholders and political leaders based on ethical and unethical situations. After a 
thorough review of the literature, the researcher concluded that no one instrument had 
been developed and validated for measuring stakeholder and political leader‟s 
perceptions on ethics and corruption. As described by Daake‟ and Anthony‟s (2000) 
study that developed original scales, this researcher developed a survey instrument that 
was based on two sources. First, the researcher reviewed and partially adapted two 
previously used general scales “The perceived role of ethics and social responsibility: A 
scale development” (Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996), and “A validation 
and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale” (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1993). 
Secondly, and more importantly, that having been said, after an extensive analysis, the 
researcher, had to develop his own survey scales as were specifically related to his 
research questions. Thirdly, the researcher created original scales as an outflow of the 
larger on-going action research process. The researcher designed the questionnaires and 
survey instrument from interviews with key political leaders, relevant literature, and 
consulting with subject matter experts. The reason for collecting both qualitative and 
quantitative data is to bring together the strengths of both forms of research to compare 
and validate results for this study. The goal is to bring together both forms of data to 
enrich the design the survey instrument.  
Reliability of Survey Instrument 
Prior to discussing the reliability of the survey instrument, a definition of 
measurement as suggested by Blaclock (1968) who observed that: 
Sociological theorists often use concepts that are formulated at rather high levels of 
abstraction. These are quite different from the variables that are the stock-in-trade of 
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empirical sociologists… The problem of bridging the gap between theory and 
research is seen as one of measurement error (p. 6; 12). 
In other words, measurement is most usefully viewed as the “process of linking 
abstract concepts to empirical indicants” (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 10), “as a process 
involving an “explicit” organized plan  for classifying (and often quantifying) the 
particular sense data at hand-the indicates-in terms of the general concept in the 
researchers mind”(Riley, 1963, p. 23).  
Carmines and Zeller further clarify the above definition by stating that: 
It makes it apparent that measurement is a process involving both theoretical as 
well as empirical considerations. From an empirical standpoint, which the focus is 
on the “observable response” whether it takes the form of a mark on a set of self- 
administered questionnaire, the behavior recorded in an observational study, or 
the answer given to an interviewer. Theoretically, interest lies in the underlying 
unobservable (and direct immeasurable) concept that is represented in the 
response. (p. 10) 
Therefore, as enumerated by Carmines and Zeller (1979), measurement focuses 
on the crucial relationship between empirically grounded indicator (s) – the observable 
response, and the underlying unobservable concept (s). When this relationship is a strong 
one, analysis of empirical indicators can lead to useful inferences about the relationships 
among the underlying concepts. Similarly, if the theoretical concepts have no empirical 
referents, then the empirical tenability of the theory essentially remains unknown (pp. 10 
-11). From this perspective, Carmines and Zeller presented an auxiliary theory “denoting 
the relationship between the concepts and indicators is equally important to the researcher 
as the substantive theory linking concepts to one another” (p. 11).  
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Carmines and Zeller‟s (1979) definition of measurement, leads the researcher to 
determine the extent to which a particular empirical indicator (or a set of empirical 
indicators) represents a given theoretical concept. In this particular case, the researcher is 
using empirical indicators of perceptions, trust, cynicism, narcissism, and power. 
Reliability of this researcher‟s survey instrument focused on the extent to which a 
measuring procedure yielding the same results on repeated trials. Reliability therefore is 
the result of the consistency found in repeated measurements of the same phenomenon. 
The more consistent the results given by repeated measurements the higher the reliability 
of the measuring procedure (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). 
The concept of reliability is important to this researcher. The researcher‟s survey 
instrument was pretested with college level seniors in a strategic management and policy 
class, doctorate level students, and business and community leaders, to determine the 
reliability of the survey instrument. A test and retest was administered within two months 
of each other.  
Validity of Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument must also be valid. The researcher‟s survey instrument is 
considered construct valid, if it measures what it is intended to measure. A valid 
measuring instrument is the degree that it measured this theoretical concept rather than 
some other phenomenon. “While reliability focuses on a particular property of empirical 
indicators-the extent to which they provide consistent results across repeated 
measurements – validity concerns the crucial relationship between concept and indicator” 
(Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 12).  
 Cronbach (1971) stated, “One validates, not a test, but an interpretation of data 
arising from a specified procedure” (p. 447). Cronbach indicated that the distinction is 
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central to validation as the survey instrument can measure one kind of phenomenon and 
be valid but can be invalid for assessing other phenomenon. Additionally, according to 
Cronbach, the researcher does not validate the measuring instrument itself, but rather the 
measuring instrument in relation to the purpose for which the researcher constructed it to 
be used to measure the theoretical constructs.  
In turn, the researcher focused on construct validity as described by Cronbach and 
Meehl (1955) who observed “construct validity must be investigated whenever no 
criterion or universe of content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be 
measured” (p. 282). At the its core, construct validity is the extent to which a particular 
measure relates to other measures consistent  with theoretically derived hypotheses 
concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured (Carmines & Zeller, 
1979). 
Construct validity according to Carmines and Zeller involves the following steps: 
First, the theoretical relationships between the concepts themselves must be 
specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures of the 
concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be interpreted in 
terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular measure. (p. 23) 
As further described by Carmines and Zeller (1979) the process of construct 
validation is theory-laden. It is almost impossible to validate a measure or concept unless 
there are existent theoretical network that surrounds the concept. Without this network, it 
is impossible to create theoretical predictions, which, further directly lead to empirical 
tests involving measures of the concept (p. 23). Construct validation follows the logic and 
implies that the relationship between multiple indicators which are designed to represent 
a given theoretical concept and theoretically relevant external variables should be similar 
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in terms of direction, strength, and  consistency (Carmines & Zeller). They further argued 
the use of construct validity has generalized applicability in the social sciences. Thus, this 
researcher assessed the construct validity of the survey instrument by looking at the 
performance of the scales, and then determining if it they were consistent with the 
theoretically derived expectations. The theoretical concepts as discussed in Chapter 2 
were used to derive hypotheses. The qualitative aspect of interviewing political leaders 
allowed the researcher to identify themes that were incorporated into the survey 
instrument and analyzed quantitatively. The theoretical streams of related literature 
included the following theories: stakeholder, agency, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
corruption, public choice, political motivation, narcissistic behavior, resource 
dependency, power, congruency, trust, perceptions, cynicism, ethical leadership, media 
influence and communication strategies. Since this is an exploratory descriptive study, 
the researcher designed the instrument not to predict behavior of political leaders but to 
assess the perceptional differences among stakeholder groups.  
   As previously stated, the researcher utilized and modified existing scales. To 
reiterate though the vast majority of the scaled were original. The survey instrument was 
pre-tested with a women‟s business group in addition to college students. The researcher 
requested and received permission to utilize and modify two existing scales, “A 
validation and extension of a multidimensional ethics scale” (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 
1993) and “The perceived role of ethics and social responsibility: A scale development” 
(Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996). However, after reviewing the existing 
scales, only two questions were used, but the researcher informed by these existing 
instruments developed the remaining survey.  
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Population 
Sampling Procedures 
Due to the nature of this exploratory study, the researcher used purposeful 
strategic sampling of the target populations. The underlying principal common to 
purposeful sampling according to Patton (1987) is selecting information rich cases. 
Patton elaborated on this concept by stating, “The general purpose takes its specific focus 
from the information needs of primary stakeholders and decision-making context of the 
particular program being evaluated” (p. 145). 
Additionally, Patton indicated that there are no specific guidelines for determining 
the size of the purposeful sample, and that this is a matter for negotiation with 
stakeholders, decision-makers, and information users. “The sample should be large 
enough to be credible given the purpose of the evaluation, but small enough to permit 
adequate depth and detail for each case in the sample” (Patton, p. 58). 
In addition, the researcher also utilized opportunistic sampling with political 
leaders. This allowed the researcher to take advantage of on-the-spot opportunities with 
political leaders. For instance, the researcher was able to interview political leaders at 
business after hour‟s events, community forums, presentations, etc., where these political 
leaders were at and in which the researcher would not have access to them that easily at a 
later date in time. 
Demographics of the Population 
Leedy and Ormond (2005) described purposive sampling as “choosing people 
who we have decided as typical of a group or those who represent diverse perspectives on 
an issue” (p. 206). Thus, the researcher identified typical stakeholder groups that 
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represent diverse perceptions of political leaders. The researcher has identified the 
appropriate stakeholders and political leaders. 
Political leaders: The researcher utilized a representative sample in identifying 
the major elected officials in Illinois. U.S. Congresswoman, state senator, state 
representative, county executive, county board chairperson, county state‟s attorney, 
circuit judge, mayors, trustees, council members, county board members. These political 
leaders represent the range of the major elected officials in Illinois. The political leaders 
are all elected officials in Illinois. This study relied on their participation to answer the 
interview questions and participate in the survey. These political leader‟s self-perceptions 
are crucial in defining where thy view themselves compared to how their stakeholders 
view them.  
External stakeholders: The researcher has identified several relevant and diverse 
major stakeholder groups to be included in this study. These stakeholder groups are 
representative of groups that are affected by political leader‟s decisions. The researcher 
has identified these external stakeholders, identified and are listed below. 
College students: The researcher obtained approval from two college professors in 
two college political science departments. The researcher did not know any of the 
students who completed the survey. The students were from two distinct higher 
educational institutions in the approximate ages 18-25 and had similar levels of political 
science and economics. One institution is a private four-year college and the other is a 
public junior college. Students sampled represented diverse demographics. 
 Businesses: The researcher administered several surveys to local chambers of 
commerce, women organizations, and service groups such as Rotary and Kiwanis. The 
business organizations represent a diverse sample of business people in the region.         
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 Unions:  The researcher identified two major unions in the area that comprises the 
largest unions in the region. The researcher administered the surveys to union members at 
their monthly local labor meeting. The unions surveyed are representative of union 
memberships throughout Illinois. These unions employ building-trades, which are 
comprised of laborers, carpenters, pipefitters, truck drivers, masons, painters, electricians, 
and other miscellaneous building trade workers. In addition, other unionized groups such 
as fire fighters, postal workers, teachers, and government union workers, which were 
separate from the non-union government workers, were also added to complete the union 
category. The surveys for the union workers were also distributed to their union-steward, 
who forwarded the survey to their respective membership to complete. Once completed, I 
picked up those surveys that were completed. 
 Government employees:  The researcher administered surveys to government 
employees that included federal, state, and local government employees. They included 
employees from governor appointments to clerical workers and everyone in between 
which were identified as non-union. The researcher identified government workers 
through his 26 years of government experience, and utilized purposeful sampling of 
government employees.  
 The final sample included 471 individuals who were broken down by the 
following categories as identified in Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
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Table 6 
Occupation Demographics 
 
Occupation    Frequency Percent   
  
Government Employee 
 
104 
 
22.1 
  
Elected Official 65 13.8   
Union-Building Trades 75 15.9   
Business Professional 99 21.0   
College Student 128 27.2   
Total 471 100.0  
 
 
 
Table 7 
Ethnicity Demographics 
   
                  
                    Ethnicity 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
  
 
 
Caucasian 
 
404 
 
85.8 
 
85.8 
 
African American 43 9.1 9.1  
Hispanic 19 4.0 4.0  
American Indian/Alaska 5 1.1 1.1  
Total 471 100.0 100.0 
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Table 8 
Gender Demographics 
 
             
          Gender Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
 
 
 
Male 
 
247 
 
52.4 
 
52.4 
 
Female 224 47.6 47.6 
 
Total 471 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Table 9 
Age Group Demographics 
 
 
Age Groups Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
 
  
18-24 
 
128 
 
27.2 
 
27.2 
 
25-44 133 28.2 28.2  
45-54 93 19.7 19.7  
55 & Above 117 24.8 24.8  
Total 471 100.0 100.0  
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Table 10 
Political Affiliation Demographics 
 
 
Political Affiliation Frequency 
 
Percent Valid Percent 
 
  
Republican 
 
174 
 
36.9 
 
36.9 
 
Democrat 179 38.0 38.0  
Independent 112 23.8 23.8  
Libertarian 6 1.3 1.3  
Total 471 100.0 100.0  
 
Data Collection 
The researcher collected the data by meeting with the various stakeholder groups 
in two different ways. First, the researcher personally administered the survey instrument 
to specific stakeholder groups containing selected business groups and certain union-
building trades. Second, in some cases, the surveys were distributed ahead of the 
stakeholder group and organizations‟ meeting. The head of the organization was given 
the survey to distribute to their members and once completed, the researcher picked up 
the completed responses. General instructions were given on the survey instrument but no 
further justification was made to make sure the researcher did not bias the results. After 
the participants completed the questionnaire, the researcher briefly explained the 
significance of the study and offered to present the finding to the specific stakeholder 
groups if requested. IRB forms were given to the leaders of each respective group and to 
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each of the participants. In some cases, the designated group representative signed the 
IRB release form on behalf of their members. The researcher in giving instructions to 
each stakeholder group discussed with each stakeholder group that this was a voluntary 
survey. If the respondent did not feel comfortable answering any of the questions, they 
were told that they could skip or chose not to complete the survey. The results of the 
surveys were confidential and no names were used to identify any participant. Basic 
demographics including occupation was the primary demographic variable which formed 
the basis of stakeholder groups was included in was used to test various hypotheses. If the 
participant did not complete the demographic section or list their occupation the survey 
was not used. In examples of participants not answering a question, which was less that 
three percent of the cases, a mean substitution imputation model (Hair et al., 2006) was 
used for variables that had missing data. Since missing data was minimal 14 cases out of 
471, and only on sporadic questions, the researcher had no additional concerns that any 
dependent variable was dissimilar based on whether other variables contained missing 
data or not.  
The researcher collected the data over a period of five months between May – 
September 2009. The stakeholders groups as identified by their respective occupation 
were contacted by the researcher to obtain administration dates. After the respective 
leaders of those stakeholder groups agreed to allow the researcher to conduct the survey, 
times and locations were mutually agreed upon and then scheduled. The participants were 
given the research instrument and were allowed at least 40 minutes to complete. Most 
surveys were completed with the time range of 15-25 minutes. However, some groups 
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were given the survey in advance of their meeting, and completed surveys were turned 
over to the researcher at that time. 
 Data was collected over this period to coincide with stakeholder group 
availability. In surveying college students, it was necessary to survey them while they 
were in class. For some elected officials it was important to survey them while they were 
not in legislative session in Springfield, Illinois. Mayoral caucus groups and mayoral 
associations meet monthly or quarterly and it was necessary to schedule the 
administration of the survey instrument to these groups based on their availability. The 
researcher was concerned about a high-level of cynicism by stakeholder groups with the 
announcement of former governor Rod Blagojevich impeachment and removal from 
office. The researcher waited for the media hype to die down for a period before 
administering the remaining surveys, as to reduce the intense media presence and bias 
regarding corruption by elected officials. 
After the researcher received the appropriate approvals from each stakeholder 
group, the survey instrument was administered to each willing participant. Again, the 
researcher assured the participants of confidentiality, and no names were requested or 
used on the survey. This assured the participants complete anonymity. In cases where 
respondents submitted their response to the researcher electronically by email, the 
researcher printed the survey without the name, or covers memo email identifying the 
sender, and placed the survey with all of the others to be entered to assure confidentiality. 
The researcher administered the test in a well- lighted and comfortable meeting room. 
Participants were told that if they needed a break or needed refreshments they could take 
the time needed. The participants were voluntary and agreed to take the test. The 
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researcher only made brief remarks regarding the test and asked if there were any 
questions regarding how to complete the survey. Participants were asked to follow the 
instructions on the survey, and use their best judgment in answering the questions. 
Additionally, all participants were informed that there was no right or wrong answers on 
the survey.  
Analytical Methods 
According to Argyrous (2005), the following statistical procedures are appropriate 
for analyzing Likert scales, ratings and ranking scales. The following statistical 
methodologies and procedures were used to analyze the data from the survey instrument 
included: descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and standard deviations), univariate 
statistical analysis, bivariate correlations (interval/ratio data), frequencies, cross 
tabulations, Chi-squares for nominal data, independent-samples t-tests, checking for 
normality (histograms, skewness and kutosis), and One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to determine if the covariant 
political affiliation had an impact on the results. These tests were performed by using the 
above-mentioned statistical tests used to measure the perceptual differences between 
stakeholder groups for my research instrument. In addition, the researcher wanted to 
pursue not only the significant statistical differences, but also the practical differences. 
This analysis was performed on each exploratory hypothesis that had a significant mean 
difference. The American Psychological Association is now requiring that effect size be 
reported in addition to the results of the hypothesis testing (Kirk, 1996).  
Utilizing the Cohen‟s d, which utilized measurements called standardized mean 
differences, and was calculated by the difference between two means divided by the 
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overall standard deviation (Cohen, 1992). Partial Eta squared for effect size, was 
conducted for ANOVA and ANCOVA, in conjunction with Cohen‟s d for paired 
comparisons of means. All of the hypotheses were checked for practical significance by 
performing these appropriate effect size measurements.  
Limitations 
 The first limitation of this survey instrument is that it is a newly developed scale. 
As in all newly developed instruments, there are limitations. One obvious limitation is 
that the scale may be considered too long and might be construed as being multi-
dimensional in nature. Further reduction of scales or the combination of constructs could 
be addressed by using factor analysis; the scales for each construct could be appropriately 
addressed. This would result in a shorter survey instrument measuring single constructs 
versus perceived multiple constructs. 
 The second limitation was the use of forced choice Likert scales. The researcher 
utilized forced choice scales to allow the participant to make a decision based on the 
strongly disagree, moderately disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, moderately 
agree, strongly agree. Amongst researchers, there is some disagreement as to using odd 
versus even Likert scales and it is based on the contextual research of the study.  
 The third limitation of the survey instrument is reliability such as test-retest. Since 
the researcher could only give the test once to participants, the reliability of the 
instrument needs further analysis in testing for all of the constructs being measured. A 
longitudinal study could assist in reviewing the reliability over a longer period.  
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Reliability measures could be addressed at this time and incorporate larger stakeholder 
groups. Ultimately, internal reliability can be performed once sub-scales are identified 
through further testing such as factor analysis. 
 The final limitation of this study is this study was conducted it over a highly 
volatile period of cynicism and high incidents of corruption on the federal, state, and 
local levels. As discussed in the second limitation of this study, a longitudinal study 
would average out the levels of cynicism over longer periods. There is a need for a more 
refined survey instrument, measurement of one-dimensional constructs versus perceived 
multiple, and a larger more inclusive sample that is representative of the entire electorate. 
The survey instrument was quite extensive and covered a multitude of complex 
concepts and questions for future research. As stated earlier, the researcher had only one 
chance to survey these groups. If the researcher had better access to larger groups, a 
larger sample would have been more appropriate. Due to time constraints and access to 
these groups, the samples were adequate, but the researcher would have preferred to 
sample more targeted and diverse groups. Accessing groups via the internet and posting 
on-line surveys using Survey Monkey would have allowed the researcher to capture a 
larger and possibly more diverse sample, with the intention of capturing a true random 
sample of stakeholder groups. However, in the end, this is typical of conducting 
exploratory research. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
 This section discusses the results. Perceptions are unique, in that everyone has 
one. The crux of this study is to determine different stakeholder groups’ perceptions 
regarding the perceptions of ethical behavior of political leaders/politicians. The 
researcher utilized a purposeful sample of selected groups that exerted considerable 
influence on the political process. The researcher indentified stakeholder groups based on 
shared characteristics such as voting patterns and special interests, advocating for 
government reforms, and expressing a general interest in better governance. 
Consequently, the researcher identified stakeholder groups, which have considerable 
impact on government. These stakeholder groups included government workers, elected 
officials, union- building trades, business -professional groups, and college students (one 
of the reasons the researcher used students was due to their impact on the last presidential 
election.) 
 This chapter details the findings and conclusions regarding the different 
stakeholder groups in this exploratory study. The nexus of this research study was based 
on stakeholder and agency theory. Agency theory advocates there are principals and 
agents. In government, the agent is the elected official and represents the principal - the 
electorate. This study explored the consequential effects of the stakeholder interests 
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wherein distinct stakeholder groups are competing for scarce resources. In this case, 
stakeholders are competing for government resources, programs and services. Elected 
officials behaviors are considered important for effective governance. Therefore, the 
researcher analyzed stakeholder’s perceptions regarding elected official’s behavior. 
However, new potential propositions emerged from this study, namely, the inversion of 
agency theory. This researcher proposed that the agent – the elected official, inverted his 
or her relationship with the principal and acted as the principal not as the agent. When an 
elected official’s behavior is one that inverts agency theory, the elected official’s 
unethical behavior could move towards corrupt behavior, which could then translate into 
illegal corrupt behavior (see CUB Model as described in Chapter 1.) This chapter reports 
findings of the exploratory hypothesis set forth in this research study. 
 The following exploratory hypotheses were tested using SPSS, and summarized 
in the findings: There are five major hypotheses with the first three hypotheses containing 
multiple parts. The major hypothesis for H1 is that there will be significant perceptual 
differences between elected officials and political leader’s behaviors. The hypotheses are 
broken down in five parts to look at differences in ethical behavior, trust, 
unethical/corrupt behavior, ethical relativism, and communications between stakeholder 
groups and elected officials for the first three hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 looked at 
differences between stakeholders and elected officials on communications. Hypothesis 5 
looked at differences between stakeholders and elected officials on the dimension on trust 
and ethics. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests, and all independent- 
samples t-tests used a two-tailed test. 
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The exploratory hypotheses are described in this section. 
Hypotheses H1-H5 
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and  
 stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior. 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
          stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ trust. 
H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and  
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical relativism. 
H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ communications. 
Hypotheses H2A-H2E 
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ ethical behavior. 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ trust. 
H2c:  There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based   
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ unethical corrupt behavior. 
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H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based 
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ ethical relativism. 
H2e:  There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups based  
on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ communication. 
Hypotheses H3A-H3E 
H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior. 
 
H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding trust. 
H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. 
H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. 
H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
         stakeholder groups regarding communication. 
Hypothesis 4 
H4:  There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and elected 
officials regarding their level of communications. 
Hypothesis 5 
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the various  
       stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. 
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Findings 
 
 Initially, and prior to testing the exploratory hypotheses, the researcher performed 
descriptive statistics on the 46 Likert scale questions by occupation. Stakeholder group 
means were calculated for each question, as well as total overall group means combined. 
The 46 Likert questions are described in Table 11.  
Table 11 
 46 - Likert Questions 
Questions 
1. Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate). 
2. I consider most politicians/political leaders to be ethical in their behavior. 
3. Politicians/political leaders usually promise more than they can deliver. 
4. Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit. 
5. I trust the media more than I trust politicians/political leaders. 
6. I think a politician/political leader can actually be unethical without technically breaking the law. 
7. In general, I believe Republicans are more ethical than Democrats are.  
8. I believe that politicians/political leaders who are perceived as “religious” generally are more 
ethical than those who are not religious.  
9. Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest.  
10. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their own political office to help family, friends, 
and special interest groups as ethical. 
11. Employees of government agencies are generally more ethical than the politicians/political leaders 
for whom they work.  
12. Business leaders are more ethical than politicians/political leaders.  
13. In my opinion, the news media generally is too easy on politicians/political leaders. 
14. A politician/political leader who says what the public wants to hear to be elected is unethical.  
15. A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their promises after being elected is unethical. 
16. A politician/political leader who uses or engages in negative campaigning to purposely distort an 
opponent’s views or positions is unethical.  
17. I believe that politicians/political leaders who withhold important information from the public are 
unethical. 
18. Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted. 
19. I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises 
20. Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs. 
21. Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their 
wrongdoing. 
22. I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt. 
23. I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical 
24. Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. 
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Table 11 (continued).  
46 Likert Questions 
Questions  
25.  Politicians/political leaders favor those special interest groups who can get them re-elected or 
contribute to their campaign.  
26. I think politicians/political leaders should take more polls of their constituents to better understand 
and serve their needs.  
27. Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest group over another are 
unethical. 
28. I consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her own personal interests over those of the 
electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical.  
29. Politicians/political leaders who blame the media or their staff for their own personal mistakes are 
unethical. 
30. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their office to help family, friends as unethical. 
31. I consider politicians/political leaders who use their office to help family, friends, and special interest 
groups as illegal.  
32. I believe that good ethics is good politics. 
33. If the survival of the politician/ political leader’s career is at stake, most politicians/political 
leaders will compromise their ethics.  
34. For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes 
have to disregard their personal ethics.  
35. I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their 
personal interests are met even if it means bending or breaking the rules. 
36. Communication between the politician/ political leader and voter is important to the effectiveness 
of government. 
37. I believe that politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term 
governance strategies.  
38. What is ethical varies from how one views the situation. 
39. Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is 
ethical is up to the individual.  
40. Whether a politician’s/political leader’s behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon 
the circumstances surrounding the action.  
41. A politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her own political self-
interest. 
42. For me a politician/political leader’s ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them. 
43. A self-promoting political leader is viewed by me as more “effective” than a non self-promoting 
political leader. 
44. A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or groups who did not contribute to their 
political campaign is considered unethical. 
45. I am satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader. 
46. I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my politician’s/political leaders. 
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Table 12 
46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups 
 
 
Question 
 
Government 
Employees 
 
 n = 104 
M 
 
Elected 
Officials 
 
n = 65 
M 
 
Union-
Building 
Trades 
  n = 75 
M 
 
 
Business 
Professionals 
 
 n = 99 
M 
 
College 
Students 
 
n = 128 
M 
 
*Overall 
Mean 
(Mean of 
Means) 
M 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
3.89 
3.35 
5.13 
3.49 
2.75 
4.76 
2.89 
2.79 
3.51 
5.06 
4.15 
3.31 
3.08 
4.38 
4.78 
4.97 
4.69 
3.45 
23.18 
3.19 
4.95 
4.59 
3.61 
 
4.57 
4.49 
4.68 
4.48 
2.49 
4.91 
2.82 
2.88 
4.55 
4.40 
2.83 
2.86 
2.82 
4.02 
4.68 
4.80 
4.40 
4.02 
3.95 
3.74 
4.72 
4.23 
3.40 
 
3.37 
3.16 
4.56 
3.13 
2.88 
4.4 
2.23 
2.95 
3.45 
4.55 
3.92 
3.11 
3.47 
4.75 
5.03 
4.88 
5.21 
3.23 
3.15 
3.11 
5.15 
4.89 
4.01 
 
3.79 
3.39 
5.16 
3.33 
2.74 
4.65 
2.93 
3.13 
3.64 
4.89 
3.74 
3.67 
3.56 
4.31 
4.78 
5.11 
4.69 
3.45 
3.36 
3.25 
5.18 
4.66 
3.43 
 
3.77 
3.51 
5.13 
3.26 
2.8 
4.55 
3.63 
3.87 
3.37 
4.25 
3.72 
3.39 
3.34 
4.39 
5.27 
4.99 
4.90 
3.45 
3.27 
3.27 
4.99 
4.37 
3.54 
 
3.85 
3.53 
4.98 
3.47 
2.75 
4.64 
2.99 
3.19 
3.63 
4.61 
3.73 
3.31 
3.28 
4.38 
4.94 
4.97 
4.79 
3.49 
3.35 
3.29 
5.01 
4.54 
3.59 
 
 
*Mean of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholder groups 
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Table 12 (continued). 
46 Likert Questions - Means by Stakeholder Groups 
 
 
 Question 
 
Government 
Employees 
 
n = 104 
 
M 
 
Elected 
Officials 
 
n = 65 
 
M 
 
Union-
Building 
Trades 
n = 75 
 
M 
 
 
Business 
Professionals 
 
n = 99 
 
M 
 
College 
Students 
 
n = 128 
 
M 
 
*Overall 
Mean 
(Mean of 
Means) 
 
    M 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
 
4.58 
5.17 
4.79 
3.81 
4.75 
4.45 
2.09 
3.98 
5.21 
4.74 
4.00 
2.92 
5.58 
5.40 
4.11 
3.36 
3.55 
5.30 
5.39 
2.99 
4.13 
3.57 
3.71 
 
4.32 
4.58 
4.38 
3.68 
4.80 
4.62 
2.86 
3.18 
5.38 
4.03 
3.37 
2.35 
5.45 
5.35 
4.09 
3.28 
3.54 
5.26 
5.29 
2.86 
4.32 
3.94 
4.51 
 
4.85 
4.97 
4.99 
4.11 
4.92 
4.77 
2.16 
4.24 
5.35 
4.89 
4.07 
3.45 
5.43 
5.16 
4.20 
3.51 
3.95 
5.19 
5.05 
3.28 
4.65 
3.53 
3.59 
 
4.69 
5.12 
4.82 
3.73 
4.62 
4.45 
2.16 
4.11 
5.14 
4.58 
3.55 
2.62 
5.52 
5.38 
4.08 
3.07 
3.44 
5.51 
5.44 
3.21 
4.48 
3.57 
3.82 
 
4.83 
5.04 
4.83 
4.07 
4.94 
4.76 
2.60 
3.70 
4.99 
4.95 
4.28 
2.86 
5.39 
5.14 
4.23 
3.73 
3.87 
5.27 
5.18 
3.73 
4.47 
3.15 
3.12 
 
4.68 
5.01 
4.78 
3.89 
4.81 
4.61 
2.36 
3.86 
5.18 
4.69 
3.90 
2.85 
5.47 
5.28 
4.15 
3.41 
3.68 
5.31 
5.28 
3.27 
4.41 
3.50 
3.66 
 
 
*Mean of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders 
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Table 13  
46 Likert Questions – Standard Deviations by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Question 
 
Government 
Employees 
 
   n = 104 
    SD 
 
Elected 
Officials 
 
      n = 65 
  SD 
 
Union-
Building 
Trades 
    n = 75 
         SD 
 
Business 
Professionals 
 
      n = 99 
        SD 
 
College 
Students 
 
    n = 128 
       SD 
 
*Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
      SD 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
1.343 
1.406 
1.089 
1.269 
1.305 
1.347 
1.625 
1.384 
1.526 
1.221 
1.305 
1.141 
1.426 
1.303 
1.206 
1.127 
1.239 
1.276 
1.022 
1.175 
1.056 
1.187 
1.226 
 
1.089 
1.033 
1.133 
1.032 
1.359 
1.057 
1.638 
1.452 
1.426 
1.344 
1.098 
1.248 
1.333 
1.566 
1.393 
1.416 
1.272 
0.960 
0.981 
1.004 
1.364 
1.235 
1.272 
 
1.206 
1.209 
1.287 
1.212 
1.162 
1.405 
1.321 
1.365 
1.255 
1.527 
1.271 
1.122 
1.388 
1.164 
1.026 
1.219 
.0891 
1.321 
1.193 
1.269 
1.049 
1.085 
1.202 
 
1.304 
1.316 
.0987 
1.478 
1.209 
1.272 
1.402 
1.426 
1.396 
1.245 
1.084 
1.051 
1.394 
1.299 
1.282 
1.228 
1.137 
1.281 
1.102 
1.223 
.0962 
1.081 
1.231 
 
1.029 
1.057 
0.896 
.0974 
1.219 
1.241 
1.577 
1.286 
1.135 
1.436 
1.027 
.0974 
1.307 
1.449 
1.113 
1.245 
1.169 
1.114 
1.070 
1.174 
0.818 
1.135 
1.212 
 
1.243 
1.276 
1.084 
1.271 
1.247 
1.281 
1.585 
1.435 
1.391 
1.384 
1.216 
1.116 
1.385 
1.372 
1.216 
1.236 
1.217 
1.218 
1.093 
1.189 
1.032 
1.157 
1.236 
 
 
*Standard deviation of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders 
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Table 13 (continued). 
46 Likert Questions – Standard Deviations by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Question 
 
Government 
Employees 
 
n = 104 
     SD 
 
Elected 
Officials 
 
n = 65 
  SD 
 
Union-
Building 
Trades 
n = 75 
   SD 
 
Business 
Professionals 
 
n = 99 
SD 
 
College 
Students 
 
n = 128 
SD 
 
*Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
SD 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
 
1.305 
0.908 
1.094 
1.488 
1.252 
1.245 
1.200 
1.481 
1.021 
0.903 
1.351 
1.772 
0.664 
0.854 
1.564 
1.421 
1.506 
1.042 
0.829 
1.153 
1.539 
1.593 
1.562 
 
1.552 
1.014 
1.366 
1.371 
1.460 
1.195 
1.413 
1.784 
0.896 
1.237 
1.269 
1.556 
0.771 
1.082 
1.411 
1.463 
1.448 
0.871 
0.931 
1.402 
1.572 
1.059 
1.033 
 
1.182 
0.93 
1.084 
1.279 
1.136 
0.981 
1.151 
1.496 
0.993 
0.924 
1.417 
1.742 
0.932 
0.987 
1.252 
1.288 
1.283 
1.023 
0.985 
1.300 
1.180 
1.554 
1.517 
 
1.131 
0.848 
1.073 
1.316 
1.426 
1.402 
1.037 
1.362 
1.116 
1.089 
1.543 
1.695 
0.919 
0.955 
1.433 
1.547 
1.52 
0.72 
0.798 
1.416 
1.328 
1.472 
1.431 
 
1.191 
0.891 
0.957 
1.237 
1.209 
1.063 
1.336 
1.465 
1.076 
0.942 
1.273 
1.601 
0.907 
0.994 
1.4 
1.519 
1.377 
0.945 
1.023 
1.29 
1.397 
1.459 
1.378 
 
1.226 
0.925 
1.104 
1.343 
1.293 
1.192 
1.259 
1.531 
1.042 
1.047 
1.406 
1.77 
0.847 
0.971 
1.42 
1.475 
1.441 
0.931 
0.925 
1.338 
1.414 
1.476 
1.473 
 
 
*Standard deviation of all stakeholder groups combined, N=471 for total stakeholders 
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Table 14 
46 Likert Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender 
 
 
Question 
 
Male 
n= 47 
M 
 
Male 
n=247 
SD 
 
Female 
n= 224 
M 
 
Female 
n=224 
SD 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
3.96 
3.72 
4.92 
3.66 
2.70 
4.67 
3.10 
3.21 
3.78 
4.48 
3.73 
3.23 
3.22 
4.28 
4.90 
4.98 
4.79 
3.59 
3.42 
3.34 
5.02 
4.53 
3.60 
 
1.145 
1.183 
1.079 
1.236 
1.232 
1.295 
1.548 
1.354 
1.368 
1.431 
1.207 
1.199 
1.407 
1.364 
1.189 
1.181 
1.159 
1.179 
1.056 
1.154 
1.044 
1.154 
1.245 
 
3.72 
3.32 
5.05 
3.27 
2.79 
4.62 
2.86 
3.17 
3.47 
4.76 
3.72 
3.40 
3.33 
4.49 
4.98 
4.96 
4.79 
3.39 
3.26 
3.23 
5.00 
4.55 
3.57 
 
1.327 
1.347 
1.087 
1.282 
1.266 
1.265 
1.619 
1.521 
1.401 
1.317 
1.229 
1.011 
1.362 
1.372 
1.247 
1.298 
1.281 
1.255 
1.123 
1.226 
1.022 
1.162 
1.229 
 
 
*N=471 for total stakeholder group 
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Table 14 (continued). 
46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Gender 
 
 
Question 
 
Male 
n=247 
     M 
 
Male 
n=247 
      SD 
 
Female 
n=224 
   M 
 
Female 
n=224 
      SD 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
 
4.76 
5.04 
4.65 
3.88 
4.91 
4.49 
2.45 
4.03 
5.09 
4.62 
3.91 
2.83 
5.40 
5.26 
4.15 
3.43 
3.69 
5.35 
5.23 
3.28 
4.38 
3.52 
3.62 
 
1.215 
.912 
1.176 
1.356 
1.288 
1.189 
1.299 
1.469 
1.104 
1.097 
1.425 
1.660 
.905 
.881 
1.361 
1.463 
1.452 
.898 
.922 
1.367 
1.397 
1.487 
1.528 
 
4.49 
4.99 
4.93 
3.91 
4.69 
4.74 
2.27 
3.68 
5.29 
4.76 
3.89 
2.86 
5.55 
5.31 
4.15 
3.39 
3.66 
5.27 
5.33 
3.25 
4.44 
3.47 
3.71 
 
1.316 
.940 
1.000 
1.331 
1.291 
1.186 
1.209 
1.580 
.960 
.986 
1.388 
1.747 
.774 
1.063 
1.466 
1.491 
1.431 
.966 
.928 
1.309 
1.435 
1.467 
1.411 
 
 
*N=471 for total stakeholder group 
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Table 15 
46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Political Affiliation 
 
 
Question 
 
Republican 
     n=174 
   M / SD 
 
Democrat 
     n=179 
   M / SD 
 
Independent 
    n=112 
   M / SD 
 
Libertarian 
  n=6 
  M / SD 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
3.90/ 1.08 
3.41/ 1.20 
5.16/ .994 
3.35/ 1.26 
2.55/ 1.27 
4.75/ 1.15 
4.10/ 1.43 
3.81/ 1.35 
3.52/ 1.27 
4.67/1.37 
3.72/1.07 
3.56/1.04 
3.39/1.41 
4.43/1.32 
5.08/1.16 
4.93/1.23 
4.68/1.23 
3.49/1.97 
3.35/1.02 
3.33/1.11 
4.95/.957 
4.54/1.08 
3.63/1.24 
 
3.88/1.29 
3.68/1.27 
4.75/1.57 
3.61/1.30 
2.93/1.25 
4.56/1.27 
2.01/1.18 
2.66/1.32 
3.93/1.46 
4.45/1.42 
3.64/1.22 
3.17/1.06 
3.10/1.37 
4.41/1.39 
4.90/1.20 
4.98/1.22 
4.78/1.19 
3.65/1.89 
3.44/1.32 
3.46/1.19 
5.03/1.11 
4.62/1.24 
3.61/1.27 
 
3.76/1.38 
3.48/1.39 
5.05/1.05 
3.49/1.24 
2.72/1.19 
4.60/1.43 
2.75/1.28 
3.09/1.37 
3.38/1.38 
4.80/1.34 
3.93/1.37 
3.16/1.27 
3.32/1.33 
4.21/1.42 
4.77/1.31 
5.03/1.24 
4.98/1.19 
3.29/1.27 
3.23/1.11 
2.98/1.22 
5.05/1.03 
4.40/1.13 
3.52/1.18 
 
3.17/1.33 
3.17/1.17 
5.67/.816 
2.67/1.03 
3.33/.516 
4.67/2.16 
4.00/1.67 
3.00/1.55 
2.67/1.37 
4.17/1.17 
2.83/1.47 
3.33/.516 
4.33/1.63 
5.0/1.01 
5.17/.983 
4.50/1.87 
4.50/1.05 
2.67/1.21 
2.67/1.21 
2.50/1.63 
5.50/.837 
4.83/1.17 
3.00/1.10 
 
 
 *Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups 
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Table 15 (continued). 
46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Political Affiliation 
 
 
Question 
 
Republican 
n= 174 
     M / SD 
 
Democrat 
n=179 
M / SD 
 
Independent 
n=112 
       M / SD 
 
Libertarian 
n=6 
     M / SD 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
 
4.84/1.12 
5.09/.911 
4.72/1.22 
3.90/1.26 
4.94/1.27 
4.59/1.17 
2.45/1.28 
3.82/1.49 
5.28/.982 
4.73/1.09 
3.82/1.44 
2.79/1.68 
5.45/.838 
5.30/.952 
4.15/1.54 
3.37/1.56 
3.64/1.43 
5.30/.946 
5.39/.864 
3.30/1.42 
4.32/1.43 
3.36/1.45 
3.49/1.46 
 
4.46/1.39 
4.90/.949 
4.93/1.02 
3.93/1.25 
4.59/1.39 
4.61/1.21 
2.31/1.18 
3.80/1.59 
5.12/1.09 
4.59/1.01 
3.91/1.39 
2.93/1.71 
5.55/.750 
5.27/.940 
4.15/1.29 
3.38/1.40 
3.83/1.42 
5.30/.904 
5.23/.917 
3.36/1.27 
4.56/1.32 
3.84/1.42 
4.04/1.45 
 
4.75/1.25 
5.06/.903 
4.65/1.04 
3.82/1.57 
4.97/1.13 
4.62/1.22 
2.30/1.37 
4.03/1.49 
5.16/1.04 
4.76/1.04 
4.05/1.37 
2.83/1.71 
5.40/1.00 
5.27/1.07 
4.12/1.44 
3.35.1.48 
3.46/1.47 
5.37/.968 
5.18/1.03 
3.04/1.31 
4.31/1.54 
3.21/1.51 
3.37/1.42 
 
5.00/.984 
5.33/.816 
4.50/1.05 
3.83/1.94 
4.17/.983 
4.83/.753 
2.17/.983 
4.00/1.67 
4.67/1.21 
5.17/.983 
3.67/1.51 
2.33/2.07 
5.00/.632 
5.33/.816 
4.67/1.03 
3.67/1.37 
4.17/1.33 
5.00/.632 
5.50/.548 
3.67/1.03 
4.17/1.33 
2.67/1.03 
2.83/.983 
 
 
*Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups 
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Table 16 
46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age Groups 
 
 
Question 
 
Ages (18-24) 
    n= 128 
   M / SD 
 
Ages (25-44) 
     n= 133 
    M / SD 
 
Ages (45-54) 
     n= 93 
    M / SD 
 
Ages (55 & above) 
   n=117 
  M / SD 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
3.84/.946 
3.50/1.00 
5.09/.926 
3.27/.978 
2.84/1.17 
4.57/1.22 
3.60/1.57 
3.80/1.32 
3.38/1.01 
4.23/1.35 
3.67/1.01 
3.43/1.01 
3.26/1.28 
4.25/1.42 
5.20/1.18 
4.98/1.20 
4.87/1.21 
3.47/1.09 
3.26/1.01 
3.32/1.14 
4.93/.825 
4.32/1.14 
3.47/1.18 
 
3.75/1.24 
3.48/1.35 
4.93/1.17 
3.45/1.23 
2.63/1.17 
4.73/1.19 
2.76/1.63 
3.09/1.38 
3.44/1.39 
4.62/1.41 
3.93/1.22 
3.35/.993 
3.17/1.36 
4.44/1.32 
4.95/1.01 
4.77/1.25 
4.77/1.20 
3.44/1.28 
3.34/1.03 
3.16/1.22 
4.92/1.00 
4.54/1.18 
3.60/1.15 
 
3.82/1.33 
3.41/1.28 
4.84/1.16 
3.42/1.42 
2.70/1.19 
4.28/1.49 
2.45/1.38 
2.86/1.29 
3.60/1.54 
4.82/1.34 
3.57/1.17 
3.24/1.09 
3.40/1.54 
4.42/1.28 
4.85/1.29 
5.15/1.13 
4.74/1.29 
3.52/1.29 
3.34/1.15 
3.34/1.22 
5.12/1.09 
4.70/1.11 
3.61/1.36 
 
4.00/1.44 
3.71/1.44 
5.03/1.07 
3.76/1.43 
2.80/1.45 
4.91/1.20 
2.86/1.50 
2.91/1.53 
4.05/1.48 
4.85/1.35 
3.68/1.42 
3.21/1.36 
3.32/1.41 
4.41/1.44 
4.71/1.35 
5.03/1.32 
4.76/1.20 
3.56/1.23 
3.45/1.20 
3.35/1.18 
5.12/1.21 
4.66/1.17 
3.68/1.29 
 
 
 *Note N=471 for all stakeholder groups 
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Table 16 (continued). 
46 Likert Survey Questions - Means and Standard Deviations by Age Groups 
 
 
Question 
 
Ages (18-24) 
       n= 128 
     M / SD 
 
Ages (25-44) 
     n= 133 
    M / SD 
 
Ages (45-54) 
     n= 93 
    M / SD 
 
Ages (55 & above) 
      n=117 
      M / SD 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
 
4.80/1.19 
4.99/.883 
4.77/.941 
4.01/1.24 
4.90/1.22 
4.71/1.21 
2.59/1.32 
3.61/1.49 
4.87/1.14 
4.87/.931 
4.17/1.24 
2.87/1.55 
5.42/.759 
5.05/1.05 
4.22/1.31 
3.69/1.51 
3.87/1.35 
5.26/.916 
5.17/1.01 
3.66/1.21 
4.42/1.31 
3.19/1.39 
3.21/1.40 
 
4.61/1.17 
5.00/.905 
4.78/1.09 
3.65/1.24 
4.71/1.27 
4.47/1.08 
2.23/1.12 
4.00/1.36 
5.09/1.09 
4.58/1.02 
3.91/1.42 
2.76/1.67 
5.41/.986 
5.24/1.01 
4.35/1.26 
3.39/1.28 
3.85/1.29 
5.20/1.11 
5.20/.959 
3.30/1.37 
4.23/1.48 
3.52/1.62 
3.57/1.48 
 
4.68/1.41 
5.06/.818 
5.01/1.03 
3.97/1.38 
4.55/1.42 
4.51/1.33 
2.28/1.27 
4.18/1.54 
5.42/.812 
4.72/1.08 
3.82/1.50 
2.80/1.87 
5.65/.564 
5.45/.730 
4.09/1.50 
3.28/1.51 
3.55/1.55 
5.44/.758 
5.29/.916 
3.05/1.14 
4.51/1.28 
3.70/1.38 
3.98/1.41 
 
4.62/1.32 
5.01/1.07 
4.61/1.31 
3.98/1.50 
5.02/1.26 
4.74/1.17 
2.32/1.30 
3.74/1.70 
5.44/.941 
4.58/1.15 
3.68/1.46 
2.96/1.77 
5.45/.942 
5.44/.960 
3.89/1.61 
3.24/1.59 
3.36/1.56 
5.39/.851 
5.47/.738 
2.97/1.49 
4.51/1.55 
3.66/1.43 
4.01/1.46 
 
 
*Note: N=471 for all stakeholder groups 
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The midpoint for the Likert scale is 3.5 which equates to the point between 
somewhat disagree and somewhat agree. These scales did not include a neutral response 
and are based on a six-point Likert scale. The higher the response the more agreement 
there is, and conversely, the lower the score the more disagreement. The scaling for the 
instrument was 1 - strongly disagree, 2 - moderately disagree, 3 - somewhat disagree, 4 - 
somewhat agree, 5 - moderately agree, 6 - strongly agree.  
Occupational group as identified in Figures 10 - 54, graphs the 46 Likert scale 
questions. These included means for each individual stakeholder group, and the overall 
stakeholder groups means for the total groups. The overall group stakeholder means were 
calculated by dividing each stakeholder group by the total n size of 471 divided by 5 - the 
number of stakeholder groups.  
 For illustrative purposes, the stakeholder groups were graphed against each other 
including the overall stakeholder group means. These graphs give the reader a quick 
snapshot of how each stakeholder group (government employee, elected official, union-
building trades, business professionals, and college students) answered the questions. 
Further statistical analysis of mean differences were conducted to test the exploratory 
hypothesis. The level of practical significance utilizing a Cohen’s d was calculated when 
appropriate. According to Cohen (1988), the standard interpretation is .8 or larger = large 
(8/10 of a standard deviation unit); .5 = moderate (1/2 of a standard deviation); and .2 = 
small (1/5 of a standard deviation). As presented in the findings summary table, statistical 
significance is reported as well as Cohen’s d - practical significance. 
 The next section reports the mean differences between stakeholder groups on the 
46 - Likert questions. Using descriptive statistics, the 46 Likert questions on the survey 
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instrument were graphed by stakeholder groups: government employees, elected officials, 
union-building trades, business professionals, and college students. The following 
Figures 9 - 54 graphically illustrated the means of stakeholder groups. Elected officials 
were different from all other stakeholder group on each of the 46 Likert questions. These 
graphs reflected the overall differences between stakeholder groups and elected officials. 
Subsequently, the findings showed statistical differences using a variety of statistical 
techniques. 
  
Figure 9. Occupational stakeholder group breakdown percentage 
The next section illustrates the 46 Likert questions for all stakeholder groups. For 
purposes of this research study, the researcher did not differentiate the differences 
between political leaders and politicians in these 46 Likert questions, as not to skew the 
results from some respondent’s perceptions of politicians as having a possible negative 
connotation. In all of the 46 Likert questions politicians are denoted as POL and political 
leaders are PL. 
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Strongly      Moderately      Somewhat     Somewhat     Moderately     Strongly  
Disagree     Disagree  Disagree        Agree  Agree           Agree         
                                  
       1                  2                       3                4                    5                      6 
Figure 10. Question 1 - most pol/pl really try to do the right thing for the citizens. 
 
 
Figure 11. Question 2 - I consider most pol/pl to be ethical in their behavior. 
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Figure 12. Question 3 - pol/pl usually promise more than they can deliver. 
 
 
Figure 13. Question 4 - pol/pl are more honest than the public gives them credit for. 
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Figure 14. Question 5 - I trust the media more than I trust pol/pl. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Question 6 - I think a pol/pl can actually be unethical without technically 
breaking the law. 
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Figure 16. Question 7- in general I believe Republicans are more ethical than Democrats. 
 
 
Figure 17. Question 8  - I believe that pol/pl who are perceived as “religious” generally 
are more ethical than those who are not religious. 
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Figure 18. Question 9 - most pol/pl are dishonest. 
 
 
Figure 19. Question 10 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends, 
and special interest groups as ethical. 
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Figure 20. Question 11 - employees of government agencies are generally more ethical 
than the pol/pl for whom they work. 
 
Figure 21. Question 12 - business leaders are more ethical than pol/pl are. 
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Figure 22. Question 13 - in my opinion, the news media is generally too easy on pol/pl. 
 
 
Figure 23. Question 14 - a pol/pl who says what the public wants to hear to be elected is 
unethical. 
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Figure 24. Question 15 - a pol/pl who purposely breaks their promises after being elected 
is unethical. 
 
 
Figure 25. Question 16 - a pol/pl who uses or engages in negative campaigning to 
purposely distort an opponent’s views or positons is unethical. 
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Figure 26. Question 17 - I believe that pol/pl who withhold important information from 
the public are unethical. 
 
 
Figure 27. Question 18 - pol/pl generally can be trusted. 
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Figure 28. Question 19  - I believe that pol/pl generally keep their promises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Question 20 - pol/pl generally understand my needs. 
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Figure 30. Question 21 - most pol/pl who betray the public trust would lie to conceal 
their wrongdoing. 
 
 
Figure 31. Question 22  - I believe that pol/pl who are unethical are also corrupt.  
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Figure 32. Question 23 - I believe that pol/pl who are self-promoting are unethical. 
 
 
Figure 33. Question 24  - pol/pl who seek their own interest over the citizens i consider 
corrupt. 
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Figure 34. Question 25 - pol/pl favor those special interest groups that get them re-
elected or contribute to their campaign.  
 
 
Figure 35. Question 26 - I think pol/pl should take more polls of their constituents to 
better understand and serve their needs. 
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Figure 36. Question 27 - pol/pl who favor one group or special interest group over 
another is unethical. 
 
Figure 37. Question 28 - I consider a pol/pl who sacrifices his/her own personal interests 
over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical. 
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Figure 38. Question 29 - pol/pl who blame the media or their staff for their own personal 
mistakes are unethical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Question 30 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends as 
unethical. 
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Figure 40. Question 31 - I consider pol/pl who use their office to help family, friends, 
and special interest groups as illegal. 
 
 
Figure 41. Question 32 - I believe that good ethics is good politics. 
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Figure 42. Quesiton 33 - if the survival of the pol/pl career is at stake, most pol/pl will 
compromise their ethics. 
 
Figure 43. Question 34 - for a pol/pl to remain competitive in the field of politics, they 
will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics. 
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Figure 44. Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a pol/pl is making 
sure their personal interests are met even it means bending or breaking the rules. 
 
Figure 45. Question 36 - communication between the pol/pl and voter is important for the 
effectiveness of government. 
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Figure 46. Question 37 - I belive that pol/pl commitment to ethical behavior is essential 
for long-term governance strategies. 
 
Figure 47. Question 38 - what is ethical varies from how one views the situation. 
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Figure 48. Quesiton 39 - questions of what is ethical for the politician can never be 
resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual. 
 
Figure 49. Question 40 - whether a pol/pl behavior is judged to be moral or immoral 
depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action. 
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Figure 50. Question 41 - a pol/pl must place the interests of society over his/her own self-
interest. 
 
Figure 51. Question 42 - for me a pol/pl ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for 
them. 
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Figure 52. Question 43 - a self promoting pol/pl is viewed as more “effective” than a non 
self-promoting political leader. 
 
Figure 53. Question 44 - a pol/pl who ignores individuals or groups who did not 
contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical. 
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Figure 54. Quesiton 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my pol/pl. 
 
 
Figure 55. Question 46 - I am satisifed with my ability and access to communicate with 
my pol/pl. 
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Further analysis was performed on the variables using Analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) to test for homogeneity and intergroup differences in perceptual differences 
between stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior. In this analysis, 
a number of significant dynamics were identified to test for each hypothesis. As 
identified by Mertler and Vannatta (2005): 
Analysis of covariance parallels the above procedure of ANOVA, with one 
additional component: The adjustment of the dependent value scores. Initially, the 
covariant is measured prior to the manipulation of the independent variable. 
Following the implementation of treatments, the dependent measures are 
collected. The initial phase of the analysis involves the statistical adjustment of 
the dependent variable group means in order to control for the effects of the 
covariant on the dependent variable. (p. 100)   
In this research study, the findings were analyzed utilizing several techniques: 
descriptive statistics, Chi-square, independent- samples t-tests, One-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), Cohen’s d for practical significance is also calculated and reported 
next to the mean differences. ANCOVA was run using political party affiliation as the 
covariant. Summary tables for the five exploratory hypotheses show the major findings 
with the appropriate effect sizes. 
Cohen’s d is an important consideration in that many disciplines are placing 
increased emphasis on reporting effect size (Kirk, 1996). While statistical hypothesis 
testing provides a way to tell the odds that differences are real according to Kirk, effect 
sizes provide a way to judge the relative importance of those differences. “For example, 
the American Psychological Association (APA) are now requiring that effect sizes be 
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reported in addition to the results of the hypothesis tests” (Kirk, p.103). The results of the 
Cohen’s d test are defined as effect size of .2 small, .5 medium, and .8 large (Kirk). 
 The next section describes the statistical analysis for each exploratory hypothesis. 
Hypothesis H1 
H1: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leader’s behaviors. There are several parts to this 
overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H1a-e and described below.  
H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to 
hypothesis – 75, 70, 53d, 56d, 60, 59, 57a-f.) Note: (*.) is significant at the .05 level. All 
questions used to answer the exploratory hypotheses are derived from the researcher’s 
survey instrument.   
 Question 75, was a composite of questions 37 - I believe that politicians/political 
leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-term governance 
strategies, question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of 
society over his/her own political self-interest, and question 42 - For me a 
politician/political leader’s ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting for them. 
A linear combination was formed by running correlations on items in the survey 
instrument that matched the general perception being measured. Linear 
combinations were utilized if the question that matched the overall perception 
being measured resulted in a correlation score of 4.50 or higher, and based on the 
researcher’s judgment using face validity. Since this was an exploratory study 
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and the researcher developed an original scale, which was tested for the first time, 
factor analysis was not conducted. Future research would include factor analysis. 
 Composite question 75 showed there were significant differences between 
stakeholders groups utilizing a One-way ANOVA,  F(4, 466) = 2.667, p = .032. 
A Bonferroni post hoc test, found no significant means differences between 
groups. Additionally, running these questions individually, there were no 
significant differences between groups. A final test, utilized ANCOVA to 
determine if there were significant differences remaining after adjusting for 
political party affiliation as a covariant.  
The ANCOVA procedure can only be used if several conditions are met. SPSS 
was used to provide a statistical test (specifically, an F-test) of the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression slopes. According to Mertler and Vannatta (2005) they stated, 
The null hypothesis being tested in this case is that all regression slopes are equal. 
If the researcher is to continue to use the analysis of covariance, the researcher 
would hope to fail to reject that particular null hypotheses, thus indicating that the 
assumption is tenable and that analysis of covariance is the appropriate technique 
to apply. In SPSS, this is determined by examining the results of the F-test for the 
interaction of the Independent Variables (IV’s) by the covariate(s). “If the F-test 
is significant than ANCOVA should not be conducted” (p. 98). 
ANCOVA was tested for homogeneity of slopes, if interaction between factors 
and covariate was not found, a univariate ANCOVA was conducted with political 
affiliation as a covariant. After adjustments by the covariant of political affiliation were 
made the significant differences at the .05 mean level between elected officials and other 
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stakeholder groups were reported. The ANCOVA results are reported only for the mean 
differences with the ANCOVA contrast model with the partial eta squared. The 
ANCOVA effects sizes are reported for significant differences in the summary tables H1-
H5. In addition, the assumption of homogeneity of regression lines was examined and 
reported if found tenable. 
 Question 75 composite, and running these questions independently (37, 
41, and 42) there was an interaction and therefore, ANCOVA could not 
be run. 
 Question 70 consisted of a linear combination of questions 1 - Most 
politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens 
(electorate), question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than 
the public gives them credit, question 9 -  Most political leaders/politicians 
are dishonest, question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be 
trusted, question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally 
keep their promises, and question 20 - Politicians/political leaders 
generally understand my needs of the survey instrument. 
 Question 70, there was a significant difference with the One-way ANOVA 
showed F(4, 466) = 11.60, p = .01. Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it 
found that there was a significant means difference between elected 
officials and government employees (4.6*) with a Cohen’s d of .864, 
union-building trades (5.9*), with a Cohen’s d of 1.07, business 
professionals (4.5*), with a Cohen’s d of .793, college student (4.9*), 
with a Cohen’s d of 1.05. Since this was a linear combination of six 
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questions the magnitude of mean scores are composite and are not 
averaged. ANCOVA was run on composite question 70, and there was an 
interaction, and could not proceed. 
 Running these questions individually with a One-way ANOVA, showed 
significant differences between all groups. Question 1 - Most 
politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens 
(electorate), a One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 9.038, p = .01. 
Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant 
means difference between elected officials and government employee 
(.675*), with a Cohen’s d of .556, union-building trades (1.196*), with a 
Cohen’s d of 1.044.business professionals (.781*), with a Cohen’s d of 
.649, and college students (.796*), with a Cohen’s d of .755. ANCOVA 
was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed. 
 Question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public 
gives them credit for, was run with a One-way ANOVA, F(4, 466) = 
14.112, p = .01. Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there 
was a significant means difference between elected officials and 
government employee (.987*), with a Cohen’s d of .855, union-building 
trades (1.344*), with a Cohen’s d of 1.19, business professionals 
(.1.144*), with a Cohen’s d of .902, and college students (.1.219*), with a 
Cohen’s d of 1.21. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and 
could not proceed.  
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 Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest. A One-way 
ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 9.440, p = .01. Using a Bonferroni post 
hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means difference 
between elected officials and government employee (1.044*), with a 
Cohen’s d of .704, union-building trades (1.101*), with a Cohen’s d of 
.818, business professionals (.917*), with a Cohen’s d of .644, and 
college students (1.187*), with a Cohen’s d of .915. ACOVA was run and 
there was an interaction and could not proceed. 
 . Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, A 
One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 4.075, p = .003. Using a 
Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means 
difference between elected officials and government employees (.563*), 
with a Cohen’s d of .504, union-building trades (.789*), with a Cohen’s d 
of .684, business professionals (.561*), with a Cohen’s d of .503, and 
college students (.562*), with a Cohen’s d of .548. ANCOVA was run 
and there was an interaction and could not proceed.  
 Question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep 
their promises, A One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 6.723, p = 
.01.Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a 
significant means difference between elected officials and government 
employee (.771*), with a Cohen’s d of .803, union-building trades 
(.807*), with a Cohen’s d of .759, business professionals (.590*), with a 
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Cohen’s d of .628, and college students (.680*), with a Cohen’s d of .690. 
ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed.  
 Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs. 
A One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 3.022, p = .018. Using a 
Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant means 
difference between elected officials and government employee (.546*), 
with a Cohen’s d of .503, union-building trades (.632*) with a Cohen’s d 
of .550, business professionals (.486*), with a Cohen’s d of .437, and 
college students (.473*), with a Cohen’s d of .430. ANCOVA was run 
and there was an interaction and could not proceed. 
 Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical 
various public professional groups are. Please rate the following 
professional groups in a scale of 1-7 with 1 being unethical and 7 being 
completely ethical. Table 17 shows the results of these rankings. 
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Table 17 
Rankings of Different Professions Perceived as being Ethical 
*Professions are ranked from highest to lowest in terms of being perceived as ethical. Highly ethical =7 and 
lowest =1 
 
 
 
 
Question Number 
 
Occupation    
 
                   M 
 
SD 
 
    
  Q53C Nurses 5.58   .956 
Q 53H Clergy 5.50 1.251 
Q53A Teachers 5.42   .960 
Q53B Medical Doctors 5.28 1.004 
Q53M Non-Profit Executives 5.22 1.146 
Q53J Small Business Owner 4.86 1.041 
Q53L CPA 4.81 1.245 
Q53N College Students 4.51 1.176 
Q53F Gov. Employees 4.40 1.209 
Q53G Union-Labor Leaders 3.96 1.503 
Q53O Lawyers 3.65 1.411 
Q53K Executive - Large Corp. 3.62 1.272 
Q53D Politicians 3.51 1.226 
Q53E News Media 3.44 1.271 
Q53I Car Dealers 3.00 1.302 
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Figure 56 is a graphical representation of question 53 regarding the data of 
occupational rankings from highest to lowest in terms of being considered ethical. 
 
Figure 56. Occupational group rankings in desending order from  most to least ethical 
*Note: Highly Ethical = 7, Not Ethical =1 
 Question 56d - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from 
an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your 
community that this compromise is considered ethical? The Chi-square 
study showed χ² (4, N = 471) = 14.84 p = .005, indicating there was no 
independence between groups relating to ethical behavior. Note: 
Independence means that knowing how one group answers the question 
will not tell you how the other group will answer the question. 
Dependence means knowing how one group answers the question will 
help you know how the other group will answer the question.  
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 Question 56a - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from 
an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your 
community that this compromise is considered unethical? The Chi-square 
study showed χ² (4, N = 471) = 12.73, p = .013, indicating there was no 
independence between groups relating to unethical behavior. 
 Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changes his or her mind (from 
an ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your 
community that this compromise is considered corrupt? The Chi-square 
study showed χ² (4, N = 471) = 19.99, p = .001, indicating there was no 
independence between groups relating to corrupt behavior. 
 Question 59 – A high-ranking elected official borrows $200,000 from a 
local developer to purchase land. The developer asks for a zoning on his 
land to be changed from residential to commercial. The elected official 
contacts the local zoning department and asks for the zoning to be 
changed from residential to commercial. The zoning is changed at the 
request of the elected official’s request. In your opinion, your reaction to 
this request from the elected official to the zoning department was:  a) this 
is completely ethical; b) conflict of interest; c) unethical, corrupt, and 
possibly illegal; d) this happens all the time most politicians would assist 
in this request. The Chi-square study showed χ² (12, N = 471) = 57.10, p 
= .000, indicating there was no independence between groups regarding 
this question. 
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 Question 60, which measured what percentage of elected officials believe 
they act ethically? Utilizing a Chi-square test between all stakeholder 
groups the results of χ² (100, N = 471) = 122.48, p = .063, indicates there 
is independence between groups regarding this question. Percentage 
testing were conducted on occupational groups and the reported the 
percentage for government employees (75.26), elected officials (80.22), 
union-building trades (67.63), business professionals (72.38), and college 
students (68.09). Another way of looking at this is the percentage of how 
the groups thought the elected official would rate themselves. 
 The second part of question 60 measured what percentages of elected 
officials believe they act unethically? Utilizing a Chi-square test between 
all stakeholder groups the results χ² (96, N = 471) = 115.23, p = .088 
indicates there is independence between groups. Percentage testing were 
conducted on occupational groups and the reported percentages for 
government employees (24.57), elected officials (19.78), union-building 
trades (30.36), business professionals (27.33), and college students 
(31.52). 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ trust. (Questions mapped to this 
hypothesis - 18, 21, 28, 35, 41, 54.)  
 Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted. A One-
way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences between 
stakeholders groups and elected officials, F(4, 466) = 4.075, p = .003. 
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Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant 
means difference between elected officials and government employees 
(.563*), with a Cohen’s d of .504, union-building trades (.789*), with a 
Cohen’s d of .684, business professionals (.561*), with a Cohen’s d of 
.503, and college students (.562*), with a Cohen’s d of .548. ANCOVA 
was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed. 
 Question 21 - Most politicians/political leaders who betray the public trust 
would lie to conceal their wrongdoing. A One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 
466) = 2.389, p = .05. Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that 
there was a significant means difference between elected officials and 
union-building trades (-.424*), with a Cohen’s d of -.353, business 
professionals (-.459*), with a Cohen’s d of -.389, and college students (-
.269*), with a Cohen’s d of -.240. ANCOVA was run and there were no 
significant results between groups. 
 Question 35 – I believe that the most important concern for a 
politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met 
even if it means bending or breaking the rules. A One-way ANVOVA was 
run, F(4, 466) = 4.383, p = .002.Using a Bonferroni post hoc test  found 
that there was a significant means difference between elected officials and 
government employees (-.569*), with a Cohen’s d of -.341, union-building 
trades (.-1.099*), with a Cohen’s d of -.666, and college students (-.506*), 
with a Cohen’s d of -.323. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction 
and could not proceed.  
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 Question 41 - A politician/political leader must place the interests of 
society over his/her own political self-interest. A One-way ANOVA was 
run and there were no significant differences between groups, F(4, 466) = 
1.520, p = .195. ANCOVA was run and no significant results were 
obtained. 
 Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public are 
concerned about ethics and corruption in politics today. While not illegal, 
a politician/political leader might have to comprise some of their values 
and principles to pass a bill benefiting their community. In looking at how 
trust was perceived by stakeholder groups for this compromised values by 
their elected leader to do something that would benefit the community, the 
Chi- square study showed χ² (8, N = 471) = 17.81, p = .023, which 
indicated there is no independence between stakeholder groups. 
H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
regarding political leaders’ unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to hypothesis 
72, 15, 34, and 44). 
 Question 72 (corrupt scale), which was a linear composite of questions 22 
- I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt. 
Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-
promoting are unethical. Question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who 
seek their own interests over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way 
ANOVA was run on question 72 and showed there was a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) = 3.686, p = .006. 
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Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were 
significant mean differences between elected officials and union-building 
trades (-1.806*), with a Cohen’s d of -.277. ANCOVA was run and there 
were no significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder 
groups.  
 These questions were run independently and there were significant 
differences for question 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are 
unethical are also corrupt, a One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 
4.018, p = .003. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found 
that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and 
government employees (-.356*), with a Cohen’s d of -.297, union-building 
trades (-.663*), with a Cohen’s d of -.567, and business professionals 
(.4.26*), with a Cohen’s d of -.370. ANCOVA was run and there were no 
significant results between elected officials and other stakeholder groups.  
 Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-
promoting are unethical, a One-way ANOVA was run, F(4, 466) = 4.636, 
p = .016. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there 
were significant mean differences between elected officials and union-
building trades (-.613*), with a Cohen’s d of -.492. ANCOVA was run 
and there were no significant results elected officials and other stakeholder 
groups.  
 Question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests 
over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way ANOVA was run and 
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there were no significant differences between groups, F(4,466) = 2.279, p 
= .06. ANCOVA was run and there were significant differences between 
subject effects, F(5, 465) = 2.051, p > .05 between elected officials and 
union building trades (-5.47*), with a Cohen’s d of -.459, business 
professionals (-.406) with a Cohen’s d of -.335, and college students (-
.524*), with a Cohen’s d of -..415. The ANCOVA contrasts show, 
F(4,465) = 2.412, p = .048, with a partial eta squared of .020. 
 Question 15 - A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their 
promises after being elected is unethical. The One-way ANOVA showed 
there were significant differences between stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) = 
4.273, p = .002. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found 
that there were significant mean differences between elected officials and 
college students (-.597*), with a Cohen’s d of -.467. Running ANCOVA 
showed no significant results between elected officials and other 
stakeholder groups. 
 Question 34 - For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the 
field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal 
ethics. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant 
differences between elected officials and other stakeholder groups, F(4, 
466) = 6.977, p = .01. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study 
found that there were significant mean differences between elected 
officials and government employees (-.631*), with a Cohen’s d of -.480, 
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union-building trades (-.697*), with a Cohen’s d of -.520, and college 
students (-.9.12*), with a Cohen’s d of -.726.  
ANCOVA was run and no significant results between elected officials and 
other stakeholder groups were obtained. 
 Question 44 - A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or 
groups who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered 
unethical. A One-way ANOVA showed there were no significant 
differences between stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) = 1.738, p = .140. 
ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between elected 
officials and other stakeholder groups. 
H1d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding elected official’s ethical relativism. (Questions mapped 
to hypothesis - 73.) 
 Question 73 (ethical), which was a linear composite of questions 38 - 
What is ethical, varies from how one views the situation. Question 39 - 
Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be 
resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, and Question 40 - 
Whether a politician’s/political leader’s behavior is judged to be moral or 
immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.  
 The One-way ANOVA study showed there were no significant differences 
between stakeholder groups on question 73, F(4, 466) = 2.341, p = .054. 
However, when the questions were run individually utilizing a One-way 
ANOVA, question 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ 
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political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the 
individual, the results were significant, F(4, 466) = 3.164, p = .014. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were 
significant mean differences between business professionals and college 
students (-.457*), with a Cohen’s d of -.305. ANCOVA was run on 
question 39 and there were significant differences between subjects, 
elected officials, and college students (-.457*), with a Cohen’s d of (-.312) 
The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(4, 465) = 2.686, p = .031, with 
a partial eta squared of .023. ANCOVA was also run on questions 38 and 
40 and no significant results were obtained.  
H1e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
regarding political leaders’ communications. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -74, 
55.) 
 Question 74 (communications), which is a linear combination of questions 
19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their 
promises, question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand 
my needs, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication 
with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied with 
my ability and access to communicate with my politician’s/political 
leaders. A One-way ANOVA study showed there were significant 
differences between stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) = 7.746, p = .01. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were 
significant mean differences between elected officials and government 
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employees (2.485*), with a Cohen’s d of .692, union-building trades 
(2.765*), with a Cohen’s d of .710, business professionals (2.138*), with a 
Cohen’s d of .591, and college students (3.334*), with a Cohen’s d of 
1.010. ANCOVA was run and no significant results were obtained. 
 Question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my 
politician/political leader, was run with ANCOVA, and produced 
significant results  between subjects,  with elected officials and college 
students (.789*), with a Cohen’s d (.537), with an ANCOVA contrast 
model, F(4,465) = 2.608, p = .035, with a partial eta squared of .022. 
 Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political 
promises or values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best 
way for the politician to communicate why they changed their mind or 
voted that way?  The Chi-square study showed χ² (12, N = 471) = 31.38, p 
= .002, indicated there was no independence between groups.  
The breakdown of the individual stakeholder groups by percentage are identified 
in Table 18 and Figure 56. 
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Table 18 
Best Way Elected Official’s Communicate if Changed Mind on Votes 
 
Occupation  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Government employee  Media 53 51.0 51.0 51.0 
Political newsletter 18 17.3 17.3 68.3 
Town hall meeting 28 26.9 26.9 95.2 
Personal invite 5 4.8 4.8 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Elected official  Media 18 27.7 27.7 27.7 
Political newsletter 14 21.5 21.5 49.2 
Town hall meeting 23 35.4 35.4 84.6 
Personal invite 10 15.4 15.4 100.0 
Total 65 100.0 100.0  
Union-building trades  Media 35 46.7 46.7 46.7 
Political newsletter 14 18.7 18.7 65.3 
Town hall meeting 19 25.3 25.3 90.7 
Personal invite 7 9.3 9.3 100.0 
Total 75 100.0 100.0  
Business professional  Media 55 55.6 55.6 55.6 
Political newsletter 22 22.2 22.2 77.8 
Town hall meeting 13 13.1 13.1 90.9 
Personal invite 9 9.1 9.1 100.0 
Total 99 100.0 100.0  
College student  Media 80 62.5 62.5 62.5 
Political newsletter 17 13.3 13.3 75.8 
Town hall meeting 21 16.4 16.4 92.2 
Personal invite 10 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Total 128 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 57. Best way for elected leaders to communicate if changed mind 
  The next section reports the results of support for H1a-e hypotheses   
Hypothesis 1a-e 
 H1a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior (partially supported). 
H1b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ trust (partially supported). 
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 H1c: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ unethical/corrupt behavior (partially 
supported). 
H1d:  There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ ethical relativism (partially 
supported). 
H1e:  There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups regarding political leaders’ communications (generally 
supported). 
The next section addressed the second hypothesis of this research study. The 
overall hypothesis 2 is the same as hypothesis 1 with the exception of age, gender, and 
political affiliation, were tested. All elected officials were removed from Hypotheses 2. 
Hypothesis H2 
H2: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
regarding political leader’s behaviors with respect to age, gender, and political affiliation. 
There are several parts to this overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H2a-e are 
described below. 
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ ethical behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -70, 53d, 56d, 59 60, q75) 
Note: elected officials were removed from all hypotheses in H2’s as the hypothesis were 
testing demographic differences between stakeholder groups (government employees, 
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union-building trades, business professionals, and college students) on age, gender, and 
political party affiliation. 
Additionally, ANCOVA was conducted only on age differences, ANCOVA was 
run on age and the covariant is political affiliation as in Hypothesis 1 (a-e). Finally, 
ANCOVA was not run on differences for political affiliation since that is the covariant, 
and politicians were removed from these hypotheses. The main exploratory research for 
hypothesis 2 was to look at how stakeholder groups differ from each other with elected 
officials removed. 
 Question 75, which is a linear combination of question 37 - I believe that  
politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-
term governance strategies, Question 41 - A politician/political leader must place 
the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, and Question 42 - 
For me a politician/political leader’s ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting 
for them. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences 
between stakeholders groups regarding age, F(3, 402) = 3.969, p = .008. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant 
mean differences between ages (18-24) and (55 and above) at (-.970*), with a 
Cohen’s d of -.462. ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between 
age groups. 
 Questions (37, 41, and 42) were run independently with a One-way ANOVA, and 
there were only significant differences for question 37, F(3, 402) = 4.014, p = 
.008. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were 
significant mean differences between ages 18-24 and 45-44 at (-.38*) with a 
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Cohen’s d of -.433, and between 18-24 and 55 and above at (-.400*), with a 
Cohen’s d of -.398. ANCOVA was run and showed no significant results between 
age groups.  
 Regarding gender, an independent- samples t-test was conducted on question 75 
and there were no significant differences between gender, t(404) = -1.068, p = 
.286. Additionally, these questions were run independently, and there were no 
significant differences for question 37, 41, and 42. Regarding political afflation, a 
One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences between 
groups, F(3, 402) = .352, p = .788.   
 A One-way ANOVA was run individually for questions 37, 41, and 42, and there 
were no significant difference regarding political affiliation.  
 ANCOVA was run on question 37, 41, and 42. Question 42 produced significant 
results on question 42 which indicated age differences 18-24 and 55-above at (-
.279*), with a Cohen’s d  of , The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3, 401) 
= 1.805, p = .146, with a partial eta squared of .013. 
 Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical various 
public professional groups are. Please circle your unethical/ethical rating on each 
of the following groups on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being unethical and 7 being 
completely ethical  regarding how Politicians/political leaders/elected political 
leaders. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were no significant differences 
between age groups, F(3, 402) =.764, p = .515. 
   Question 53d, regarding gender, an independent- samples t-test was conducted 
and there was no significant difference between gender, t(3) = 1.860, p = .064.  
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 Question 53d - regarding political affiliation, a One-way ANOVA was run and 
there were significant differences between groups, F(3, 402) = 9.490, p = .01. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant 
mean differences between Republicans and Democrats (-.706*), with a Cohen’s d 
of -.613. ANCOVA was run and showed no significant differences between 
groups. 
 Question 56d - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an 
ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community 
that this compromise is considered ethical. The Chi-square study showed χ² (3, N 
= 406) = .590, p = .899, indicated that there was independence regarding age 
groups. Regarding gender, a Chi-square study showed χ² (1, N = 406) = 1.659, p = 
.198, indicated that there was independence between gender groups. Regarding 
political affiliation, a Chi-square study showed χ² (2, N = 406) = 9.645, p = .022 
which indicated that there was no independence between groups regarding this 
question.  
 Question 59 - A high-ranking elected official borrows $200,000 from a local 
developer to purchase land and the developer asks for zoning on his land to be 
changed from residential to commercial. The elected official contacts the local 
zoning department and asks for the zoning to be changed from residential to 
commercial. The zoning is changed at the request of the elected official’s request. 
In your opinion, please indicate your reaction to this request from the elected 
official to the zoning department.  
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The Chi-square study showed χ² (9, N = 406) = 56.94, p = .000, which indicated 
that there was no independence between age groups.  
 Question 59, regarding gender, a Chi-square study showed a χ² (3, N = 406) = 
.252, p = .969 which indicated that there was independence between groups.  
 Question 59, regarding political affiliation, a Chi-square study showed χ² (9, N = 
406) = 6.88, p = .650, indicated that there was independence between groups.  
 Question 60 - In your opinion, what percentage of politicians/political leaders 
believe they act ethically? Regarding how groups responded to political leaders 
acting ethically, the Chi-square test between age groups, χ² (75, N = 406) = 
142.1, p = .000, indicated that the age groups were not independent of each other. 
 Question 60, regarding gender, the Chi-square results showed χ² (25, N = 406) = 
35.00, p = .88, indicated there was independence between groups.  
 Question 60, regarding political affiliation, the Chi-square results showed χ² (75, 
N = 406) = 71.79, p = .584, which indicated there was independence between 
groups.  
 Question 60 - second part - In your opinion, what percentage of 
politicians/political leaders believe they act unethically? Regarding age, the Chi-
square results showed χ² (72, N = 406) = 130.53, p = .000, indicating the groups 
were not independent.  
 Question 60-second part, regarding gender, the Chi-square results showed χ² 
(245, N = 406) = 26.63, p = .198, indicating there is independence between 
gender.  
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 Question 60 - second part, regarding political affiliation, the Chi-square result 
showed χ² (72, N = 406) = 63.02, p = .766, indicating there is independence 
between groups. 
 Question item 70, was a composite of questions 1 - Most politicians/political 
leaders really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), question 4 -  
Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, 
question  9- Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, question 18 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 19 - I believe that 
politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, and question  20 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs.  
 Question 70 was run using an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed test), there 
were no significant difference between gender, with males (M = 20.97, SD 5.54) 
and females, (M =19.84, SD = 5.82), t( 404) =2.011, p = .045. There were no 
significant differences running a One-way ANOVA, on age and political 
affiliation. Furthermore, running an ANCOVA showed no significant results 
between age groups.  
 Additionally, running these questions independently, there were no significant 
difference regarding age for questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20. ANCOVA was run 
on these questions independently and produced no significant results between age 
groups.  
 Regarding gender, running an independent-samples t-test there were significant 
differences between gender for question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more 
honest than the public gives them credit, males, (M =3.50, SD = 1.21), and 
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females, (M = 3.13, SD = 1.23), t( 404) =3.025, p = .003, with a mean difference 
of (.366*), with a Cohen’s d of .301.  
 Regarding political affiliation, running a One-way-ANOVA, there were 
significant difference between groups for question 4, F(3, 402) = 2.987, p = .031. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were no 
significant mean differences between political affiliations. 
 Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, a One-way ANOVA 
found, F(3 402) = 4.745, p = .003. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the 
study found that there were significant mean differences between political 
affiliations between Republicans and Democrats (-.43*) with a Cohen’s d of -
.338, and between Democrats and Independents (.51*), with a Cohen’s d of .399. 
 Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, a One-
way. ANOVA was run and found, F(3, 402) = 3.641, p = .013. Conducting a 
Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean 
differences between political affiliations between Democrats and Independents 
(.445*), with a Cohen’s d of .372.  
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ trust. (Questions mapped to hypothesis -18, 21, 28, 35, 41 and 54).  
 A One-way ANOVA was conducted on questions 18, 21, 28, 35, 41. The 
only significant question was 21 - Most politicians/political leaders who 
betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing. Regarding 
age, the One-way ANOVA for question 21 found, F( 3,402) = 4.387, p = 
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.005. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there 
were significant mean differences between age groups for 18-24 and 45-
54 at (-.391*), with a Cohen’s d of -.467, and 18-24 and 55 and above at 
(-.291*), with a Cohen’s d of -.290, 25-44 and 45-54 at (-.402*), with a 
Cohen’s d of -.430, and 25-44 and 55 and above at (-.302*) with a 
Cohen’s d of -.278.  
 ANCOVA was run on questions 18, 21, 28, 35, 41, and there were 
significant age group differences between subjects for question 28 - I 
consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her own personal 
interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly ethical, 
resulted in significant differences between age groups 45-54 and 55-
above at (-.511*), with a Cohen’s d of -.414. The ANCOVA contrast 
model indicated, F(3.401) = 2.457, p = .063, with a partial eta squared of 
.018.  
 Question 35 – I believe that the most important concern for a 
politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met 
even if it means bending or breaking the rules, the  ANCOVA showed 
significant results between subjects age groups, with 25-54 and 55-above 
at (-.536*), with a Cohen’s d of -.313. The ANCOVA contrast model 
indicated, F(3,401) = 1.694, p =.168, with a partial eta squared of .013.  
 Question 41- A politician/political leader must place the interests of 
society over his/her own political self-interest, was the only other 
significant question in this hypothesis The only other significant question 
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in hypothesis 2b, running ANCOVA  was  question 41. The age 
differences between 25-54 and 55-above at (.277*), with a Cohen’s d of 
.486. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3, 401) = 2.089, p = 
.101, with a partial eta squared of .015.  
 Regarding gender, an independent- samples t-test (two-tail test) was 
conducted on the above questions (18, 21, 28, 35, and 41) and there were 
no significant differences for questions 18 - Politicians/political leaders 
generally can be trusted, question 21 - Most politicians/political leaders 
who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing, 
question  28 - I consider a politician/political leader who sacrifices his/her 
own personal interests over those of the electorate (citizens) to be highly 
ethical, question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a 
politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are met 
even if it means bending or breaking the rules, question 41 - A 
politician/political leader must place the interests of society over his/her 
own political self-interest.  
 Regarding political affiliation, there were no significant differences 
between questions 18, 21, 28, 35, and 41. 
 Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public is 
concerned about ethics and corruption in politics today and yet, we know 
there are many honest politicians/political leaders are doing the right 
things. While not illegal, a politician/political leader might have to 
comprise some of their values and principles to pass a bill benefiting their 
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community  In my opinion, regarding this situation a politician should: 
(circle one) 
1) Never compromise principles 
2) Sometime should compromise principles 
3) Compromise principles    
 The Chi-square study on question 54 showed there was a significant 
differences between stakeholder groups regarding age, χ² (62, N = 406) = 
14.24, p = .027, which indicated there was no independence between age 
groups.  
  Regarding gender on question 54, the Chi-square showed χ² (2, N = 406) = 
2.568, p = .277, which indicated that there was independence between gender.  
 Regarding political affiliation on question 54, the Chi-square statistic showed 
χ² (6, N = 406) = 19.16, p = .004, which indicated that there was no 
independence between political affiliation. 
H2c:  There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ unethical and corrupt behavior. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis -72, 56a, 
56b, 15, 34, 44, 47b, 47a). 
 Question 72, which was a linear composite of questions 22 - I believe 
politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, question 23 - I 
believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, 
and question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests 
over the citizens I consider corrupt. A One-way ANOVA was run on age and 
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showed there were significant differences between stakeholder groups, F(3, 
402) = 2.752, p = .042. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found 
that there were no significant mean differences between age groups.  
 ANCOVA was run also run question 72 and showed significant age group 
differences between subjects, between 18-24 and 55-above at (-1.069*), with 
a Cohen’s d .394, and 25-44 and 55-above at (-.865*), with a Cohen’s d of 
.319.The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3,401) = 3.029, p = .029, 
with a partial eta squared of .022.  
 Question 22 - I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also 
corrupt, was run independently with a One-way ANOVA, and found, F(3,402) 
= 6.00, p = .001. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that 
there were significant mean differences between age groups 18-24 and 55 and 
above at (.654*), with a Cohen’s d of -.189, 18-24 and 45-54 at (-.410*), with 
a Cohen’s d of -.372, 25-44 and55 and above at (-.429*), with a Cohen’s d of -
.389, and 55 and above and 18-24 at (.654*) with a Cohen’s d of -.603. 
ANCOVA was run and there were no significant differences between age 
groups. 
 Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-
promoting are unethical,  produced significant results running ANCOVA for  
between age group subjects, F(4,401) = 1.292, p > .05, and there were no 
subsequent significant differences between age groups.  
 Regarding gender for question 72, an independent- samples t-test (two tailed 
test) was conducted and there were no significant differences in gender, 
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 t(404) = 1.368, p = .172. Regarding political affiliation, a One-way ANOVA was 
run and there were no significant differences between political affiliations, 
F(3,402) = .717, p = .542. 
 Question 56a – Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an 
ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your 
community that this compromise is considered unethical. A Chi-square test 
was conducted on age, χ² (3, N = 406) = 2.24, p = .525, indicated that there 
was independence between age groups.  
 Regarding gender for question 56a, the Chi-square test showed χ² (1, N = 406) 
= 1.63, p = .201, indicating that there was independence between gender.  
 Regarding political affiliation for question 56a, the Chi-square results showed 
χ² (3, N = 406) = 6.71, p = .082, indicating that there was independence 
between political affiliation. 
 Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an 
ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your 
community that this compromise is considered corrupt? A Chi-square test was 
conducted on age χ² (1, N = 406) = .669, p = .083, indicated that there was 
independence between age groups.  
 Regarding gender for question 56b, the Chi-square statistic χ² (1, N = 406) = 
4.523, p = .033, indicating that there was no independence between gender.  
 Regarding political affiliation for question 56b, the Chi-square showed χ² (3, 
N = 406) = 4.50, p = .212, indicating that there was independence between 
political affiliations. 
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 Question 15 - A politician/political leader who purposely breaks their 
promises after being elected is unethical, which looked at the concept if an 
elected official purposely breaks their promises after being elected is 
unethical. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and showed there were no 
significant differences between stakeholder groups by age, F(3, 402) = 1.778, 
p = .102.  
 Question 15 regarding gender, an independent-samples t-test was conducted 
and there were no significant differences between gender, t(404) = -.586, p = 
.558.  
 Regarding political affiliation for question 15, a One-way ANOVA was run, 
and there were significant differences between political affiliations, F(3,402) 
= 3.302, p = .020. Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that 
there were significant mean differences between Republicans and 
Independents (.434*), with a Cohen’s d of .359. ANCOVA was run and 
produced no significant results on this question 15. 
 Question 34 - For a politician/political leader to remain competitive in the 
field of politics, they will sometimes have to disregard their personal ethics. A 
One-way ANOVA was run by age, and the study showed there were no 
significant differences between stakeholder groups, F(3,402) =1.272, p  = 
.284. ANCOVA was run and produced no significant results on this question.  
 Regarding gender for question 34, an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed) 
was conducted and there was no significant difference between gender, t (404) 
=-.493, p = .622.  
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 Regarding political affiliation for question 15, a One-way ANOVA was run 
and there were no significant differences between political affiliations, F(3, 
402) = .869, p = .457).  
 Question 44 - A politician/political leader who ignores individuals or groups 
who did not contribute to their political campaign is considered unethical. 
A One-way ANOVA was run by age and there were no significant differences 
between stakeholder groups, F(3, 402) = 1.310, p = .271. Additionally, 
running an ANCOVA produced no significant results on this question.  
 Regarding gender on question 44, an independent- samples t-test (two-tailed) 
was conducted and there were no significant differences between gender, 
t(404) = -.995, p = .320.  
 Regarding political affiliation for question 44, an ANOVA was conducted and 
there were no significant differences between political affiliations, F(3, 402) = 
1.107, p = .346. 
 Question 47a – Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they 
might not otherwise get on their own is unethical? A  Chi-square study by age 
showed χ² (3, N = 406) = 1.116, p = .773, indicated the groups were 
independent of each other. Regarding gender, χ² (1, N = 406) = 1.303, p = 
.254, indicated that there was independence between gender.  
       Regarding political affiliation for question 47a, χ² (3, N = 406) = .927, p = 
.819, indicated the groups were independent of each other. 
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       Question 47b – Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they 
might not otherwise get on their own is corrupt? The Chi-square study by age, 
χ² (3, N = 406) = 16.50, p = .001, showed the groups were not independent of 
each other.  
      Regarding gender for question 47b, the Chi-square showed χ² (1, N = 406) = 
1.446, p = .229, indicating the groups were independent of each other.  
      Regarding political affiliation for question 47b, the Chi-square showed χ² (3, N 
= 406) = 9.517, p = .023, the groups were not independent of each other.  
H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ ethical relativism. (Question mapped to this hypothesis -73). 
 Question 73, which was a composite of questions 38 - What is ethical varies from 
how one views the situation, question, 39 - Questions of what is ethical for the 
politician/ political leader can never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the 
individual, and question 40 - Whether a politician’s/political leader’s behavior is 
judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the 
action. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and there were significant 
differences between stakeholder groups by age, F(3, 402) = 2.943, p = .033. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were no 
significant mean differences between age groups. ANCOVA was run on question 
73, and produced no significant results. 
 ANOVA was run individually on questions 38, 39, and 40, and there were no 
significant differences. ANCOVA was run and significant age group differences 
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were found on question 38, differences between  age differences between 25-44 
and 45-54 and above at (.436*), with a Cohen’s d of (.306).The ANCOVA 
contrast model indicated, F(3,401) = 2.059, p = .105, with a partial eta squared of 
.015.  
 Question 39  - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/political leader can 
never be resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, ANCOVA found 
significant age group differences between 18-24 and 55 and above at (.475*), with 
a Cohen’s d (.321). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3,401) = 2.161, p 
= .092, with a partial eta squared of .016. 
 Question 40  - Whether a politician’s/political leader’s behavior is judged to be 
moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action, 
ANCOVA found significant age group differences between ages 18-24 and 55-
above at (.475*), with a Cohen’s d of (.331) and 25-44 and 55-above at (.410*), 
with a Cohen’s d of (.286). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3,401) = 
2.437, p = .064, with a partial eta squared of .018.  
 Regarding gender on question 40, an independent-samples t-test was conducted 
and there were no significant differences in gender, t(404) = 1.367, p = .173, and 
no significant differences were found on questions 38, and 39. 
 Regarding political affiliation on question 40, a One-way ANOVA was conducted 
and there were no significant differences between political affiliations, F(3, 402) 
=.924, p = .429.  
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H2e: There will be significant perceptual differences between stakeholder groups 
based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) regarding political 
leaders’ communication. (Questions mapped to this hypothesis - 74, 55) 
 Question 74 was a linear composite of questions 19 - I believe that 
politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, question 20 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, question 45 - I am 
satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and 
question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my 
politician’s/political leaders. A One-way ANOVA was run by age, and the study 
showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups, F(3, 
402) = .875, p = .454. 
 Regarding gender on composite question 74, an independent- samples t-test (two 
– tailed) was conducted and there were no significant differences between gender, 
t(404) = .085, p = .933.  
 Regarding political affiliation on question 74, a One-way ANOVA produced 
significant differences, F(3, 402) = 6.22, p = .01, between Republican-Democrats 
(-1.425*), with a Cohen’s d of (-.348) and Democrat – Independent (1.9.53*), 
with a Cohen’s d of (.453).  
 ANCOVA was run on question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of 
communication with my politician/political leader. The between subjects, with 
respect to age and political affiliation, F(4, 401) = 1.196, p > .05, and produced 
significant age group differences between 18-24 and 45-54 at (.457*) with a 
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Cohen’s d of (-.300). The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(3, 401) = 1.805, 
p = .146, with a partial eta squared of .013. 
 Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my 
politician’s/political leaders. ANCOVA was run and showed significant age group 
differences between 18-24 and 45-54 at (.602*), with a Cohen’s d of (-.450), and 
18-24 and 55-above at (.582*), with a Cohen’s d of (-.394). The ANCOVA 
contrast model indicated, F(3, 401) = 3.713, p = .012, with a partial eta squared of 
.027.  
 In addition, running these questions (19, 20, 45, and 46) independently, there 
were no significant differences relating to these questions on gender. 
 Regarding political affiliation on question 46, the One-way ANOVA study 
showed there were no significant differences between stakeholder groups, F(3, 
402) =.952, p = .415.  
 Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, was run 
with a One-way ANOVA, and was significant, F(3, 402) = 3.641, p = .013. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant 
mean differences between Democrat -Independents (.445*), with a Cohen’s d of 
(.374), and Republicans and Independents (.317*), with a Cohen’s d of (.264).  
 Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my 
politician’s/political leaders was significant for political affiliation. A One-way 
ANOVA was significant, F(3, 402) = 6.834, p = .01. Conducting a Bonferroni post 
hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean differences between 
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Republicans-Democrats (-.620*), with a Cohen’s d of (-.418), and Democrat-
Independents (.704*) with a Cohen’s d of (-.489). 
 Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political promises or 
values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best way for the 
politician to communicate why they changed their mind or voted that way? The 
One-way ANOVA showed that there were no significant difference between age of 
stakeholders and how elected leaders could better communicate with them. Chi-
square was run, χ2 (9, N = 406) = 5.89, p = .750, indicating independence between 
age groups.  
 Regarding gender on question 55, the Chi-square results indicated, χ2 (3, N = 406) 
= 2.09, p = .554, indicated there was independence between gender. Regarding 
political affiliation, a Chi-square χ2 (9, N = 406) = 12.671, p = .178, indicated 
independence between political affiliation groups. 
The next section shows Tables 19 – 21 that indicate the percentage of how 
stakeholder groups answered question 55 by age, gender and political affiliation. 
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Table 19 
 
Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote. 
 
 
Age  Frequency Percent  Cumulative Percent 
18-24  Media 78 60.9  60.9 
Political newsletter 17 13.3  74.2 
Town hall meeting 22 17.2  91.4 
Personal invite 11 8.6  100.0 
Total 128 100.0   
25-44  Media 61 49.6  49.6 
Political newsletter 23 18.7  68.3 
Town hall meeting 29 23.6  91.9 
Personal invite 10 8.1  100.0 
Total 123 100.0   
45-54  Media 40 51.3  51.3 
Political newsletter 17 21.8  73.1 
Town hall meeting 16 20.5  93.6 
Personal invite 5 6.4  100.0 
55 and above  Media 44 57.1  57.1 
Political newsletter 14 18.2  75.3 
Town hall meeting 14 18.2  93.5 
Personal invite 5 6.5  100.0 
Total 77 100.0           
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Table 20 
 
Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote. 
 
 
Gender  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male  Media 124 50.2 50.2 50.2 
Political newsletter 37 15.0 15.0 65.2 
Town hall meeting 59 23.9 23.9 89.1 
Personal invite 27 10.9 10.9 100.0 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
Female  Media 117 52.2 52.2 52.2 
Political newsletter 48 21.4 21.4 73.7 
Town hall meeting 45 20.1 20.1 93.8 
Personal invite 14 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Total 224 100.0 100.0  
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Table 21 
 
Q55- Best Way Politician would Communicate if they Changed their Mind on a Vote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Political affiliation Frequency Percent  Cumulative Percent 
Republican  Media 92 62.6  62.6 
Political newsletter 20 13.6  76.2 
Town hall meeting 22 15.0  91.2 
Personal invite 13 8.8  100.0 
Total 147 100.0   
Democrat  Media 72 48.0  48.0 
Political newsletter 27 18.0  66.0 
Town hall meeting 38 25.3  91.3 
Personal invite 13 8.7  100.0 
Total 150 100.0   
Independent  Media 56 54.4  54.4 
Political newsletter 23 22.3  76.7 
Town hall meeting 20 19.4  96.1 
Personal invite 4 3.9  100.0 
Total 103 100.0   
Libertarian  Media 3 50.0  50.0 
Political newsletter 1 16.7  66.7 
Town hall meeting 1 16.7  83.3 
Personal invite 1 16.7  100.0 
Total 6 100.0   
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The next section reports the results of support H2a-e hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 2a-e  
H2a: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders’ ethical behavior (partially supported). 
H2b: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders’ trust (partially supported). 
H2c:  There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders’ unethical corrupt behavior (partially supported). 
H2d: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders’ ethical relativism (partially supported). 
H2e:  There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials 
and stakeholder groups based on key demographics (age, gender, and political affiliation) 
regarding political leaders’ communication (partially supported). 
The next section addressed the third hypothesis of this research study. The overall 
hypothesis 3 is the same as hypothesis 1, with the exception all stakeholder groups are 
combined (government workers, union-building trades, business-professionals, and 
college students) were tested against elected officials. 
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Hypothesis H3 
H3: There will be significant perceptual differences between elected officials and 
all other stakeholder groups combined regarding political leader’s behaviors. There are 
several parts to this overall hypothesis, which is broken down by H3a-e are described 
below.  
H3a: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other 
combined stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior (Questions mapped to 
hypothesis 75, 70, 53d, 56d, 59a) 
 Question 75, which is a linear combination of question 37 - I believe that  
politicians/political leaders commitment to ethical behavior is essential for long-
term governance strategies, question 41 - A politician/political leader must place 
the interests of society over his/her own political self-interest, and question 42 - 
For me a politician/political leader’s ethical behavior is a critical factor in voting 
for them. 
 Question composite 75 was run with an independent- samples t-test (two tailed), 
there were no significant differences between elected officials and all other 
stakeholders groups combined, t(469) = -.136, p = .892. Running these questions 
independently, there were no significance differences on questions 37, 41, and 42. 
 Question 70, was a composite of question 1 - Most politicians/political leaders 
really try to do the right thing for the citizens (electorate), question 4 - 
Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives them credit, 
question  9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, question 18 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, question 19 - I believe that 
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politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, and question  20 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs. 
 Question composite 70, was run utilizing an independent-samples t-test (two-
tailed), and there were significant differences between elected officials and all 
other stakeholder groups combined was significant, all non political stakeholder 
groups combined, (M = 20.41, SD = 5.70), and elected officials, (M = 25.31, SD = 
4.70), t(469)= -6.575, p = .01, with a composite mean difference of (-4.901*), 
with a Cohen’s d of - .935.  
 Questions 1, 4, 9, 18, 19, and 20, were run independently, and were analyzed with 
an independent-samples t-test. 
 Question 1 - Most politicians/political leaders really try to do the right thing for 
the citizens (electorate), there were significance differences between elected 
officials and all other stakeholder groups combined was significant, all non- 
political stakeholder groups combined, (M  = 3.73, SD = 1.22), elected officials, 
(M = 4.57, SD = 1.09), t(469) = -5.180, p = .01, with a mean difference of (-
.835*), and a Cohen’s d of -.724. 
 Question 4 - Politicians/political leaders are more honest than the public gives 
them credit, was significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 
3.31, SD = 1.23), elected officials, (M = 4.48, SD = 1.03), t(95.753) = -8.203, p = 
.01, with a mean difference of (-1.164*), with a Cohen’s d of -1.029.  
 Question 9 - Most political leaders/politicians are dishonest, was significant, all 
non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.49, SD = 1.33), elected 
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officials, (M = 4.55, SD = 1.43), t(469) = -5.958, p = .01, with a mean difference 
of (-1.069*), with a Cohen’s d of -.769.  
 Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted, was 
significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.41, SD = 1.24), 
elected officials, (M = 4.02, SD = .960), t(101.321) = -4.510, p = .01, with a mean 
difference of (-.604*), with a Cohen’s d of -.551.  
 Question 19- I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their 
promises, was significant, all non-political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 
3.25, SD = 1.09), elected officials, (M = 3.95, SD = .981), t( 97.324) = -5.729, p = 
.01, with a mean difference of (-.705*), with a Cohen’s d of -.703 
 Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, was 
significant, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.21, SD 
=1.20), elected officials, (M =3.74, SD = 1.00), t(95.876) = -3.796, p = .01, with 
a mean difference of (-.524*), with a Cohen’s d of -.478. 
 Question 53d - Studies in the past have rated how honest and ethical various public 
professional groups are in regards to politicians being ethical. An independent- 
samples t-test showed that there was a significant difference between elected 
officials and all other stakeholder groups combined, all non- political stakeholder 
groups combined, (M = 3.38, SD = 1.22), elected officials, (M = 4.29, SD = .931), t 
(103.069) = -6.992, p = .01, with a mean difference of (-.912*), with a Cohen’s d of 
-.837. A Chi-square was run on this question and indicated, χ2 (1, N = 471) = 14.01, 
p = .000, indicating there was no independence between elected officials and all 
other stakeholders combined.  
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Table 22 shows the percentages of how elected officials answered this question to 
all other stakeholders combined. 
Table 22 
 
Question 53d - How Ethical or Unethical are POL/PL’s 
 
 
Q76_plvsotherstakeholders others =1 political=2 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Non political stakeholder  1 20 4.9 4.9 4.9 
2 82 20.2 20.2 25.2 
3 121 29.8 29.9 55.1 
4 103 25.4 25.4 80.5 
5 68 16.7 16.7 97.2 
6 9 2.2 2.2 99.3 
7 3 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 407 100.0              100.0  
Politician  2 3 4.6 4.6 4.6 
3 8 12.3 12.3 16.9 
4 25 38.5 38.5 55.4 
5 25 38.5 38.5 93.8 
6 4 6.2 6.2 100.0 
Total 65 100.0 100.0  
Note: (1 = completely unethical, 7 = completely ethical) 
 
 Question 56b - Do you feel if a politician changed his/her position (from an 
ethical to some questionable position) to get something done for your community 
that this compromise is considered corrupt. A Chi-square was run χ2 (1, N = 471) 
= 11.88 p = .001, indicating there was no independence between elected officials 
and all other stakeholders combined.  
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 Question 59a - A high-ranking elected official borrows $200,000 from a local 
developer to purchase land. The developer asks for zoning on his land to be 
changed from residential to commercial. The elected official contacts the local 
zoning department and asks for the zoning to be changed from residential to 
commercial. The zoning is changed at the request of the elected official’s request. 
In your opinion, please indicate your reaction to this request from the elected 
official to the zoning department if this is completely ethical. A Chi-square was 
run χ2 (3, N = 471) = 13.67, p = .003, indicating there was no independence 
between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined. 
 The next section, Table 23 shows the percentages of how elected officials versus 
all other stakeholders combined answered this question. 
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Table 23 
 
Question 59 – Scenario Regarding Politician – Developer 
 
 
Group 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Non- political 
stakeholder 
 A-completely ethical 21 5.2 5.2 5.2 
B-conflict of interest 153 37.7 37.7 42.9 
C=considered 
unethical/corrupt 
156 38.4 38.4 81.3 
D-happens all the times-
assists 
76 18.7 18.7 100.0 
Total 406 100.0 100.0  
Politician  A-completely ethical 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
B-conflict of interest 35 53.8 53.8 55.4 
C=considered 
unethical/corrupt 
27 41.5 41.5 96.9 
Total 65 100.0 100.0  
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H3b: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other 
combined stakeholder groups regarding trust. (Questions mapped to hypothesis - 18, 21, 
28, 35, 41 and 54). Significant results are reported.  
 Question 18 - Politicians/political leaders generally can be trusted. An 
independent- samples t-test (two tailed) was conducted, all non- political 
stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.41, SD = 1.24), elected officials, (M = 4.02, 
SD = .960), t(101.321) = -4.510, p = .01, with a mean difference of (-.604), with a 
Cohen’s d of .551.  
 Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political 
leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or 
breaking the rules. There was a significant difference between elected officials 
and all other stakeholder groups combined, all non- political stakeholder groups 
combined, (M = 2.93, SD = 1.56), elected officials, (M = 2.35, SD = 1.56), t(469) 
= 2.534, p = .012, with a mean difference of (.572), with a Cohen’s d of .355.  
 Question 54 - Many studies show a vast majority of the public is concerned about 
ethics and corruption in politics today and yet, we know there are many honest 
politicians/political leaders are doing the right things. While not illegal, a 
politician/political leader might have to comprise some of their values and 
principles to pass a bill benefiting their community. A Chi-square was calculated 
χ2 (2, N = 471) = .125, p = .939, indicating there was independence between 
elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined. 
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H3c: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other 
combined stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior. (Questions were 
mapped to hypothesis - 15, 34, 44, 47a-b, and 72).  
 Question 72, which was a linear combination of questions 22 - I believe 
politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also corrupt, question 23 - I 
believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, and 
question 24 - Politicians/political leaders who seek their own interests over the 
citizens I consider corrupt. An independent- samples t-test was conducted on 
composite question 72 and there were significant differences between elected 
officials and all other combined stakeholder groups, all non- political stakeholder 
groups combined, (M = 12.94, SD = 2.72), elected officials, (M = 11.95, SD = 
3.36), t(469) = 2.623, p = .009, with a mean difference of (.990*), and a Cohen’s 
d of -.323.  
 Questions (22, 23, and 24) were run independently, and there were significant 
difference between elected officials and all other combined stakeholder groups for 
question 22 – I believe politicians/political leaders who are unethical are also 
corrupt. The independent- samples t-test showed all non- political stakeholder 
groups combined, (M = 4.59, SD = 1.14), elected officials, (M = 4.23, SD = 1.24), 
t(469) = 2.343, p = .020, with a mean difference of (.360*), with a Cohen’s d of -
.303. 
 Questions 15 and 44 were not significant. Question34 - For a politician/political 
leader to remain competitive in the field of politics, they will sometimes have to 
disregard their personal ethics. An independent-samples t-test was conducted and 
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showed a significant differences between elected officials and all other combined 
stakeholder groups, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.99, SD 
= 1.41), elected officials, (M = 3.37, SD = 1.27), t(469) = 3.342, p = .001, with a 
mean difference of (.621*), with a Cohen’s d of -.462. 
 Questions 47 a - Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they 
might not otherwise get on their own is unethical. The Chi-square results showed 
χ² (1, N = 471) = .006, p = .940, indicated that there was independence between 
elected officials and all other stakeholder groups combined. The second part of 
question 47 b- Helping a friend or family get a job in government that they might 
not otherwise get on their own is corrupt. The Chi-square results showed  χ² (1, N 
= 471) = 19.52, p = .01, indicating that there is no independence between elected 
official and all other stakeholder groups combined regarding corrupt behavior. 
H3d: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other 
combined stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism. (Questions mapped to 
hypothesis - 38, 39, and 40). 
 Questions 38 - What is ethical varies from how one views the situation, question 
39 - Questions of what is ethical for the politician/ political leader can never be 
resolved since what is ethical is up to the individual, and question 40 - Whether a 
politician’s/political leader’s behavior is judged to be moral or immoral depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the action. An independent- samples t-test 
showed there were no significant differences between elected officials and all 
other combined stakeholder groups for questions (38, 39, and 40). 
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H3e: There will be significant differences between political leaders and all other 
combined stakeholder groups regarding communication. (Questions mapped to 
hypothesis - 74, 55, and 62). 
 Question 74, which was a linear combination of questions 19- I believe 
that politicians/political leaders generally keep their promises, question 20 - 
Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, question 45 - I am 
satisfied with the level of communication with my politician/political leader, and 
question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my 
politician’s/political leaders. An independent-samples t-test was conducted on 
composite question 74, and there were significant differences between elected 
officials and all other combined stakeholders groups combined, all non- political 
stakeholder groups combined, (M = 13.42, SD = 4.19), elected officials, (M = 
16.14, SD = 2.83), t (114.979) = -6.67, p = .01, with a mean difference of (-
2.270*) with a Cohen’s d of .760.  
 Questions (19, 20, 45, and 46) were run independently with an independent- 
samples t-test, and there were significant differences between elected officials and 
all other combined stakeholder groups. 
 Question 19 - I believe that politicians/political leaders generally keep their 
promises, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.25, SD = 1.09), 
elected officials, (M = 3.95, SD = .891), t(97.324) = -5.729, p = .01, with a mean 
difference of (-.705*), with a Cohen’s d of .703.  
 Question 20 - Politicians/political leaders generally understand my needs, all non- 
political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 3.21, SD = 1.20), elected officials, 
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(M = 3.74, SD = 1.00), t(95.876) = -3.796, p = .01, with a mean difference of (-
.524*), with a Cohen’s d of .478.  
 Question 45 - I am satisfied with the level of communication with my 
politician/political leader, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 
3.43, SD = 1.52), elected officials, (M = 3.94, SD = 1.06), t(11.376) = -3.366, p = 
.001, with a mean difference of (-.510*), with a Cohen’s d of .389.  
 Question 46 - I am satisfied with my ability and access to communicate with my 
politician’s/political leaders, all non- political stakeholder groups combined, (M = 
3.53, SD = 1.49), elected officials, (M = 4.51, SD = 1.03), t(111.700) = -6.632, p = 
.01, with a mean difference of (-.981*), with a Cohen’s d of -.761. 
 Question 55 - If a politician/political leader changed their political promises or 
values to get something done, what in your opinion is the best way for the 
politician to communicate why they changed their mind or voted that way? 
(Circle one):  Media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet) 
 Personal political newsletter 
 
 Town Hall meeting 
 
 Personal invitation to meet personally with you or specific 
interest groups 
 
A Chi-square was calculated and the results showed χ² (3, N = 471) = 18.54, p = 
.01, indicating that there is no independence between elected officials and all 
other combined stakeholder groups regarding this question. 
 Table 24 indicated the best way politicians/political leader should communicate if 
they changed their mind on votes  
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Table 24 
Q55 – Best Way POL/PL’s should Communicate if they Changed their Mind on Votes 
 
 
Groups Frequency Percent 
 
Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Non political stakeholder  Media 223 54.9 54.9 54.9 
Political newsletter 71 17.5 17.5 72.4 
Town hall meeting 81 20.0 20.0 92.4 
Personal invite 31 7.6 7.6 100.0 
Total 406 100.0 100.0  
Politician  Media 18 27.7 27.7 27.7 
Political newsletter 14 21.5 21.5 49.2 
Town hall meeting 23 35.4 35.4 84.6 
Personal invite 10 15.4 15.4 100.0 
Total 65 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 58 indicates graphically illustrates the best way a politician/political leader 
should communicate if they changed there mind on votes. 
 
 
Figure 58. Best way pol/pl would communicate if changed mind on votes  
The next section reports the results of support H3a-e hypotheses. 
Hypotheses H3a -e  
 H3a: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
stakeholder groups regarding ethical behavior (partially supported). 
 
H3b: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other          
stakeholder groups regarding trust (partially supported). 
278 
 
H3c: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other          
stakeholder groups regarding unethical/corrupt behavior (partially supported). 
 H3d: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
   stakeholder groups regarding ethical relativism (partially supported). 
 H3e: There will be significant differences between elected officials and all other  
 stakeholder groups regarding communication (partially supported). 
The next section addressed Hypothesis H4 regarding differences between 
stakeholder groups and elected officials regarding their level of communications. 
Hypothesis 
H4: The will be significant differences between stakeholders and elected officials 
regarding their level of communications. (Question mapped to hypothesis - 80 is a linear 
combination of questions 26, 36, 45, and 46). 
Question 80, is a composite of question 26 - I think politicians/political leaders 
should take more polls of their constituents to better understand and serve their needs, 
question 36 - Communication between the politician/ political leader and voter is 
important to the effectiveness of government, question 45 - I am satisfied with the level 
of communication with my politician/political leader, and question 46 - I am satisfied 
with my ability and access to communicate with my politician’s/political leaders.  
 Question  80 composite, was run with a One-way ANOVA, and there was a 
significant mean difference between groups regarding their total overall level of 
satisfaction with their elected officials, F(4, 466) = 5.233, p = .01. Using a 
Bonferroni post hoc test it was found that there was a significant mean difference 
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between elected officials and college students unions (1.793*), with a Cohen’s d 
of .685. ANCOVA was run and there was an interaction and could not proceed. 
 Running these questions (26, 36, 45, and 46) individually with a One-way 
ANOVA, showed  significant differences for question 45- I am satisfied with the 
level of communication with my politician/political leader, F(4, 466) = 3.432, p = 
.009. Using a Bonferroni post hoc test, it was found that there was a significant 
means difference between elected officials between elected officials at college 
students at (.789*) with a Cohen’s d of .619. ANCOVA showed significant 
differences between elected officials and college students at (.789*) with a 
Cohen’s d of .537 The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(4, 465) = 3.483, p = 
.008, with a partial eta squared of .029, and a Cohen’s d of (.537). 
Table 25 illustrates the overall mean for the linear combination for the level of 
communication between elected officials and all other stakeholders combined. 
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Table 25 
Overall Mean for Linear Combination - Question 80 
 
 
N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Q80_commcomb 
q80-linear 
combination of 
overall 
communication 
471 8 24 17.41 .135 2.941 -.249 .113 -.188 .225 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
471 
         
 
*Note: Midpoint of scale is 3.5. Overall mean 17.41/4 (questions) = 4.353 
Government employee mean  (17.64/4) = 4.410 
Elected official mean      (18.28/4) = 4.570 
Union- Building trade mean (17.53/4) = 4.383 
Business professional mean (17.72/4) = 4.430 
College student mean  (16.48/4) = 4.120 
 Group Comparisons regarding level of satisfaction regarding communications 
between elected officials and stakeholder groups were conducted. The overall 
mean for all of the groups combined is (4.353) in addition; the mean of means 
was taken of all stakeholder groups to eliminate unequal variances between 
groups with a mean of means of (4.38), for government employees (4.410), 
elected officials (4.570), union-building trades (4.383), business professionals 
(4.43) and college students (4.120). This indicates that all groups rate their level 
of satisfaction regarding their level of communications with elected officials as 
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positive, with the exception of college students who rate their level of 
communications under the group mean of (4.353). 
The next section addressed the level of cynicism between all stakeholder groups 
including elected officials as illustrated in Table 26. 
Table 26 
 
A Visual Comparison of Composite Question 80 
 
 
Cynicism by occupational stakeholder groups 
1----------2----------3----------4---.-------5----------6 Mean of means groups (4.38) 
1----------2----------3----------4-----.-----5----------6 Elected Official (4.570) 
1----------2----------3----------4--.--------5----------6 Union-Building Trades (4.383) 
1----------2----------3----------4----.------5----------6  Business Professional (4.43) 
1----------2----------3----------4-.---------5----------6 College Students (4.120) 
1 = strongly disagree, 2= moderately disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 
4= somewhat agree, 5= moderately agree, 6= strongly agree 
 
The next section reports the results of support H4 hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4  
H4:  There will be a significant difference between all stakeholders groups and 
elected officials regarding their level of communications (partially supported). 
The next section addressed Hypothesis 5, which looked at political leaders 
perceived their level of trust and ethics higher than the various stakeholder groups who 
perceive those same qualities. This implies that the public is more cynical than the 
political leaders who feel they are justified by their experiences as political leaders. 
282 
 
Hypothesis 5 
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the 
various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities. (Question mapped to 
hypothesis question 90, which was a linear combination of 21, 23, 27, 33, and 35.) 
 Question 90 was a composite of question 21- Most politicians/political leaders 
who betray the public trust would lie to conceal their wrongdoing, question 23 - I 
believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting are unethical, 
question 27 - Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest 
group over another are unethical, question 33 - If the survival of the politician/ 
political leader’s career is at stake, most politicians/political leaders will 
compromise their ethics, and question 35 - I believe that the most important 
concern for a politician/political leader is making sure their personal interests are 
met even if it means bending or breaking the rules. 
 Question 90 composite, was run with a One-way ANOVA and there were 
significant differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) 
= 7.356, p = .01.Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there 
were significant mean differences between elected officials and government 
employees (1.844*), with a Cohen’s d of -.456, union-building trades (-3.429*), 
with a Cohen’s d of -.881, business professionals (-1.351*), with a Cohen’s d of -
.341, and college students (-2.222*), with a Cohen’s d of -.642. ANCOVA was 
run on composite question 90, and no significant differences were obtained. 
 Question 23 - I believe that politicians/political leaders who are self-promoting 
are unethical. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant differences 
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between elected officials and stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) =3.088, p = .016. 
Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant 
mean differences between elected officials and union building trades at (.613*) 
with a Cohen’s d of -.492. 
 Question 33 - If the survival of the politician/ political leader’s career is at stake, 
most politicians/political leaders will compromise their ethics. A One-way 
ANOVA was run and showed there were significant differences between elected 
officials and stakeholder groups, F(4, 466) = 10.140, p = .01. Conducting a 
Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were significant mean 
differences between elected officials and government workers (-.710*), with a 
Cohen’s d of -.655, union building trades at (.-.863*), with a Cohen’s d of -.787, 
business-professionals (-.545), with a Cohen’s d of -.471, and college students (-
.915), with a Cohen’s d of  -.836. 
 Question 35 - I believe that the most important concern for a politician/political 
leader is making sure their personal interests are met even if it means bending or 
breaking the rules. A One-way ANOVA was run and there were significant 
differences between elected officials and stakeholder groups, F(4,466) = 4.383, p 
= .002.Conducting a Bonferroni post hoc test, the study found that there were 
significant mean differences between elected officials and union building trades at 
(-1.099*), with a Cohen’s d of -.605. 
 Questions (21, 23, 27, 33, and 35) were run independently with ANCOVA and  
question 27 - Politicians/political leaders who favor one group or special interest 
group over another are unethical, produced the only significant difference 
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between elected officials and union-building trades (-.469*) with a Cohen’s d -
.520,and elected officials and business professionals at (-.440*) with a Cohen’s d 
of -.437. The ANCOVA contrast model indicated, F(4, 465) = 2.32, p = .055, 
with a partial eta squared of .020. 
The next section reports the results of support H5 hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5 
H5: Political leaders will perceive their level of trust and ethics higher than the 
various stakeholders who will perceive those same qualities (partially supported). 
 The next section will address the summary of the significant findings for the five 
exploratory hypotheses. 
Summary of the Findings 
Summary Tables for the five hypotheses are reported indicating the questions, 
statistical technique, effect size, and if hypothesis was supported or partially supported. 
Only the significant differences mean differences between elected officials and other 
stakeholder groups are reported. All significant results are reported in this section. 
Additional ANCOVA tables are illustrated in Appendixes B-G. 
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Table 27 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1A 
 
Hypothesis 1a Statistical 
technique 
Significant means 
differences  or % 
differences 
between groups  
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
Supported/Partially 
Supported 
Question 60 –   
% of elected 
leader’s acting 
ethically 
Chi-square (.063) 
no independence 
between groups 
% response by 
group: 
Gov emp. (75.26) 
Elect off. (80.22) 
Union-Bt. (67.23) 
Bus  prof  (72.38) 
College st. (68.09) 
Cannot be run on 
Chi-square 
Partially Supported 
Question 60  
Part 2- % of 
elected leader 
acting unethically 
 
Chi-square (.088) 
No independence 
between groups 
% response by 
group: 
Gov emp  (24.57) 
Elect off   (19.78) 
Union-Bt  (30.36) 
Bus  prof  (27.33) 
College st. (31.52) 
Cannot be run on 
Chi-square 
Partially Supported 
 
 
 
*ANOVA was run 
on all questions 
and there were 
significant 
findings, however, 
when ANCOVA 
was run, there 
were no significant 
differences, 
meaning political 
party affiliation 
overwhelmed the 
ANOVA results. 
  ANOVA results 
partially supported, 
ANCOVA results 
not supported. 
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Table 28 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1B 
 
Hypothesis 1B Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d - Note: 
Cohen’s d effect 
size (.2 small, .5 
medium, .8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
Supported 
Question  21: 
Most pol/pl’s who 
betray the public 
trust would lie to 
conceal their 
wrong doing. 
ANCOVA Union-building 
trades (-.401*) 
Bus prof (-.449*)  
 
-.387  
-.435 
Partial eta squared 
(.019) 
Partially Supported 
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Table 29 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1C 
 
Hypothesis 1c Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 24: 
Pol/pl who seek 
their own interests 
over citizens I 
consider corrupt. 
 
ANCOVA Unions     (-.547*) 
Business  (-.406*) 
College st.(-.524*) 
-.459 
-.335 
-415 
Partial eta squared 
.020 
Partially supported 
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Table 30 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1D 
 
Hypothesis 1d Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 39: 
Questions of what 
is ethical for 
thePol/pl can 
never be resolved 
since what is 
ethical is up to the 
individual. 
ANCOVA College st.(-.457*) -.312 
Partial eta squared 
.027 
Partially supported 
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Table 31 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 1E 
 
Hypothesis 1e Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 45: 
I am satisfied with 
the level of 
communications 
with my pol/pl. 
ANCOVA College st.(.789*) .537 
Partial eta squared 
.029 
Partially supported 
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Table 32 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2A 
 
Hypothesis 2a Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
age groups with 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl) 
removed. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 42: 
For me a pol/pl’s 
ethical behavior is 
critical factor in 
voting for them. 
 
 
 
ANCOVA 18-24 and 55 & 
above  
(-.279*) 
 
 
 
(.309) 
 
Partial eta squared 
(.013) 
Partially supported 
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Table 33 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2B 
 
Hypothesis 2b Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
age groups with 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl) 
removed. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 28: 
I consider a pol/pl 
who sacrifices 
his/her own 
political interest 
over those of the 
electorate 
(citizens) to be 
highly ethical. 
 
ANCOVA 45-54 and 55-above  
(-.511*) 
 
(-.414) 
Partial eta squared 
(.018) 
Partially supported 
Question 35: 
I believe that the 
most important 
concern for a 
pol/pl is making 
sure their personal 
interests are met 
even if it means 
bending or 
breaking the rules. 
ANCOVA 25-54 &55-above 
(-.536*) 
 
 
(-.313) 
Partial eta squared 
(.013) 
Partially supported 
Question 41: 
A pol/pl must the 
interests of society 
over his/her own 
political self-
interest. 
 
ANCOVA 
 
25-54 &55-above 
(-.2.77*) 
 
 
(.486) 
Partial eta squared 
(.015) 
 
Partially supported 
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Table 34 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2C 
 
Hypothesis 2c Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
age groups with 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl) 
removed. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 72: 
(linear 
combination of 
questions 22,23, 
and 24) 
 
 
ANCOVA 18-24 - 55-above  
(-1.069*) 
25-54-55-above 
(-.865) 
 
(.394) 
 
(.319) 
Partial eta squared 
(.022) 
Partially supported 
Question 23: 
I believe that 
pol/pl who are 
self-promoting are 
unethical. 
 
ANCOVA 18-24 -55-above 
(.372*) 
 
 
(.302) 
Partial eta squared 
(.011) 
Partially supported 
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Table 35 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2D 
 
Hypothesis 2d Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
age groups with 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl) 
removed. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 73: 
Is a linear 
combination of 
questions  38, 39, 
40. 
ANCOVA 18-24 – 45-54 
(1.034*) 
18-24 -55-above 
(1.253*) 
25-44-55-above  
(1.024*) 
 
(.299) 
 
(.363) 
 
(.297) 
Partial eta squared 
(.022) 
Partially supported 
Question 38: 
What is ethical 
varies from how 
one views the 
situation 
ANCOVA 25-44 -55-above 
(436*) 
 
 
(.306) 
Partial eta squared 
(.015) 
Partially supported 
Question 39: 
Questions of what 
is ethical for the 
pol/pl can never be 
resolved since 
what is ethical is 
up to the 
individual. 
 
ANCOVA 
 
18-24 -55-above 
(.475*) 
 
(.321) 
Partial eta squared 
(.016) 
 
 
Partially supported 
Question 40: 
Whether a pol. 
behavior is judged 
to be moral or 
immoral depends 
on circumstances 
of the situation. 
ANCOVA 18-24 – 55-above 
(.475*) 
25-44 – 55-above 
(.410*) 
 
(.331) 
 
(.286) 
 
Partial eta squared 
(.018) 
Partially supported 
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Table 36 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 2E 
 
Hypothesis 2e Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
age groups with 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl) 
removed. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 45: 
I am satisfied with 
the level of 
communications 
with my pol/pl. 
 
 
 
ANCOVA 18-24 – 45-54  
(.457*) 
 
(-.300) 
Partial eta squared 
(.013) 
Partially supported 
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Table 37 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3A 
 
Hypothesis 3a Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl’s) 
and all other 
stakeholder groups 
combined. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d  
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 70: 
Linear 
combinations of 
questions 1,4,9,18, 
19, and 20)  
Independent- 
samples t-test. 
(-.4901*) 
t (469) = -6.575, p 
=.001. 
(-.423) 
 
Supported 
Question 1: 
Most pol/pl really 
try to do the right 
thing for the 
citizens 
(electorate). 
 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(-.835*) 
t (469) = -5.180, p 
=.001. 
(-.724) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 4: 
Pol/pl are more 
honest than the 
public gives them 
credit for. 
 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(-1.164*) 
t (469) = -8.203, p 
=.001. 
 
(-1.029) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 9: 
Most Pol/pl are 
dishonest. 
 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
(-1.069*) 
t (469) = -5.958 
p=.001. 
(-.769) Supported 
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Table 38 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3B 
 
Hypothesis 3b Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl’s) 
and all other 
stakeholder groups 
combined. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 18: 
Pol/pl generally 
can be trusted 
Independent- 
samples t-test. 
(-.604*) 
t (469) =-4.510 p 
=.001. 
(-.551) 
 
Supported 
Question 35: 
I believe that the 
most important 
concern for a 
POL/pl is making 
sure their personal 
interests are met 
even if it means 
breaking the rules. 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.572*) 
t(469) = 2.534, p = 
.012. 
(.355) 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
297 
 
Table 39 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3C 
 
Hypothesis 3c Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl’s) 
and all other 
stakeholder groups 
combined. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 72: 
Question 72 is a 
linear combination 
of questions 22, 
23, and 24. 
Independent- 
samples t-test. 
(.990*) 
t (469) =2.623 p 
=.009. 
(-.323) 
 
Supported 
Question 22: 
I believe pol/pl 
who are unethical 
are also corrupt.  
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.360*) 
t (469) = 2.343, p 
=.020. 
(-.303) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 34: 
For a pol/pl to 
remain 
competitive in the 
field of politics, 
they will 
sometimes have to 
disregard their 
personal ethics.  
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.621*) 
 
t(469) = 3.342,  
 
p =.001. 
(-.462) 
 
 
Supported 
 
 Note: There were no significant findings for Hypothesis 3d. 
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Table 40 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 3E 
 
Hypothesis 3e  Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
politicians/political 
leaders (pol/pl’s) 
and all other 
stakeholder groups 
combined. 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
 
 
Supported/Partially 
supported 
Question 74: 
Question 72 is a 
linear combination 
of questions 19, 
20, 45, and 46. 
Independent- 
samples t-test. 
(.2.720*) 
t(114.791) = -.668, 
p = .001. 
(-.760) 
 
Supported 
Question 19: 
I believe that 
pol/pl  generally 
keep their 
promises.  
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(-.705*) 
t(97.324) = -5.279, 
p =.001. 
(.703) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 20: 
Pol/pl generally 
understand my 
needs.  
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.-.524*) 
t(95.876) = -3.796, 
p =.001. 
(.478) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 45: 
I am satisfied with 
the level of 
communications 
with my pol/pl. 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.-.510*) 
t(111.376) = -
3.366,  p =.001. 
(.389) 
 
 
Supported 
Question 45: 
I am satisfied with 
the level of 
communications 
with my pol/pl. 
Independent- 
samples t-test 
 
(.-.510*) 
t(111.376) = -
6.632, p =.001. 
(.761) 
 
 
Supported 
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Table 41 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
Supported/Partially 
Supported 
Question  45: 
I am satisfied with 
the level of 
communications 
with my pol/pl 
ANCOVA College students 
(.789*)  
 
(.537) 
Partial eta squared 
(.029) 
Partially Supported 
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Table 42 
Summary of Major Significant Findings for Hypothesis 5 
 
Hypothesis 5 Statistical 
technique 
*Significant means 
differences at the 
.05 level between 
elected officials 
and other groups 
Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
Note: Cohen’s d 
effect size (.2 
small, .5 medium, 
.8 large) 
Partial eta squared 
 
Supported/Partially 
Supported 
Question  27: 
Most pol/pl who 
betray the public 
trust would lie to 
conceal their 
wrong doing. 
ANCOVA Unions building 
trades 
(-.469*) 
Business 
professionals 
(-.440*) 
 
 
(-.520) 
 
 
(-.437) 
Partial eta squared 
(.020) 
Partially Supported 
 
The next section will discuss the conclusions of this research study. All results are 
reported in the previous section in the summary of findings. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to expand the understanding of the role 
stakeholder’s perceptions play in how the view elected officials behavior. Five 
stakeholder groups rated their perceptions of elected officials. These perceptions were 
then compared to how elected officials rated themselves. Since this was an exploratory 
study, a purposeful sample of stakeholder groups was conducted. Stakeholder groups 
were selected to represent a wide diversity of the population. Thus, stakeholder groups 
were chosen as representative samples of the general electorate. These included 
government employees, elected- officials, union-building trades, business-professionals, 
and college students. 
The most significant contribution provided of the current study is its evidence that 
the concept of perceptions played a critical role in how different stakeholders viewed the 
behavior of the elected official. The study originated with the interests in the concepts of 
the stakeholder and agency theories. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that, “all 
persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain 
benefits and that there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over 
another” (p. 68). Freeman (1984) defined stakeholders as “any group or individuals who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organizations objectives” (p. 46). The 
researcher postulated these theories could be applied to the government and electorate. 
Therefore, the stakeholder groups chosen for this study have different interests in the 
achievement of governance strategies. However, in the political realm, this researcher 
argued that there is a disparity between how relevant or special interest groups are treated 
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compared to the ordinary citizen. This study looked at how different stakeholder groups 
perceived elected official’s behaviors.  
The second major theoretical influence looked at how agency theory affected the 
electorate. Agency theory is the relationship between a principal (owners) and the agent 
of the principal (organizational managers). One interesting benefit produced from this 
study is the potential for future research, namely, a possible inversion of agency theory. 
This occurs when the agent acts to takes on the duties of the principal. In the political 
context, this occurs when an elected official (agent of the electorate) takes on the duties 
of the principal (electorate). When an elected official takes on the role of the principal, 
this inversion occurs. 
The media is replete with stories of unethical and corrupt politicians. For 
example, former Illinois governor Jim Edgar stated, “Our place, in terms of being 
considered one of or the most corrupt state in terms of politics, is pretty secure” (Edgar, 
2010, p. A1). To restate, this research study was an exploratory study looking at how 
relevant stakeholder groups (government employees, union-building trades, elected 
officials, business-professionals, and college students) viewed ethical and unethical 
behavior of elected officials. The researcher reviewed the extant literature for existing 
scales. The investigator identified two research instruments, but they lacked the necessary 
questions to test the hypotheses for this study. Therefore, the researcher developed an 
original survey instrument. The research instrument was developed and refined by 
generating questions from the literature, focus groups, expert panel groups, and elected 
officials. Once the survey instrument was finalized, the examiner conducted preliminary 
reliability and validity tests.  
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Construct validity was verified by the expert panel group and various elected officials 
who reviewed the questions to determine if the questions were measuring what they were 
intended to measure, and they confirmed the questions appeared to be valid.  
 To review, the researcher administered the survey instrument to the various 
stakeholder groups. Here are the most significant findings. 
First, the 46 Likert scales showed that all stakeholder groups had different group 
means than the elected official. As described in the above narrative, some were 
significantly different and some were not. The group means indicated that stakeholder 
groups perceived elected officials differently than elected officials perceived themselves 
in this study. In most cases, the elected officials rated themselves or viewed themselves 
more favorably than other stakeholder groups perceived them. 
Second, all of the exploratory hypotheses were at least partially supported with 
the exception of hypothesis 3d, which had no significant differences between groups 
when ANCOVA was applied. There were significant mean differences at the .05 level for 
all exploratory hypotheses; however, upon closer inspection the researcher ascertained 
that political affiliation could confound the results. Therefore, ANCOVA was conducted 
on all of the exploratory hypotheses controlling for political party affiliation. 
Subsequently, as outlined in Tables 27 - 42, the results for the differences between groups 
were significantly reduced. Political party affiliation was a major factor in the group 
mean differences between all stakeholder groups. 
Third, the researcher was interested in the level of cynicism among stakeholder 
groups. Due to the constant media barrage of unethical and corrupt elected officials being 
indicted and going to prison, a cynicism index was developed as a sub-set of the 46 
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Likert questions. All stakeholder groups exhibited higher than average levels of cynicism, 
assuming a midpoint of 3.5 on a 6 point Likert scale. The overall group mean 
(combination of all stakeholder groups was 4.006, which was an unweighted mean. The 
lowest reported cynicism group was elected officials at 3.636. The highest was union-
building trades at 4.322. Due to relatively high levels of cynicism of all groups, to find 
significant mean differences between stakeholder groups became more difficult. 
However, there were still significant differences between stakeholder groups. 
Fourth, the level of satisfaction for communication between stakeholder groups 
and elected officials only produced one significant group finding that of the college 
students. The remaining other groups were not satisfied with the level of communications 
with their elected officials. This perhaps indicates that elected officials have considerable 
work to do to improve their communications with various stakeholder groups. 
This study revealed some interesting and unexpected findings, for example, the 
patterns of perceptions of unethical behaviors of the elected official. High levels of 
stakeholder cynicism along with the perception that some elected officials may bend or 
break the law is interesting. The two constructs of cynicism and elected official’s 
personal self-interest seemed related. The high level of distrust by all stakeholder groups 
of their elected officials contributed significantly to this phenomenon. In particular, this 
exploratory study affirms the importance of studying stakeholder’s beliefs about elected 
officials ethical behavior, communication, and trust.  
Additionally, a compelling finding of this study was the results of how 
stakeholders rated various occupations in terms of being ethical, (on a scale of 1-7 with 1- 
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being not ethical at all and 7 - highly ethical). The professions ranking from highest to 
lowest in terms of being rated as ethical are displayed in Table 4.88. 
Table 43 
Rankings of Professionals 
 
Occupation 
 
Rankings 
 
 
Nurses 
 
5.58 
Clergy 5.50 
Teachers 5.42 
Doctors (Medical) 5.28 
Non-Profit Executives 5.22 
Small Business Owners 4.86 
CPA’s 4.81 
College Students 4.51 
Government Employees 4.40 
Labor (Unions) 3.96 
Elected Officials 3.62 
News Media 3.44 
Car Dealers 3.00 
 
*7=Highly ethical, 1=Not ethical at all 
Elected officials are ranked just above news media professionals and car dealers in terms 
of being considered ethical. While the relative ranking of car salesman is no surprise, the 
media’s low ranking is a disturbing finding, given the fact that in a democracy we rely on 
the media to be the watchdog of government. 
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Implications and Recommendations 
 A significant result of this research study was the development of a new survey 
instrument to measure the perceptions of how various stakeholder groups view the 
behavior of elected officials. There were no satisfactory existing research instruments 
available to measure the perceptions of stakeholders of elected official’s behavior. To the 
extent this instrument is valid and reliable; there are significant contributions to the study 
of ethics and perceptions of elected official’s behavior. Going into this study, the 
researcher postulated there would be big differences between stakeholder groups, 
however, (government employees, elected-officials, union-building trades, business-
professionals, and college students) was more aligned than initially postulated. However, 
there were significant differences between stakeholder groups and elected officials.
 Political leaders frequently publically announce their intention to work for the 
greater good of the public. For example, former U.S. Congresswoman Debbie Halvorson 
from Illinois publically stated, “Congress should be beyond approach when it comes to 
ethics and accountability” (D. Halvorson, personal communication, March 4, 2010). 
Ethics and accountability are central to good governance, and this research study 
explored the various perceptions of stakeholder groups regarding elected officials 
behavior. Interestingly, elected officials who took the same survey perceived or rated 
themselves as being more accessible and more ethical than various stakeholder groups 
perceived them to be in the same survey. While not totally unexpected, this is one of the 
first empirical tests of this type of disconnect.  
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There was a disparity between how the elected officials perceived themselves versus how 
various stakeholders viewed them. Given these findings, elected officials have work to do 
to increase how they are perceived regarding ethics and accountability. 
 This research study was grounded on the concepts of stakeholder and agency 
theory. However, as previously stated above, some initial conclusions can be drawn 
regarding agency theory and the possible inversion. Nevertheless, more theoretical-
empirical work needs to be conducted regarding the inversion of agency theory. It 
appears that elected officials, who are the agents of the principals (electorate), act or 
invert this agency relationship, good governance is affected. An example of an elected 
official inverting the agency relationship was Elected Official A, an Illinois legislator, 
who explained his position as state representative: 
I am elected to represent those who voted for me. As such, and as a policy expert, 
I tell my constituents what I need to tell them, as I am the expert. They have 
elected me to do what is right for them as I know more than they do. (Elected 
Official A, personal communication, February, 5, 2010) 
This statement represents a possible inversion of agency theory. The elected official acted 
as if he owned [italics added] the office and those who elected him worked for him. The 
severe consequences of inverting agency theory are illustrated by the indictment of 
former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich. He was indicted for trying to sell a US senate 
seat. Former governor Blagojevich, who is the agent for the people that elected him, 
seems to have inverted the relationship. 
 On the other hand, many elected officials to understand their position. Elected 
Official B stated, “The people of my district sent me to Springfield to fight on their 
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behalf for more open government that is accountable to the taxpayer , and that is what I 
am trying to do” (Elected Official B, personal communication, May 5, 2010). Elected 
Official C stated, “We realize always, that is about them keeping their power” (Elected 
Official C, personal communication, June 7, 2010). Finally, Elected Official D stated, 
“Politics and governing should not be about fear and anger, it should be about what is 
right for the voters” (Elected Official D, personal communication, June 8, 2010). 
 It is unlikely that most elected officials ever realize that they are trying to invert 
the agency relationship. However, when they think they own government resources for 
private-personal gain or implement policies that they think their constituents want 
without actually asking them good governance is comprised. The implications of this 
type of agency inversion by elected officials can have severe consequences for the 
electorate. Elected officials who invert the agency relationship are more prone to 
unethical, corrupt, and corrupt-illegal behavior as indentified in the CUB model. Future 
confirming research on this construct of inversion of agency theory needs to be done. 
 As with all research, there are limitations. One potential limitation of this study 
was the length of the survey. Even though it took participants roughly fifteen to twenty 
minutes to complete, a more appropriate test should have been completed within ten 
minutes. Future research utilizing this survey instrument could be scaled down through 
factor analysis. Potentially, once the scales have been factored analyzed, the scales can be 
substantially reduced in number. 
 Another potential limitation of this study was the purposeful sampling techniques 
utilized in this exploratory research study. Stakeholder groups were chosen based on their 
participation in the governing process. Even though students seemed less engaged and 
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informed they are the future electorate. These stakeholder groups (government 
employees, elected officials, union-building trades, business- professionals, and college 
students) were selected to be a representative sample of stakeholder groups that influence 
governance policies. However, these groups might not be representational of all voters in 
Illinois. Future research would benefit from a more random sample of the electorate. The 
results would be more generalizable to the population rather than to specific stakeholder 
groups that were used in this study. 
Final Thoughts 
 Future research could hone in on certain aspects of ways in which elected officials 
could communicate better with the electorate. The researcher found that the concepts of 
ethics have different connotations to those surveyed. A more delineated and simplified 
scale on ethics, ethical behavior, and trust needs to be constructed to reduce ambiguous 
meanings of the items being measured. In addition, future research would focus on 
surveying other states such as Florida, Iowa, California, New York, Kansas, and New 
Jersey, (with the same type of stakeholder groups) and see if the results are similar or 
different to this study conducted in Illinois. 
  In conclusion, Rose-Ackerman (1999) described corruption as a relationship 
between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant 
actors; in other cases private actors are the most powerful ones. This exploratory research 
study set out to determine the nature of perceptions regarding ethical behavior and 
corruption for elected officials.  
310 
 
Rose-Ackerman argued that high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and 
lead to ineffective government. She additionally postulated that corruption is not just an 
economic problem, but it is intertwined with politics.  
 The initial conclusion about a new construct, the inversion of agency theory was 
developed. The development of a new survey instrument to study the perceptions of 
stakeholders regarding elected officials behaviors was an important contribution, finally, 
understanding the complex nature of perceptions as it relates to ethics and good 
governance was also delineated. The goal of understanding corruption is not to remove 
the bad apples and punish them; rather it is establishing credibility by punishing highly 
corrupt officials (Rose-Ackerman). Additionally, Kass (2010) illustrated this concept of 
good governance by stating: 
Perhaps you have heard of it. Invented by my noble ancestors, the Greeks, it is a 
system of government by which free people debate ideas sometimes vigorously, 
sometimes rudely. They elect leaders who are expected to give reasons for their 
actions. The leaders must form a consensus before they can spend the people’s 
money. Yes, it is indeed a weird system of governance, relatively unknown in 
these parts. It is called democracy. (p. 2)  
 In particular, this study is the first attempt to comprehend how the electorate 
perceived ethical and unethical behaviors of elected officials. Future structural reforms 
need to implemented to reduce the unethical and illegal behavior of elected officials. 
Recently, Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley announced his retirement from office for the 
last 20 years stated, “This office doesn’t belong to me, this office belongs to the people of 
our city” (Kass, 2010). Now if only our politicians would believe this.  
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APPENDIX A 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Reliability Statistics Questions 1 - 46 
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Cronbach's alpha measures how well a set of items (or variables) measures a 
single unidimensional latent construct. When data have a multidimensional structure, 
Cronbach's alpha will usually be low. Technically speaking, Cronbach's alpha is not a 
statistical test - it is a coefficient of reliability or consistency For the entire likert scale (46 
questions)  Anything over .6 is considered relevant, but most researchers like to have .7 
and above (UCLA Academic Technology Services-www.ats.ucla.edu). Chronbach’s 
Alpha Summary Table 42 is described in the next section. 
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Table 44 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Reliability Statistics Questions 1-46 
 
Question 
 
Cronbach’s Apha 
 
No. of Items 
1-46 
.677 46 
Question 70 (ethical behavior) 
Linear combination 
1, 4, 9, 18, 19, 20 
.876 6 
Question 71(trust) 
Linear combination 
1,2,4,9,18,19,20 
.894 6 
Question 72 (unethical/corrupt 
behavior 
Linear combination 
22,23,24 
.670 3 
Question 73 (ethical 
relativism) 
Linear combination 
38, 39 40 
.723 3 
Question 74 (communication) 
Linear combination 
19, 20, 45, 46 
.793 4 
Question 75 (ethical behavior 
and voting for them 
Linear combination 
37, 41, 42 
 
.706 
 
3 
Question 90 (unethical 
behavior and voting for them) 
Linear combination 
21, 23, 27, 33, 25 
.602 5 
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APPENDIX B 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 70 
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Table 45 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 70  
 
Dependent Variable: Q70ETH_BEH ETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares               df Mean Square F          Sig. 
Corrected Model 1190.410a 5 238.082 7.502 .000 
Intercept 32990.968 1 32990.968 1039.535 .000 
OCCUPATION * 
POL_AFFIL 
1190.410 5 238.082 7.502 .000 
Error 14757.361 465 31.736   
Total 225300.000 471    
Corrected Total 15947.771 470    
a. R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .065) 
Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test 
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APPENDIX C 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 71 
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Table 46 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 71  
 
Dependent Variable:Q71_TRUST TRUST 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares               df     Mean Square         F         Sig. 
Corrected Model 1733.619a 5 346.724 7.973 .000 
Intercept 44114.232 1 44114.232 1014.382 .000 
OCCUPATION * 
POL_AFFIL 
1733.619 5 346.724 7.973 .000 
Error 20222.280 465 43.489   
Total 307252.000 471    
Corrected Total 21955.898 470    
a. R Squared = .079 (Adjusted R Squared = .069) 
Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test 
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APPENDIX D 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 72 
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Table 47 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 72 
 
Dependent Variable:Q72_UNETHCO UNETHICAL-CORRUPT 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares              df Mean Square F           Sig. 
Corrected Model 118.240a 5 23.648 2.992 .011 
Intercept 12458.681 1 12458.681 1576.328 .000 
OCCUPATION * 
POL_AFFIL 
118.240 5 23.648 2.992 .011 
Error 3675.178 465 7.904   
Total 81044.000 471    
Corrected Total 3793.418 470    
a. R Squared = .031 (Adjusted R Squared = .021) 
Note: There was an interaction and cannot proceed with the post hoc test 
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APPENDIX E 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73 
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Table 48 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:Q73_ETHREL ETHICAL RELATIVISM 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares               df Mean Square F           Sig. 
Corrected Model 100.556a 5 20.111 1.674 .139 
Intercept 9075.842 1 9075.842 755.469 .000 
OCCUPATION * 
POL_AFFIL 
100.556 5 20.111 1.674 .139 
Error 5586.285 465 12.014   
Total 65146.000 471    
Corrected Total 5686.841 470    
a. R Squared = .018 (Adjusted R Squared = .007) 
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Table 48 (continued). 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 73 
 
Dependent Variable:Q73_ETHREL ETHICAL RELATIVISM 
(I) 
OCCUPATION 
(J) OCCUPATION 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig.
a
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Difference
a
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Elected official 
 
 
Government 
employee 
-.283 .536 .597 -1.336 .769 
Union-building 
trades 
-.663 .556 .234 -1.756 .430 
Business 
professional 
-.001 .542 .998 -1.067 1.064 
College student -1.084* .530 .042 -2.126 -.042 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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APPENDIX F 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 80 
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Table 49 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 80 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:q80_comm q80_linear combination of 26, 36, 45 ,46 
 
Source 
Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 171.848a 5 34.370 4.106 .001 .042 
Intercept 22158.868 1 22158.868 2647.164 .000 .851 
OCCUPATION * POL_AFFIL 171.848 5 34.370 4.106 .001 .042 
Error 3892.420 465 8.371    
Total 146894.000 471     
Corrected Total 4064.268 470     
a. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .032) 
Note: interaction cannot proceed with post hoc test 
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APPENDIX G 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 90 
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Table 50 
 
ANCOVA Test for Linear Combination Question 90 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:q90_cynicisism q_90 revised cynicism scale 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square      F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 385.240a 5 77.048 4.962 .000 .051 
Intercept 29050.379 1 29050.379 1870.855 .000 .801 
OCCUPATION * 
POL_AFFIL 
385.240 5 77.048 4.962 .000 .051 
Error 7220.455 465 15.528    
Total 196486.000 471     
Corrected Total 7605.694 470     
a. R Squared = .051 (Adjusted R Squared = .040) 
Note: interaction cannot proceed with post hoc test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
